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For my parents 
who have always believed in me.
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A b st r a c t
This thesis deals with the most prominent accounts of analyzing singular 
event causation by employing counterfactuals or counterfactual 
information. The classic counterfactual account of token event causation 
was proposed in 1973 by the philosopher David Lewis and ruled that an 
event c is a cause of event e, if and only if there is a chain of 
counterfactually dependent events between c and e. Apart from facing 
conceptual problems due to its metaphysical claim to analyze causation 
'as such' and to reduce it to counterfactual dependency, this account also 
produced implausible results: first, it stipulated that token causation is a 
transitive relation, and second, it could not analyze situations in which an 
effect is over-determined by various causes, either symmetrically or by 
one cause pre-empting another one.
In 2000, almost three decades later, Judea Pearl, formerly an engineer, 
formulated a new and highly influential theory of modeling causal 
dependencies using counterfactual information that, as I argue, neither 
faces these conceptual problems nor produces these undesired results. 
This formal theory analyzes causal relationships between token events in a 
given situation in two steps: first, a causal model describing the relevant 
mechanisms at work in the situation is constructed, and second, causal 
relationships between the events featured in the situation are determined 
relatively to this model. Pearl's definition of causation according to a 
model is technically complicated, but its underlying rationale is that the 
decisive property of a cause is to sustain its effect via a certain causal 
process against possible contingencies, this notion of sustenance 
embodying an aspect of production and an aspect of counterfactual 
dependency.
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This theory of Pearl's was received with great interest in the philosophical 
community, most importantly by Christopher Hitchcock and James 
Woodward, who tried to simplify this account while preserving the basic 
intuition that a cause is linked to its effect by a causal process, in essence a 
concatenation of the mechanisms at work in the situation, just defining a 
causal process in a formally simpler way.
I describe and employ this simplified account by Hitchcock and 
Woodward as a graphic introduction to Pearl's theory, because the same 
basic notions, like the one of a causal model, are defined in a formally 
more accessible way and the basic problems, like the generation of a 
causal model, become obvious. I mainly discuss Hitchcock's account, since 
this is the earlier one, since it is more elaborate, and mainly since it is 
conceptually in need of clarification. W oodward's account is in essence 
equivalent to Hitchcock's, given a slightly changed terminology.
The core of my thesis consists of a comparison of Pearl's theory with 
Hitchcock's account. I present four paradigmatic examples, three of which 
are judged differently by these two theories. In each of these three 
examples our causal intuition is in accord with the judgment delivered by 
Pearl's account but contradicts the verdict of Hitchcock's. I draw the 
conclusion that Hitchcock's project of simplifying Pearl's theory fails in 
the second step of causal analysis, i.e. in defining causation according to a 
given model.
Building on the lessons learned from this comparison, I offer a slight 
generalization of Pearl's definition of token causation according to a 
model, since Pearl's original account has the shortcoming that token 
causes cannot be exogenous in a model.
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In t r o d u c t io n  a n d  O v er v iew
In 1973, in the article 'Causation', David Lewis proposed his classic 
counterfactual account of token causation that became one of the most 
debated views in the philosophical study of causation in the last decades.1 
In essence, this account ruled that for two occurring events c and e in a 
situation S, event c actually causes event e if and only if there is a chain of 
events d i , . . . , d n ,  such that d\ is causally dependent on c, d i  is causally 
dependent on d i, ... , and e is causally dependent on dn. In this context, 
event d\+i is causally dependent on event di if and only if the following 
counterfactual holds: 'If d\ had not occurred, then di+i would not have 
occurred.' Lewis gave an elaborate semantics of so-called possible worlds 
in order to account for the truth of these counterfactuals, and he even 
championed the highly controversial thesis that these possible worlds 
were real in a physical sense.2 However, this claim of Lewis's to account 
for a metaphysical notion of causation and moreover to reduce this notion 
to counterfactual dependency, was more commonly perceived as a 
problem for this account rather than as an advantage.
The striking response that Lewis's account received was in my view due 
to its main feature, namely simply to describe causal relationships with 
the aid of counterfactuals. For, this mode of representation of token-level 
causal relationships offers benefits in various ways. On the one hand, 
formally, it is a remarkably simple way to describe causal dependencies. 
On the other hand, this mode of representation reflects at least part of our 
causal intuition, which often regards an event as causally responsible for 
another if they are counterfactually dependent. In my view, though,
1 Cf. [dL 73].
2 Cf. Lewis's book Counterfactuals, [dL 73b].
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the main benefit of a counterfactual description of causal relationships 
lies in the fact that such a description offers information that could 
theoretically be exploited for forecasting and also of manipulating 
described events. It is this possibility of offering knowledge beyond a 
mere descriptive causal explanation, i.e. knowledge that can be applied in 
predictions and control, which makes a counter-factual description of 
causal relationships so interesting.3
Unfortunately, Lewis's account did not only have these rather abstract 
features, which it moreover shares with every counterfactual account on a 
foundational level and which make all of these accounts highly desirable. 
Lewis's account also produced implausible results. The following are in 
my view the basic three problems that have become apparent in the 
application of Lewis's account: First, Lewis's account stipulates that token 
causation is a transitive relation. Second, Lewis's account cannot analyze 
situations in which an effect is symmetrically over-determined by various 
causes. Third, Lewis's account can also not analyze situations in which an 
effect is asymmetrically over-determined by one cause pre-empting 
another one.
Failure of Lewis's classic account in these three points has been widely 
recognized in the philosophical community.4 In his recent paper 'Two 
Concepts of Causation', Ned Hall attributed this failure partly to the fact 
that Lewis's account does not completely capture our pre-theoretic 
intuition about token causation.5 According to Hall, token-level causal 
relationships have at least two aspects in our intuition, a production 
aspect, according to which a cause c has to bring about its effect e, and a 
dependence aspect, according to which e counterfactually depends on c. 
Lewis's account obviously only captures the latter aspect.
3 Cf. also [jP 00] for further remarks on the applicability of counterfactual information for 
the purpose of prediction and control.
4.Cf. for example the collection of articles in [CHP 04].
5 Cf. [nH 04].
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In 2000, Lewis reacted to these shortcomings of his classic account by 
gravely modifying it in his new article "Causation as Influence'.6 This new 
account still ruled that event c causes event e in a situation S if and only if 
there is a chain of events d^,...,dn, linking c and e. However, the relation 
that had to hold between the links d\ and di+i of this chain was no longer 
counterfactual dependence, but the new relation of influence. In essence, 
d\ influences di+i according to Lewis if and only if there is a range of 
alterations (di, di",...) of di and a range of alterations (di+i', di+i",...) of di+i 
such that the following counterfactuals hold: 'If di had occurred, then di+i 
would have occurred.', 'If di' had occurred, then di+i" would have 
occurred.', ... . This introduction of event-alterations into Lewis's new 
account was an improvement. However, Lewis's new account still 
inherited the shortcoming of its predecessor by stipulating transitivity of 
causation.7 Moreover, it also introduced new problems, like counter­
intuitively analyzing events that were intuitively spurious causes as 
proper causes.8 All in all, this new account was not the solution hoped for. 
In my view, help came from another direction.
Also in 2000, in his book Causality -  Models, Reasoning, and Inference,9 Judea 
Pearl formulated a new counterfactual account of both the type-level and 
the token-level causation. Pearl started his study of causation from an 
empiricist tradition. Coming from an engineering background and not 
being a philosopher by training, Pearl mainly conducted research in 
probability theory and artificial intelligence and had the conviction that 
causal relationships were in essence useful abbreviations of probabilistic 
patterns. Pearl's main work in this field was his book Probabilistic 
Reasoning in Intelligent Systems.™
8 Cf. [dL 00].
7 Cf. for example [jC 00].
8 Cf. for example [iK 01].
9Cf. [jP 00].
10 Cf. [jP 88],
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Since then, Pearl's view of causation has changed dramatically. In his book 
Causality, Pearl regards the probabilistic relationships as mere surface 
phenomena and takes the causal relationships as the fundamental 
building blocks both of physical reality and of our understanding of this 
reality.11 Causality is now commonly regarded as a milestone in the study 
of causation, and without a doubt it has been more influential in the 
philosophical community than any other of Pearl's publications.
In this thesis, I will only deal with the token-level account of causal 
modeling that Pearl offers in Causality. I will argue that this account 
avoids Lewis's conceptual problem of attempting to analyze a meta­
physical notion of causation. Furthermore, I will claim that there 
is evidence that this account of Pearl's also surmounts the three basic 
problems of Lewis's counterfactual account: symmetric and asymmetric 
over-determination and the stipulation of a transitivity of token 
causation.
Pearl's formal account analyzes causal relationships between token events 
in a given situation S in two steps: First, a causal model M describing the 
relevant mechanisms at work in situation S is constructed. Second, causal 
relationships between the events featured in situation S are determined 
relative to this model M. I will argue that this strategy of Pearl's to divide 
the problem of causal analysis into two sub-problems -  first the generation 
of an appropriate model M  formalizing situation S, and second the 
definition of causation in S relativized to such a model M  -  offers many 
advantages over the classic undivided approach: On the one hand this 
division trivially avoids striving to account for a metaphysical notion of 
causation that is independent of our description. On the other, it also 
allows accounting for the fact that there are various descriptions of the 
same situation S that are all equally justified, depending on which events, 
and also on which kinds of events, in S are of interest for us.
11 Cf. the introduction of [jP 00].
12
Pearl's definition of token causation according to a model is technically 
complicated, but its underlying rationale is that the decisive property of a 
cause is to sustain its effect via a certain causal process against possible 
contingencies. I will argue that this notion of sustenance, embodying both 
an aspect of production and an aspect of counterfactual dependency in 
Hall's terminology, is responsible for the success of Pearl's account of 
modeling token causation.
Pearl's account of modeling token causation was received with great 
interest in the philosophical community, most importantly by Christopher 
Hitchcock in his article 'The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in 
Equations and Graphs' and by James Woodward in his influential book 
Making Things Happen.12 In my understanding, both Hitchcock and 
Woodward tried to simplify Pearl's account while preserving its basic 
rationale: In a situation S a cause c is linked to its effect e by a causal 
process, which is in essence a concatenation of the mechanisms at work in 
S. In my view, Hitchcock and Woodward wanted to achieve this 
simplification by discarding Pearl's notion of sustenance in the 
formalization of a causal process. Instead, they opted for identifying a 
causal process in a situation S with a route in a causal model M of this 
situation.
12 Cf. [cH 01] and [jW 03].
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This thesis follows the leading question whether this simplification of 
Pearl's account by Hitchcock and Woodward succeeds. In answering this 
question I proceed in the following way:
The first chapter is intended to give a thorough clarification and corrective 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's account of token causation which he gives in 
"The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs' and is 
also intended to briefly touch on the account that Woodward sketches in 
Making Things Happen. As the title of Hitchcock's article already suggests, 
his main intention, apart from offering a simplification of Pearl's account, 
is to motivate that token causation is not a transitive relation in general. In 
contrast to this, Woodward merely intends to give a sketch of certain 
characteristics that a successful account of token causation has to fulfill. 
For the details of this sketch Woodward explicitly refers to Hitchcock.
My reason for focusing on Hitchcock's account of token causation in this 
chapter, apart from the fact that Woodward explicitly refers to it, is first 
that it is more detailed and second that it is in strong need of a conceptual 
clarification. The argumentation that I will offer in this chapter represents 
my attempt to reconstruct Hitchcock's rather involved original in the most 
charitable and unambiguous way in order to find out how his account 
really functions.
The only point in which my corrective reconstruction deviates from 
Hitchcock's original is the way in which I relativize his definition of 
definitions of token causation to a model M of the underlying situation S. 
In my view, such a relativization allows us to analyze situations S from 
various viewpoints, depending on which events, and also which kinds of 
events, in S are of interest for us.
14
Starting this way with a thorough clarification of Hitchcock's account also 
allows the introduction of the basic notions of a counterfactual account of 
causal modeling in a simple and illustrative way, so that this chapter also 
serves as a preparation to the formally more advanced subsequent chapter 
which deals with Pearl's influential approach in modeling token 
causation.
As already mentioned, both Hitchcock and Woodward formulated their 
accounts under the influence of Pearl's, and in my view their main 
intention was to simplify Pearl's formally rather elaborate work by finding 
simpler formal expressions of the basic rationale in Pearl's work: The 
understanding that first a token cause c and its effect £ in a situation S are 
linked by a causal process and second that such a process is in essence a 
concatenation of mechanisms at work in S.
I argue that Hitchcock formalizes a causal process between events c and e 
in a situation S by a route in a causal model M  of this situation. Following 
Pearl, Hitchcock implicitly differentiates two kinds of token causation. 
The first is actual causation which applies to cases in which an effect e is 
caused by a single event c. The second is a weakened version of token 
causation which I dub contributory causation and which is intended to 
cover cases of symmetric over-determination in addition to the ones just 
mentioned. I argue that there is evidence that my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's definitions of actual causation and of contributory causation 
can overcome the basic three problems of Lewis's counter-factual account 
-  symmetric and asymmetric over-determination and the intransitivity of 
actual causation.
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I round off this chapter by briefly discussing W oodward's account, which 
does not distinguish between actual and contributory causation. For 
Woodward, there is only one inclusive notion of singular event causation. 
However, I demonstrate that Woodward's definition of this inclusive 
notion of token causation is equivalent to my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation.
Finally, I briefly touch on the problem of how Hitchcock's causal models 
M  formalizing a given situation S can be constructed. I argue that this 
model generation procedure has to consist of two steps: First, the 
extraction of variables in situation S, and second the establishment of 
counterfactual dependencies between these variables and establishment of 
the structural equations.
In the second chapter, I focus on the account of modeling token causation 
that Pearl gives in his book Causality. Pearl gives accounts of many aspects 
of causal discourse in this book. He deals with causation at both the type 
and the token level, discusses the problem how to derive causal models 
from raw data and gives examples of plenty of applications in various 
fields of science. However, I limit my discussion of Pearl to in fact token 
causation, i.e. to the relation that holds between two singular events c and 
e in a situation S, when c in fact causes e, and also to the second problem of 
causal modeling, i.e. to the definition of token causation relativized to an 
appropriate causal model M formalizing a given situation S.
Pearl's basic rationale is that for an event c to qualify as a token cause for 
another event e in an arbitrary situation S, event c has to be able to sustain 
event e against certain contingencies. I will maintain that this rationale of 
Pearl's can be most easily understood with the aid of the leading idea that 
c sustains its effect e via a causal process that links cause c and effect e.
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I argue that Pearl formalizes such a process by a causal beam, which is in 
essence a simplification of a given causal model M achieved by projecting 
M  on the values of its exogenous variables. The leading idea for this 
projection is in broad terms for every variable Y in M  to filter out the 
variables W in M that are not involved in sustaining the actual value of Y. 
Pearl accounts for two kinds of token causation, actual causation, applying 
to cases in which an effect e is caused by a single event c, and contributory 
causation, applying solely to cases of symmetric over-determination. 
I highlight a peculiar feature of his account, namely that exogenous 
variables can be neither actual nor contributory causes.
Again, I only marginally mention the first problem of causal modeling, i.e. 
the derivation of an appropriate causal model M  from a given situation S. 
I give a brief synopsis of how Pearl generates his causal models and 
contrast this to the way in which Hitchcock by assuming total information 
about the situation S to be modeled tries to avoid the problem of model 
generation completely by in essence just stipulating a certain model. 
I briefly discuss Pearl's so-called algorithm of inductive causation and 
reach the result that this algorithm certainly offers criteria that a suitable 
model has to fulfill. However, it turns out that these criteria are 
insufficient to determine a model on which Pearl's definitions of actual 
and contributory causation can be applied.
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In the third chapter, I construct four paradigmatic examples to which I 
apply my reconstructions of Hitchcock's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation, Pearl's corresponding definitions, and finally 
W oodward's definition of token causation. The application of these 
different accounts to my four examples serves various purposes: First, it 
makes it easy to compare the extensions of the different accounts, i.e. one 
can easily determine whether a cause according to one definition is also a 
cause according to another one. Second, the verdicts of these accounts can 
be compared not only to each other, but also with our causal intuitions in 
these examples, and this allows us to find out whether some definitions 
are more plausible than others. Third, possible formal difficulties in the 
application of these definitions become obvious.
The chapter has two leading questions: The first is whether Hitchcock, and 
in this way Woodward, too, succeed in giving a simplification of Pearl's 
account of singular event causation. I come to the conclusion that they do 
not. I show that my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation analyzes three of my examples in a way that 
contradicts what I take to be our causal intuitions in these cases. My 
reconstruction of Woodward shows that his inclusive definition of token 
causation fares only slightly better in analyzing two of these examples 
incorrectly. In striking contrast to this, Pearl's account of actual and 
contributory causation, given that certain prerequisites are met, analyzes 
all four examples according to our intuition. From the discussion of these 
four examples I conclude that Hitchcock's and Woodward's project of 
simplifying Pearl's account fails because their underlying rationale, which 
identifies a causal process linking a cause and its effect with a route in a 
causal model, is too simplistic.
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The second leading question is whether one can improve on Pearl's 
account. By applying Pearl's account of actual and contributory causation 
to these four examples, it becomes obvious that its inability to admit 
exogenous variables as causes is an unnecessary shortcoming. For this 
reason, I offer a natural extension of Pearl's account that facilitates a 
uniform treatment of exogenous and endogenous variables in a causal 
model and in this way also allow exogenous variables to be causes. 
Finally, I give evidence that this extension of mine can surmount the three 
major problems of Lewis's classic counterfactual account: the intransitivity 
of causation, preemption, and symmetric over-determination. I motivate 
this by demonstrating that my extended account can successfully analyze 
three examples featuring the respective problems.
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his chapter is intended to give a thorough clarification and
corrective reconstruction of the accounts of token causation that 
Christopher Hitchcock offers in his article 'The Intransitivity of Causation 
Revealed in Equations and Graphs' and that James Woodward sketches in 
his influential book Making Things Happen?3 In a certain way, this mode of 
presentation will do injustice to Woodward, because he does not really 
intend to give his own account of token causation. Only a comparatively 
small part of the book deals with modeling token causation. Instead, 
Making Things Happen gives an overview of an interventionist theory of 
causation and explanation. It touches on topics like the notion of an 
intervention and its justification, the notion of invariance and the way in 
which it offers a new understanding of the concept of a law in causal 
explanations, and the issue of how causal relationships can be exploited 
for purposes of manipulation and control.
Concerning the issue of modeling token causation, W oodward's intention 
is merely to give a sketch of certain characteristics that a successful 
account of token causation has to fulfill in his view. For the details of this 
sketch Woodward explicitly refers to Hitchcock's article.14 My 
presentation and discussion of Woodward's sketch that I offer in this 
section is very short compared to the way in which I deal with Hitchcock. 
I see my justification for this mode of presentation in the following fact: 
The relevant definitions in W oodward's sketch of token causation are all 
taken over from Hitchcock. In this way, most of the remarks that I make 
about Hitchcock's account in this chapter equally apply to W oodward's 
account. My reason for focusing on Hitchcock's account of token causation 
in this chapter is mainly that Woodward explicitly refers to it, that it is 
more detailed, and finally that it is in strong need of a conceptual 
clarification.
W Cf. [cH 01] and [jW 03].
14 Cf. for example [jW 03], p. 83.
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In his article 'The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and 
Graphs' Christopher Hitchcock proposes an analysis of singular event 
causation with the aid of a framework of structural equations. These 
structural equations are deterministic functions that encode 'complete' 
counterfactual information about the situation that is causally analyzed. 
Since Hitchcock's account is given in a very informal and suggestive way, 
this chapter is mainly devoted to clarifying how this account really 
functions. The argumentation that I offer in this chapter represents my 
attempt to reconstruct Hitchcock's account in the most charitable and 
unambiguous way. I merely refer to Hitchcock's original formulations and 
definitions without quoting them, and start out directly with my 
reconstructions. In this way, I hope to save the reader any unnecessary 
confusion that might arise when consulting Hitchcock's rather involved 
original. In the course of this chapter, I will work out the implicit 
assumptions underlying Hitchcock's methodology. Moreover, I try to give 
clear formal definitions of the concepts that Hitchcock, partially implicitly, 
employs. Thus the basic notions of a counterfactual account of causal 
modeling will be introduced in a simple and illustrative way, so that this 
chapter also serves as a preparation to the formally more advanced 
following chapter of this thesis that deals with Judea Pearl's influential 
approach in modeling token causation.
Both Hitchcock and Woodward formulated their accounts after having 
received the one of Pearl, and in my view their main intention was to 
simplify Pearl's formally rather elaborate work by finding simpler formal 
expressions of the basic intuitions in Pearl's work.15 For this reason, I will 
compare the results of Hitchcock's and Woodward's accounts with the 
ones of Pearl's in the final chapter of the thesis in order to find out 
whether their simplifications succeed. In chapters two and three of this
15 Hitchcock him self refers to Pearl's account as representing the current state of the art in 
the science of causal modeling; cf. pp. 273 and 274 of [cH 01 j.
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thesis I will for the sake of simplicity treat my reconstructions of 
Hitchcock and Woodward in this chapter as if they were their own 
versions. My justification for this treatment is that I consider my 
reconstructions to be not only the straightforward formal expressions of 
their implicit rationale, but also to be as close as possible to the respective 
original. The only point in which my reconstruction deviates from their 
original accounts concerns the relativization of their definitions of 
causation to given models. I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis 
that token causal modeling can be understood as splitting the problem of 
analyzing token causation into two sub-problems: The first being the 
generation of a suitable causal model M to analyze a situation S, and the 
second being the definition of token causation according to such a given 
model. Hitchcock and Woodward implicitly define token causation in a 
situation S as a notion that is independent of our description of S by a 
model M. In my corrective reconstruction in this chapter, I will argue for a 
more pragmatic definition of token causation relativized to a model M. In 
my view, this will allow us to analyze situations S from various 
viewpoints, depending on which events, and also which kinds of events, 
in S are of interest for us.
The first section will deal with the basic building block of Hitchcock's 
account of token causation, his definition of a causal model. In my 
understanding, Hitchcock's causal models M are in essence devised to 
analyze a given situation S that contains certain token events c, d, e, etc., in 
whose causal relationships we are interested. For this purpose, a causal 
model M  is comprised of a set of variables V  that formalize alterations of 
these events and of a set of structural equations E that is devised to 
determine the values of these variables. The underlying rationale is that 
these equations E formalize deterministic mechanisms, or local laws, that 
are at work in the situation S and that govern the corresponding events.
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In my opinion, the procedure by which Hitchcock models a situation in 
order to analyze its causal structure has to consist of two steps: First, the 
extraction of variables V in situation S, and second the establishment of 
counterfactual dependencies between these variables V  and establishment 
of the structural equations E. From this reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
model generation procedure, I will draw the conclusion that, although 
Hitchcock does not explicitly mention this, his structural equations are in 
essence another notation for exactly the counterfactual information that 
we put into the analysis of a situation S.
The second section will deal with Hitchcock's definition of actual 
causation. In my view, the basic idea underlying this definition is that c is 
a cause of e in a situation S if and only if there is a causal process linking 
these events c and e. I understand such a causal process as a concatenation 
of the mechanisms that are at work in the given situation S and that are 
linking events c and e. I will reconstruct Hitchcock's notion of actual 
causation in my definition (H AC). Moreover, I will argue that Hitchcock 
formalizes a causal process between c and e by an active route in a causal 
model M  between the variables X and Z whose actual values x and z 
formalize these events c and e. This concept of an active route will be 
reconstructed by my definition (H AR). Both (H AR) and (H AC) deviate 
from Hitchcock's original formulation in an important respect: Hitchcock 
wants to account for a notion of causation 'as such' that is independent of 
our description, and he does not relativize his original definition of actual 
causation to a given model, whereas I maintain that such an 
understanding is misguided. However, I will postpone my argumentation 
for this to the next but one section of this chapter.
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In the third section, I will illustrate the functioning of my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's definitions (H AR) and (H AC). Concretely, I will discuss how 
they are applied to analyze two of Hitchcock's favorite examples, the first 
of which illustrates that actual causation is not a transitive relation in 
general and the second features a case of asymmetric over-determination. 
I will argue that for both examples the analysis by (H AR) and (H AC) is in 
accord with what I take to be our causal intuitions. Furthermore, I will 
illustrate that Lewis's classic counterfactual account fails in analyzing these 
examples. In this way, the conjecture that Hitchcock's account, 
reconstructed by (H AR) and (H AC), can surmount two of my featured 
three problems of the classic counterfactual account -  pre-emption and the 
intransitivity of actual causation -  gets some evidence.
In the fourth section, I will argue that the differentiation of the problem of 
analyzing token causation into two sub-problems -  the generation of an 
appropriate causal model Af for a situation S and the definition of 
causation according to a given model M  -  that is induced by a causal 
modeling account has a great advantage over classic metaphysical 
theories of causation: If we qualify the formal analysis of causation in 
situation S to a given causal model M, this analysis can account for the 
fact that there is a multitude of possible descriptions of this situation that 
may all be equally justified, depending on which kinds of events are of 
interest in S. Moreover, I will briefly discuss the remarkable attempt of 
Hitchcock's original account to conceptually reduce actual causation to a 
special kind of counterfactual, a so-called 'ENF-counterfactual', by which 
he wants to express the activity of a route. I will argue that this reduction 
falls short, since the concept of a surgical intervention has to enter in 
definition (H AR) and Hitchcock does not give any clues how an 
intervention could be expressed by counterfactuals.
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The fifth section will deal with Hitchcock's account of contributory 
causation for cases of symmetric over-determination. Admittedly, the term 
'contributory causation' is my terminology, since Hitchcock does not give 
this account a special name. He just states that his previous definition of 
actual causation, reconstructed by my (H AC), is not capable of analyzing 
cases appropriately in which an effect has two or more causes that work in 
parallel. For cases of this form, Hitchcock introduces a definition of a 
weakly active route, which I will reconstruct as (H WAR), and his 
definition of token causation for these cases, which I dub contributory 
causation and which I reconstruct as (H CC). In my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock, an event c is then a contributory cause of another event e in 
situation S according to a certain model M  if and only if there is a weakly 
active route between the variables formalizing these events in this causal 
model. Again, Hitchcock himself does not relativize his original account of 
token causation for cases of symmetric over-determination to a given 
model M, but wants to account for causation independently of our 
description of a situation S. However, referring to my argumentation 
before, I will continue to maintain that such an understanding is 
misguided. As a point Of application and comparison, I will show how my 
reconstructions of Hitchcock's definitions (H WAR) and (H CC) can be 
successfully applied in an analysis of Lewis's classic example of symmetric 
over-determination, the Firing Squad. Lewis famously claimed to have no 
clear intuition in this example, and as a conclusion I will show that Lewis's 
account consequently fails to analyze it.
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In the sixth section I will give a brief synopsis of the basic facts of 
Woodward's account of token causation, where the term 'token causation' 
is not Woodward's original terminology, but is chosen by me to avoid 
confusion. In strong contrast to Hitchcock, Woodward does not 
distinguish between actual and contributory causation. For Woodward, 
there is only one inclusive notion of singular event causation that also 
applies to cases of symmetric over-determination. However, Woodward's 
definition of token causation (W TC) is equivalent to Hitchcock's 
definition of contributory causation (H CC) employing the notion of a 
weakly active route defined by (H WAR). The difference from Hitchcock is 
that Woodward does not limit the extension of his definition (W TC) to 
cases of symmetric over-determination, as Hitchcock does, but that 
Woodward takes his definition to cover all cases of singular event 
causation. Since I consider my remarks about the relevant concepts in 
Hitchcock's account of token causation to translate into results about the 
analogous concepts in W oodward's account, I mainly aim to show that the 
concepts Woodward employs are equivalent to Hitchcock's.
I will confine myself to a short demonstration that Woodward's definition 
of token causation (W TC) is equivalent to my reconstruction (H CC) of 
Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation. For this aim I will also 
mention a preliminary version of this definition that Woodward gives for 
heuristic reasons, and I will argue that this preliminary version is 
equivalent to my reconstruction (H AC) of Hitchcock's definition of actual 
causation. Admittedly, Woodward does not explicitly deal with the 
generation of causal models for analyzing token causation, and moreover 
he avoids precise formal definitions of most of these concepts. This is due 
to the fact that the modeling of token causation is only of minor 
importance for him. Nevertheless, I maintain that his understanding of the 
respective notions can be extracted from his discussion more or less 
straightforwardly.
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H it c h c o c k 's Ra t io n a l e  
of Fo r m a l iz in g  S it u a t io n s  
by D e t e r m in istic  Ca u s a l  M o d e l s  
Co n t a in in g  St r u c t u r a l  Eq u a t io n s
This section deals with the basic building block of Hitchcock's account of 
token causation, his definition of a causal model. Unfortunately, 
Hitchcock's description of his modeling framework is rather unclear. For 
this reason, this section and great parts of this chapter are devoted to a 
systematic clarification of Hitchcock's account. In particular, my 
formulation in this section just represents my attempt reconstruct 
Hitchcock's modeling framework in the most charitable way.
In my understanding, Hitchcock's causal models M  are in essence devised 
to analyze a given situation S that contains certain token events c, d, e, etc., 
in whose causal relationships we are interested. For this purpose, these 
causal models M are comprised of variables V  that are either exogenous or 
endogenous. Exogenous variables formalize admissible alterations of 
background events, or background circumstances, in the situation S, 
whose development is unknown to us. Analogously, endogenous 
variables formalize admissible alterations of the events in situation S, 
about whose development we are not ignorant. A set of structural 
equations E in the causal model M is devised to determine the values of 
exactly these endogenous variables from the values of the exogenous ones. 
The underlying rationale is that these equations E formalize deterministic 
mechanisms, or local laws, that are at work in the situation S and that 
govern the corresponding events.
I will reconstruct Hitchcock's modeling framework with the aid of three 
definitions and try to clarify the exact procedure according to which
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causal models and structural equations have to be set up following 
Hitchcock. The first of these is my definition of a causal model (H CM), 
which is very close to Hitchcock's original and only differs in notation. 
The second is my definition of counterfactual dependence (H CD), and it 
is a more significant deviation from Hitchcock's original. My final 
definition of exogeneity, endogenity and structural equations (H EESE) 
does not have an explicit correlate in Hitchcock's text and has to be 
extracted from his description.
In my opinion, the procedure by which Hitchcock models a situation in 
order to analyze its causal structure has to consist of two steps: First, the 
extraction of variables V  in situation S, and second the establishment of 
counterfactual dependencies between these variables V  and establishment 
of the structural equations E. I will argue that the first step in essence 
consists of an individuation of the relevant events and their alterations in 
situation S and that this individuation depends on our interests in this 
situation. Furthermore, I will claim that in the second step only our pre- 
theoretic judgment about the described situation S enters, which contains 
the complete counterfactual information about the previously identified 
events and their possible alterations.
From this reconstruction of Hitchcock's model generation procedure, I 
will draw the conclusion that, although Hitchcock does not explicitly 
mention this, his structural equations are in essence another notation for 
exactly the counterfactual information that we put into the analysis of a 
situation S.
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For Hitchcock, the causal analysis of a given example situation begins 
with the construction of an appropriate causal model formalizing the 
relevant information known about the situation. The following is my 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of such a causal model. 
Admittedly, my formulation slightly deviates from Hitchcock's original. 
However, apart from a slightly changed notation, the only difference is 
that the following (H CM) is slightly more elaborate than Hitchcock's 
original formulation.16
Definition (Causal Model, Hitchcock) (H CM)
A causal model is an ordered pair (V,E), where V  is a set of 
variables and E is a system of structural equations relating the 
values of the variables in V.
Variables in V  formalize possible event-alterations in the 
situation S and are either exogenous or endogenous in the model. 
Correspondingly, the set of variables V  can be divided into two 
disjoint subsets U of endogenous variables and W of 
endogenous variables, such that V  = UuW.
Analogously, the set of structural equations E falls into two 
subsets, Eu and Ew. The equations Eu for exogenous variables U 
have the form U = idu and state the value u of the exogenous 
variable U in the situation S. The equations Ew for endogenous 
variables W have the form
W  = /W(X 1, . . . ,Xn)
and express the value of endogenous variable W as a function 
of the variables X that can be either exogenous or endogenous.
16 Cf. [cH 01], p. 280 for Hitchcock's original formulation.
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Admittedly, in this characterization of a causal model, the concepts of 
exogenous and endogenous variables and also of structural equations are 
just mentioned and not defined. The proper definition of these concepts 
can be found in the next but one definition (H EESE). But before that, let 
me briefly try to motivate the underlying idea of this definition and also 
introduce some other helpful concepts.
In my understanding of Hitchcock, in a causal model M, the exogenous 
variables U formalize the admissible alterations of the background events 
in the situation S, whose development is unknown to us. Analogously, I 
take it that the endogenous variables W in M formalize admissible 
alterations of the events in situation S, about whose development we are 
not ignorant. Furthermore, in my understanding of Hitchcock, every 
admissible instantiation of values u for the exogenous variables U 
uniquely determines the values w  of the endogenous variables W  in M  
with the aid of the structural equations E. With this, Hitchcock's causal 
models are completely deterministic.17
In this context, I call an instantiation of the exogenous variables IJciV of 
the causal model M  = (V, E) the state of this model, and I call an 
instantiation of all variables V that is consistent with the structural 
equations E a solution of this model. In this way, a solution is brought 
about by letting the exogenous variables U take on certain values u which 
then determine the values w  for the endogenous variables WczV, so that w  
can simply be computed out of u with the aid of the structural equations.18 
According to Hitchcock, the structural equations Ew for endogenous 
variables W encode counterfactuals.19 To be precise, in my reconstruction
17 Hitchcock is not completely explicit about this property of his causal models to be 
uniquely determined by their structural equations and the values of their exogenous 
variables in his original description of his modelling framework. Cf. [cH 01], pp. 279-281. 
However, I consider this unique determinacy to be the straightforward reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's modelling framework and moreover to be implicitly intended by Hitchcock.
18 Both of these concepts are introduced by me and not Hitchcock's original terminology. 
I just borrow these terms from Pearl for a useful abbreviation.
19 Cf. [cH 01], p. 281.
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of Hitchcock, the structural equations E in the model M  are constructed 
according to the following definition of counterfactual dependence:20
Let V = {Y,Xv ..,Xn,W} be the set of variables selected to be 
relevant for the analysis of causal dependencies in a given 
situation S.
Then W is counter/actually dependent on Y if and only if there are 
values y * y ' of Y and w * w' of W, and values x; for the other 
variables X/, i={l,...,n}, such that
Y = y  & X i  =  xi & ... &  Xn  — Xn □-> W = w  and (Cl)
Y = y ' & X l =  Xl &  . . .  & X n  = Xn D-» W = w '.
Here, the symbol denotes counterfactual implication, so that clause 
(Cl) is short for "If it were the case that Y=y & Xi=xi &:...&  Xn=xn, then it 
would be the case that W=iv.'.
Continuing in my reconstruction of Hitchcock, structural equations are 
constructed according to the following definition, which also formally 
clarifies the notions of exogeneity and endogeneity of variables:21
Definition (Exogeneity, Endogeneity, Structural Equations,
Let V  be the set of variables selected to be relevant for the 
analysis of causal dependencies in a given situation S and let Y 
be an arbitrary variable in V.
Then the structural equation Ey for variable Y is a function that 
gives the value y  of Y as a result of all and only the variables 
Xi e V  in its argument on which Y depends counterfactually.
20 Cf. [cH 01], p. 280 for Hitchcock's original definition.
21 This definition has no literal original in Hitchcock's text, but it can be condensed out of 
his original description. Cf. [cHOl], pp. 279-284 for this.
Definition (Counterfactual Dependence, Hitchcock) (H CD)
Hitchcock) (H EESE)
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If there is no variable X eV  so that Y counterfactually depends 
on Xi, then Y is called exogenous, and Ey has the form Y= y, just 
stating the value y  of Y.
If there are variables {X i,...,X n}cV  so that Y counterfactually 
depends on these Xi, then Y is called endogenous, and Ey encodes 
a set of counterfactuals of the form
X l=X ! &  . . .  &  Xn= Xn D—> "Y — f t
for all possible combinations of values (x - i , . . . , X n ) for the variables 
X l,...,X n.
In the following, I will try to illustrate the precise way in which these 
above definitions, in particular (H EESE), function in modeling a given 
situation S. For this purpose, I will employ one of Hitchcock's favorite 
examples, his so-called 'Boulder' example, with which he argued for the 
intransitivity of causation. But before I do so, allow me a few further 
remarks.
Observe that the above definition (H EESE) induces a causal order or 
hierarchy in the model M. If a variable Y counterfactually depends on 
other variables {X i,...,X n}cV , then Y is on a higher level than these Xi in 
the model M in the sense that Y is more remote from the exogenous 
variables in the model.22 Following Hitchcock, I call these Xi parents of Y in 
this context and conversely Y a child of these Xi. In order to expand this 
terminology, let me call Z an ancestor of Y if and only if there are variables 
X i,...,X n e V  such that Z is a parent of Xi, Xi is a parent of Xm, and Y is a 
parent of Xn; conversely, I call Y a descendant of Z if the same condition is 
fulfilled. Ideally, the structural equations E in the model M  are ordered by 
recursion, so that every variable Y can be traced back to exogenous 
variables and does not have itself among its ancestors, in which case Y
22 Note that the Xi can be either exogenous or endogenous, whereas Y is endogenous by 
definition.
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would constitute a loop in the model. Hitchcock does not explicitly require 
such a recursive ordering of the equations for his causal models, but in the 
example cases he discusses his models all have this property.23 Be this as it 
may, let me assume in the following that the structural equations in 
Hitchcock's causal models are recursively ordered. With this, it is 
particular ensured that Hitchcock's causal models are deterministic in the 
sense that every possible state of the model M uniquely determines a 
solution of this model. Note finally that these requirements of recursive 
ordering and determinism pose considerable constraints on the set of 
counterfactuals, out of which the structural equations are constructed 
according to definitions (H CD) and (H EESE).
Let me also remark that Hitchcock's causal models as defined by (H CM) 
can be graphically represented. The variables in V  then form the nodes of a 
graph. An arrow is drawn from node X to node W if and only if W  
counterfactually depends on X according to definition (H CD). A causal 
graph does though not specify the values of the variables. This 
information is only found in the system of structural equations E.
In order to do justice to Hitchcock, let me finally emphasize that the above 
definitions (H CM), (H CD) and (H EESE) are just my reconstructions of 
his account. My definition of a causal model (H CM) is very close to 
Hitchcock's original and only differs in notation. However, the other two 
definitions are more significant deviations from Hitchcock's original. 
(H EESE) does not have an explicit correlate in Hitchcock's text and has to 
be extracted from his description.24 And definition (H CD) reads rather 
different in Hitchcock's original. To illustrate this, let me briefly state this 
definition of counterfactual dependence in Hitchcock's original words:25
23 Cf. [cH 01], p. 281 for Hitchcock's own comments about this.
24 Cf. again [cHOl], pp. 279-284 for this.
25 Cf. [cH 01], p. 280.
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Definition (Counterfactual Dependence,
Hitchcock's Misleading Original) (HMO CD)
W  depends counterfactually on Z if and only if there are values 
2  and z' of Z and other variables Xi, ... ,Xn with respective 
values xi, ... ,Xn, such that fw (z, x\, ... ,xn) *  /w (z'f xi, ... ,xn).
I dismissed this formulation because of its striking circularity. Hitchcock 
tries to set up his structural equations with the aid of this definition of 
counterfactual dependence, but then presupposes exactly these structural 
equations/w in (HMO CD).
Be this as it may. Let me now introduce Hitchcock's 'Boulder' example, in 
order to illustrate the functioning of my reconstructions (H CM), (H CD) 
and (H EESE):26
Boulder: 'A boulder is dislodged, and begins rolling ominously 
towards a hiker. Before it reaches him, the hiker sees the 
boulder and ducks. The boulder sails harmlessly over his head 
with nary a centimeter to spare. The hiker survives his ordeal.'
According to our pre-theoretic causal intuition, Hitchcock supposes, and I 
agree, that the falling of the boulder causes the hiker to duck, and the 
ducking of the hiker causes his survival, but the falling of the boulder does 
not cause the survival of the hiker.
Illustrating definition (H CM), and also following Hitchcock's original 
description, this example can be modeled as follows:27 There are three bi­
valued variables, B, D and S. Variable B is exogenous and has the 
following meta-assignment of events to its values:
26 Cf. [cH 01], pp. 276 and 277 for Hitchcock's exposition of this example.
27 Cf. [cH 01], pp. 295-298 for Hitchcock's discussion of this example.
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B =
[0 , if  the boulder does not roll 
11, if the boulder does roll
D and S are endogenous and have the following meta-assignment of 
events to their values:
D =
S =
f 0 , if  the hiker does not duck
[ l , if the hiker does duck
0 , if the hiker does not survive
1, if the hiker does survive
Illustrating definitions (H CD) and (H EESE), the structural equations for 
the endogenous variables D and S can be given in exhaustive form, stating 
the value of the image variable resulting from any possible combination of 
values for the argument variables:28
D = 0,
if  B = 0 
if B = 1
and S =
0, if B = 1 and D = 0
1, if B = 1 and D = 1
1, if B = 0 and D = 0
1, if B = 0 and D = 1
This notation suggestively illustrates the nature of Hitchcock's structural 
equations of endogenous variables -  they are functions that state the value 
of the endogenous variable on the left hand side for every combination of 
values for the variables on the right hand side.
In the actual situation, B takes the value 1. Entering this value in the 
structural equations then yields the actual solution of this causal model: 
B = 1, D = 1, and S = 1.
The graphical representation of 'Boulder' finally is:
D
B
28 This notation is my invention. For Hitchcock's original equations cf. [cH 01], p. 295.
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With the aid of this example, I will in the following try to clarify the exact 
procedure according to which causal models and structural equations 
have to be set up following Hitchcock. In particular, I will try to reveal the 
dependence of the structural equations on underlying conditional 
information. In my opinion, the procedure by which Hitchcock models a 
situation in order to analyze its causal structure has to consist of the 
following two steps. The first of these illustrates the application of 
definition (H CM), and the second puts definitions (H CD) and (H EESE) 
in concrete terms:
Ml) Extraction of variables V in situation S.
M2) Establishment of counterfactual dependencies between these 
variables V  and establishment of the structural equations E.
In step Ml), the relevant events and their possible alterations in situation S 
have to be identified with variables and their value-assignments. This 
extraction of variables is not a process of translation that is guided by 
grammatical rules.
In Hitchcock's example 'Boulder' the events of dislodging the boulder, or 
not, and of the boulder hitting the hiker, or not, could as well be regarded 
as demanding representation by a variable. For, there is no grammatical 
distinction between the dislodging of the boulder and the rolling of the 
boulder -  both events are given in the description by predicates applying 
to the same subject. In particular, no conditionals or counterfactuals enter 
in this step of extracting variables. For, observe that the cover story of the 
example 'Boulder' does not even contain a conditional, let alone a 
counterfactual.
Instead, the extraction of variables and their values seems to be 
determined mainly by our pre-theoretic understanding and judgment of 
the situation regarding which events are relevant and which are not. In 
my view, such a pre-theoretic notion of relevance could for example be
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understood as our naive judgment whether the mentioning of a certain 
event is essential in a correct description of the situation under 
consideration. Such a description could in particular be a natural language 
description in the style of the cover story given with the example. 
Furthermore, the individuation of event-alterations in situation S also 
heavily depends on our interests in the situation. For example, we could 
be interested in the velocity and the trajectory of the boulder. In that case 
we would take different possible velocities and trajectories as alterations 
of the actual event -  the actual speed and path of the boulder. And we 
could also be interested in how exactly the boulder hits the hiker, in case it 
does. Then we would take different possible sites of impact, for example 
chest, head, legs, partial missing of the hiker, complete missing of the 
hiker, etc. as alterations of the actual event -  the boulder missing the hiker. 
All these different evaluations of the situation S yield different causal 
models M. And in my view, these models M of situation S are all equally 
justified, as equally justified as are our prior interests in the situation S 
that lead to their generation. I will discuss this topic of a dependency of a 
causal model on our interests in the situation to be modeled more 
elaborately in the fourth section of this chapter.
Step M2) in the modeling procedure is to formally represent the 
conditional dependencies in the example situation with the aid of the 
variables V  that are identified in step Ml). It is instructive to give first a 
simplified non-technical description of how counterfactual dependence is 
established before discussing the general method that determines the 
structural equations. Start now with the more graphic description of 
establishing counterfactual dependence:
Consider an arbitrary variable Y and then test it for counterfactual 
dependence on every other variable Xi, i = l,...,n  in the causal model. I.e. 
begin with Xi and find out whether there is a distribution of values for 
X2, . . . ,  Xn, such that a change in the value of Xi brings about a change in
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the value of Y, then repeat this procedure for the other Xi. If Y is 
counterfactually independent of all X e  Vin this sense, i.e. for all Xi there is 
no distribution of values to the other Xi,...,Xi-i,Xi+i,...,Xn, such that a 
change in the value of Xi would bring about a change in the value of Y, 
then Y is exogenous. Otherwise, Y is endogenous.
In this step of determining counterfactual dependencies between the 
variables in the model only our pre-theoretic judgment about the 
described situation S enters. This judgment though contains the complete 
conditional and counterfactual information about possible alterations of 
the previously identified events considered to be relevant in this situation. 
More concretely, this counterfactual information comprises all possible 
combinations of event alterations in the situation S and can most easily be 
represented by a set of counterfactuals. I call this set the basic set of super- 
exhaustive counter/actuals. For every variable Y e V  this set contains a 
complete list of counterfactuals of the following form: For every possible 
combination of values of the variables in V \Y  there is a counterfactual that 
has this combination as antecedent and that has the value y  of Y 
corresponding to this combination in its consequent. Here, whether a 
combination of values of the variables in V XY is possible, and whether a 
value y  of Y corresponds to such a combination depends entirely on our 
pre-theoretic judgment of the situation.
For a deeper understanding of step M2) in the modeling procedure, it is 
instructive to describe this set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals for a 
variable Y more formally. For this purpose, assume without loss of 
generality that V  = {Z,Xi,X2,Y}. Suppose that Z can take k values z i , . . . ,  Zk, 
Xi can take r values x-\,-\,..., y v , X2 can take m values *2,1,..., *2,™ and that y  
can take p values y \ ,..., yP with p < k-r. This means that there are k-r-m 
possible value combinations for the antecedent variables, such that the set 
of super-exhaustive counterfactuals for variable Y contains the following 
k-r-m counterfactuals:
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For all ie{l,...,k} and all je{l,...,r}, there are m counterfactuals 
Z = 2 i & Xi = xij & X 2 = xzi D-» Y = yqi for q ie {1,. ..,p},
Z = zi & Xi = x-i,] & X2 = X2,m 0—» Y = i/qm for qme {1,...,p}.
It is this set that completely determines the structural equation for variable 
y  according to definitions (H CD) and (H EESE). To be more precise, the 
structural equation for variable y  can be condensed out of this set, if we 
remove all the variables in the antecedent on which Y is not counter­
factually dependent. In the following, I describe how this elimination of 
redundant variables works.
Suppose for example that y  does not counterfactually depend on X2 
according to definition (H CD). Then for all m counterfactuals in the list 
above, the variable Z has the same value, i.e. it is yqi = ... = yqm. Then, for all 
ie{l,...,k} and all je{l,...,r}, these m counterfactuals above can be reduced 
to one counterfactual in which variable X2 is omitted:
Z = Zi & Xi = xi,j 0—» y  = yq for qe{l,...,p}.
By this procedure, we have not only reduced the number of 
counterfactuals with Y  in the consequent to k-r, but in particular we 
achieved that these resulting new counterfactuals now only contain the 
parents of Y  in the antecedent. I call these k-r counterfactuals with this 
property the exhaustive counterfactuals for the variable Y  and denote the set 
that consists of them the set of exhaustive counterfactuals for the variable Y P
As a final point of my description of step M2) of the modeling procedure, 
let me highlight the connection between this set of exhaustive 
counterfactuals for Y  and the structural equation for Y. The structural 
equation Jy for variable Y  encodes these k-r counterfactuals in the
29 This procedure also works, if y  is exogenous. In this case, Y does not counterfactually 
depend on any of the Z, Xi, and X2, so that the set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals 
reduces to the empty set 0  as set of exhaustive counterfactuals for Y.
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following way: For all ie{l,...,k} and all je{l,...,r}, the exhaustive 
counterfactual Z = z\ & Xi = xi,j D—» Y = yq translates into one line of the 
definiens of the structural equation f t  in exhaustive form.
Let me illustrate this with the aid of the example 'Boulder7 and the 
equation of variable S: The exhaustive counterfactual B=1 & D=0 □-» S=0 
for example translates into the first line of the definiens of the structural
0, if B = 1 and D = 0
equation/sin exhaustive form, given by S =
1, if B = 1 and D = 1
1, if B = 0 and D = 0
1, if B = 0 and D = 1
This exhaustive notation can then be condensed to a more practical form
, , , , „  fl, if B = 0 or D = 1
for this structural equation, so that we yield S = <
[0, otherwise
The moral that I would like to draw from this attempt of mine to clarify 
Hitchcock's model generating procedure and to reconstruct it by steps Ml) 
and M2) above is the following: Although Hitchcock does not explicitly 
mention this, his structural equations are in essence another notation for 
exactly the counterfactual information that we put into the analysis of a 
situation S in step M2). The complete information about situation S is 
already contained in the set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals that is 
stipulated at the beginning of the modeling procedure. In this way, 
structural equations do not generate new information, they just rewrite the 
information about the situation at hand that we either previously had 
available or that we previously stipulated. Trivially, this information that 
we stipulate about situation S in step M2) is about the events and their 
alterations that we individuate in step Ml). And according to my 
observation in step Ml), this individuation depends on our interests in 
this situation.
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H it c h c o c k 's  D e f in it io n  
of A c t u a l  Ca u s a t io n  
Em pl o y in g  A ctive  R o u t e s  
a s  th e  Fo r m a l iz a t io n  of Ca u s a l  Pr o c e sse s
This section will deal with Hitchcock's formal definition of actual 
causation. I will mainly discuss my reconstruction of Hitchcock's account. 
My formulation here and in great parts of this chapter just represents my 
attempt to clarify Hitchcock's account in the most charitable and 
unambiguous way.
In my view, the basic idea underlying this definition is that c is a cause of e 
in a situation S if and only if there is a causal process linking these events c 
and e. Here, I understand a causal process as a concatenation of the 
mechanisms that are at work in the given situation S and that are linking 
events c and e. I will argue that Hitchcock formalizes a causal process 
between c and e by an active route in a causal model M between the 
variables X and Z whose actual values x and z formalize these events c and 
e. In essence, an active route formally filters out a chain of mechanisms 
linking c and e, so that an alteration of event c would propagate along this 
chain to change the event e when the mechanisms in situation S that do 
not belong to this causal chain are screened off.
Three definitions form the core of my reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
account of actual causation. The first is Hitchcock's original definition of 
counterfactual dependence of one value of a variable on another value of 
another variable in a certain solution of a causal model, which I label 
(H CDSCM). The second definition is my reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
notion of an active route in a certain solution in a causal model, which I 
formulate in (H AR). Its leading idea is that a route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) in
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model M between variables X and Z, whose values x  and z formalize the 
events c and e of situation S, is active in the actual solution of M if and 
only if the following holds: A change of the value of X propagates exactly 
through the variables Yi,...,Yn in the route and changes the value of Y. 
This route then corresponds to a concatenation of mechanisms £ x ° £ y i°  . . .  
° £ Y n ° £ z  in situation S that links events c and e. The third definition finally 
is my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of actual causation, which I 
denote (H AC). It rules that event c is an actual cause of e in situation S 
according to the model M  if and only if in the actual solution of M  there is 
an active route from X to Z.
My reconstructions (H AR) and (H AC) of Hitchcock's account deviate 
from Hitchcock's original formulation in two respects: First, Hitchcock's 
original formulation neglects that the fact whether a route is active in a 
model M  or not depends on the actual solution of this model M. I take it 
though that this can be seen as a mere notational issue, since such a 
dependency is clearly unavoidable. Second, and much more importantly, 
Hitchcock himself does not relativize his original definition of actual 
causation to a given model, but wants to account for causation as such 
that is independent of our description.
I maintain that such an understanding is misguided. However, I will 
postpone my argumentation for this to the next but one section of this 
chapter, where I will also discuss the philosophic implications of this 
differentiation between a pragmatic understanding of causation 
relativized to a given model by my definition (H AC) and a more 
metaphysical understanding of causation by Hitchcock's original 
formulation. Before that, I will illustrate how my reconstructions (H AR) 
and (H AC) can be practically applied in the analysis of example cases in 
the next section of this chapter.
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Let me start my discussion with Hitchcock's original definition of 
counterfactual dependence in a solution of a causal model:30
Definition (Counterfactual Dependence in a Solution
of a Causal Model, Hitchcock) (H CDSCM)
The value z of variable Z depends counterfactually on the value x 
of variable X in a solution R(V) of a causal model M := (V, E) 
if and only if the following holds:
a) In the solution R(V) it is X=x and Z=z.
b) There are values x ' * x and z' * z, such that 
replacing the equation Ex for X
with the new equation E'x := X=x' in E 
yields the result Z=z' for variable Z.
Here, the notation of clause b) in (H CDSCM) is the shorthand of the 
following rather long condition: 'There are values x'*x  and zVz, such that 
the following holds for the system E' that results from system E, when we 
replace the equation Ex for X with the new equation E'x := X=x' that 
renders X exogenous. If we enter the values u that the variables UciV 
which are exogenous in E have in solution R{V) into the new system of 
structural equations E' (which also contains X as a new exogenous 
variable with value X=x'), this yields a new solution R'(V) in which the 
result for variable Z is Z=z7
Clearly, a surgical intervention is employed by this definition in order to 
find out whether a certain value z of variable Z depends counterfactually 
on the value x of another variable X in a solution of M. For, observe that 
replacing the equation Ex for X with a new equation E'x := X=x' in clause b) 
above amounts to surgically intervening in the model M. This intervention
30 Cf. [cH 01], p. 283 for Hitchcock's own original definition of counterfactual dependence 
in a solution of a causal model.
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only locally changes the causal model, i.e. only the value of X is surgically 
altered, whereby only the values of descendant variables of X are affected. 
The resulting values of the descendant variables Y  of X are then 
determined according to their corresponding structural equations E y that 
contain X or another descendant of X etc in their arguments. All other 
variables apart from the descendants of X keep their previous values.31 
It would lead too far away to examine the philosophic significance of an 
intervention on a variable X in a causal model M here. I consider the 
concept of an intervention to be well-known in the literature about 
causation. For a deeper examination of the formal requirements that 
interventions have to fulfill and for a motivation how an intervention on a 
variable X in a causal model M can graphically be understood, I refer the 
reader to W oodward's illuminating discussion of this concept.32 
For the purposes here it is sufficient to understand an intervention on 
variable X in model M  as an ideal manipulation of the model that only 
affects variable X directly and that removes X from the influence of its 
ancestors. Since only the descendants of X are affected by an intervention 
and only the structural equation Ex of variable X is replaced, an 
intervention only minimally disturbs the causal model M. Concerning the 
relation of an intervention to the situation S that is modeled by M, the 
intervention on X as can be understood as a hypothetical manipulation of 
the event c in S that is formalized by the actual value x  of X in M. In 
particular, such a hypothetical manipulation of S is understood to be ideal 
in the sense that it is independent of human agency.
31In this context, I call Y a descendant of X iff X is a parent of Y or a parent of a parent of 
Y and so forth.
32 Cf. [jW 03], pp. 327-336.
Let me add a word of clarification here, since Hitchcock did not formally 
distinguish this definition (H CDSCM) of counterfactual dependence in a 
solution of model M from his earlier definition (H CD) of counterfactual 
dependence for the set-up of the model M. In striking contrast to 
(H CDSCM), Hitchcock's definition (H CD) was first independent of the 
values of X and Z, because it existentially quantified over all possible 
values of all variables in V, and was second trivially independent of a 
solution in M, because the structural equations E in model M were just 
generated with the aid of (H CD).
The definition (H CDSCM) above decisively enters in Hitchcock's 
definition of an active route in a solution of a causal model.33 In this 
context, a route between two variables X and Z in causal model M := (V, E) 
is an ordered sequence of variables (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) in V  such that each 
variable in the sequence is a parent of its successor in the sequence. And a 
variable Y is called intermediate between X and Z if and only if it belongs to 
some route between X and Z.
In the following, I will mainly discuss my reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
account. His original formulation neglects to mention the intrinsic 
dependence of the activity of a route on a causal model and its solution. 
However, when reading Hitchcock's original formulation, it is clear that 
this dependence is both intended and unavoidable.
My reconstruction of the definition of an active route is the following:
Definition (Active Route, Hitchcock) (H AR)
The route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is active in a solution R{V) of the causal 
model M  := (V, E) if and only if the value 2  of Z depends 
counterfactually upon the value x of X within the resulting 
solution R'(V) of the new system of equations E', constructed 
from E as follows:
33 Cf. [cH 01], p. 286 for Hitchcock's original definition of an active route.
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For all Y in V, if Y is intermediate between X  and Z, but does 
not belong to the route (X,Yi,.--/Yn,Z), then replace the equation 
E y for Y with a new equation E 'y  := Y=y that sets Y constant to 
its value y  in the solution R(V).
If there are no intermediate variables that do not belong to this 
route, then E' is just E.34
Let me try to briefly convey the underlying idea of this definition. First, 
the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) between variables X  and Z in a solution of causal 
model M formalizes a chain of mechanisms at work in the situation S 
between the events c and e that are formalized by the values x of X  and z 
of Z. Each variable Yi in the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) in question represents to a 
set of possible alterations of an event di in situation S .  And to each of these 
sets of event alterations d\ a mechanism denoted by Eyi corresponds that 
incorporates the local laws in situation S  that determine d\. In this way, the 
route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) corresponds to the concatenation of mechanisms 
denoted by E x°E yi° . . .  ° E \n° E z  that links events c and e in the situation S. 
The definition now follows the intuition that in order to analyze the 
particular effect of a change of event c along this route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) on 
event e, all other mechanisms apart from Ex, E yi, . . . ,  EYn, and Ez have to be 
screened off.
In this understanding, the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is active in the actual 
solution of model M if and only if a change of event c propagates exactly 
through the concatenation of mechanisms E x°E yi° . . .  ° E Y n ° E z , and no other 
mechanisms in situation S, and thereby changes the event e. Formally, the 
isolation of this chain of mechanisms £ x ° £ y i°  . . .  ° E Y n ° E z  linking c and e 
is achieved by freezing the other intermediate variables Y in the model 
M  not belonging to the route (X ,Yi,...,Y n,Z) by replacing their equations
34 Observe that here R'(V) is identical with the actual solution R(V) of the model M, since 
the values y  of the intermediate variables Y  have not been changed by going over from E 
to £', they have just been frozen.
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E y  with new equations E ' y  := Y=y that set Y constant to their actual 
values y.
In order to prevent possible confusions, let me state again that the above 
definition (H AR) and also its motivation are only my reconstructions of 
Hitchcock's view. His original formulation of an active route was the 
following:35
Definition (Active Route,
Hitchcock's Misleading Original) (HMO AR)
The route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is active in the causal model (V,E) if 
and only if Z depends counterfactually upon X within the new 
system of equations E'f constructed from E as follows: 
for all Y in V, if Y is intermediate between X and Z, but does not 
belong to the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z), then replace the equation for 
Y with a new equation that sets Y equal to its actual value in E.
(If there are no intermediate variables that do not belong to this 
route, then E’ is just E.)
Apparently, Hitchcock's formulation neglects that the fact whether a route 
is active in a model M  or not depends on the solution of a model. 
However, I take (HMO AR) just to be an elliptical formulation of (H AR), 
since this dependency on a solution of a model is inherited from the 
definition of counterfactual dependence in a solution of a causal model 
(H CDSCM). And in his original formulation of this definition 
(H CDSCM), Hitchcock did not suppress this dependency.36 
Let me continue to describe Hitchcock's original formulation of his 
account of token causation. With this concept of the activity of a route in a
35 Cf. again [cH 01], p. 286.
36 Cf. again [cH 01], p. 283.
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causal model M, Hitchcock defines actual causation as the following, in 
my view rather metaphysical, notion:37
Definition (Actual Causation,
Hitchcock's M isleading Original) (HMO AC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events, and let X and Z be 
variables, such that the values of X and Z represent alterations 
of c and e respectively. Then c is a cause of e if and only if there 
is an active causal route from X to Z in an appropriate causal 
model (V, E).
Apparently, this definition equates token causation in a situation S to the 
existence of an appropriate causal model M  that contains an active route.
With this, Hitchcock attempts to give an account of the problem what it 
means for an event to cause another event as such, independently of our 
representation of these events and their surrounding situation S. And 
there are several places in Hitchcock's original discussion, where he 
implicitly defends this goal.38 The decisive notion in this context here is the 
one of an appropriate causal model. Admittedly, Hitchcock gives certain 
criteria for determining the appropriateness of a model.39 However, I 
would like to postpone the discussion of this notion of appropriateness 
and also of its associated problems until the next but one section.
In the introduction of this thesis I already mentioned the distinction that I 
make between pragmatic accounts of causation relativized to a model and 
metaphysical accounts of causation as such. In my view, this formulation 
of definition (HMO AC) here is a clear attempt to account for causation as 
such. However, even a short synoptic discussion of this distinction would 
lead us too far away in this section. So, I ask the reader to bear with me for 
this and the next section, where I would first like to motivate how the
37 Cf. [cH 01], p. 287.
38 Cf. for example [cH 01], p. 274.
39 Cf. [cH 01], p. 287.
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leading idea of Hitchcock's account to analyze token causation can be 
understood and how a meaningful account of token causation relativized 
to a model can be condensed out of it.
Definition (HMO AC) equates token causation of event e by event c in a 
situation S to the existence of an active route in an appropriate causal 
model M. We have seen above that the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) in a solution of 
a model M formalizes a chain of mechanisms E x° E y i°  . . .  °Evn°Ez  at work in 
the situation S between the events c and e that are formalized by the 
values x of X and z of Z in model M. This route was active in the actual 
solution of the model if and only if a change of event c propagated exactly 
through the concatenation of mechanisms E x ° E y i°  . . .  °Evn°Ez, and no other 
mechanisms in situation S, and thereby changed the event e.
I would motivate this notion of an active route as a way to formally 
express our intuition of a causal process linking the events c and e. In this 
way, we would understand a causal process to be a concatenation of 
mechanisms E x ° E y i°  . . .  °Eyn°Ez  at work in the given situation S linking 
events c and e, so that an alteration of event c would propagate exactly 
along this chain to change the event e with the other mechanisms in 
situation S not belonging to the causal chain in question being screened 
off. In my view, this idea of a causal process linking the events c and e is a 
very natural motivation of the role of an active route. However, Hitchcock 
in his original discussion does not speak of causal processes.
Let me now finally implement this rationale of an active route in a causal 
model as formal expression of a causal process into a definition of token 
causation relativized to a model. In my view, the straightforward reduction 
and also clarification of Hitchcock's original definition (HMO AC) given 
above is the following:
50
Definition (Actual Causation, Hitchcock) (H AC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let 
M := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the 
following holds: There are variables X and Z in V, such that the 
values x of X and z of Z in the actual solution R(V) of (V, E) 
represent the actually occurring events c and e in S and such 
that their non-actual values x' and z' represent alterations of 
c and e respectively.
Then c is an actual cause of e according to the model M  if and only 
if in the actual solution R{V) of M there is an active route from 
X to Z.
The decisive change from Hitchcock's original formulation (HMO AC) to 
this reduction (H AC) intended to define token causation relativized to a 
model lies in the role of the causal model in these formulations. In 
(HMO AC), Hitchcock existentially quantifies over all appropriate models 
M  in order to define what a cause in a situation S is -  independently of our 
description of this situation. For, this is exactly what our causal models M  
are: They are descriptions of the given situation S. In essence, (HMO AC) 
rules that c is a cause of e in situation S if and only if there is an appropriate 
description M of S, according to which there is a causal process in S linking 
c and e. In contrast to this, (H AC) qualifies token causation in situation S to 
a fixed description M of this situation from the very beginning. (H AC) 
rules that c is a cause of e according to a fixed description M  of situation S if 
and only if according to this fixed description M there is a causal process in 
S linking c and e.
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Apart from this, the only formal difference between (HMO AC) and 
(H AC) is the following: Again, my formulation (H AC) explicitly mentions 
that the activity of a route depends on the solution of the model M. And 
again, this dependence is inherited from the definition of counterfactual 
dependence in a solution of a causal model (H CDSCM) and hence 
unavoidable.
As already mentioned, I will discuss the philosophic implications of this 
differentiation between a pragmatic understanding of causation relativized 
to a given model by my definition (H AC) and a more metaphysical 
understanding of causation by Hitchcock's original formulation (HMO AC) 
in the next but one section of this chapter. There, I will also argue more 
elaborately for the advantages of my pragmatic understanding.
In the next section, I will discuss two examples, in order to illustrate how 
my reconstruction (H AC) can be applied. I will employ these examples in 
my argumentation that my reconstruction of Hitchcock's account with 
definitions (H AR) and (H AC) seems to have a striking advantage in 
comparison to Lewis's classic counterfactual account regarding two of the 
main three problems of the latter -  asymmetric over-determination and 
intransitivity of causation.
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H it c h c o c k 's  S u c c e ssfu l  A n a l y s is  
o f  Exem plary  Ca s e s  
of  A sym m etr ic  O v e r -D e t e r m in a t io n
AND OF THE INTRANSITIVITY OF CAUSATION
In this section, I will illustrate the functioning of my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's definitions (H AR) and (H AC). Concretely, I will discuss how 
they are applied to analyze two of Hitchcock's favorite examples.
Hitchcock constructed the first of these examples to motivate that actual 
causation is not a transitive relation in general. I will state the main points 
of Hitchcock's discussion of this example and maintain that an analysis of 
this example with (H AR) and (H AC) is in accord with our causal 
intuitions about this example. Furthermore, I will illustrate that Lewis's 
classic counterfactual account fails in analyzing this example for obvious 
reasons.
The second example was developed by Hitchcock to give a case of 
asymmetric over-determination of an effect e, where the actual cause c 
pre-empts another event d, that would otherwise actually cause the effect e. 
Following Hitchcock, I will show that an analysis of this example with 
(H AR) and (H AC) will be in accord with what I take to be our causal 
intuitions about this example. Again, I will show that Lewis's classic 
counterfactual account cannot analyze this example successfully.
The discussion of these two exemplary cases then gives evidence to the 
conjecture that Hitchcock's account, reconstructed by (H AR) and (H AC) 
can surmount two of my featured three problems of the classic 
counterfactual account -  pre-emption and the intransitivity of actual 
causation.
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Let me start my discussion with the first example 'Boulder' that illustrates 
an intransitivity of actual causation. The cover story of 'Boulder' was the 
following:40
Boulder: 'A boulder is dislodged, and begins rolling ominously 
towards a hiker. Before it reaches him, the hiker sees the 
boulder and ducks. The boulder sails harmlessly over his head 
with nary a centimeter to spare. The hiker survives his ordeal.'
As already mentioned, our pre-theoretic causal intuition about this 
situation was the following: The falling of the boulder causes the hiker to 
duck, and the ducking of the hiker causes his survival. However, the 
falling of the boulder does not cause the survival of the hiker, because the 
hiker would also have survived if the boulder had not rolled. In this way, 
this example shows a failure of composition in our pre-theoretic causal 
intuition. In the following, I demonstrate that the analysis by Hitchcock's 
account of actual causation is exactly in accord with this intuition of ours 
for this example.
Hitchcock's causal model for analyzing this example was the following: 
There were three bi-valued variables, B, D and S, with B being exogenous 
and D and S being endogenous. The meta-assignment of event-alterations 
to the values of these variables were:
fO , if the boulder does not roll 
B = <
[1, if the boulder does roll
fO , if the hiker does not duck 
D = \
[1, if the hiker does duck
fO , if the hiker does not survive
S =
I I , if the hiker does survive
40 Cf. again [cH 01], p. 276 for Hitchcock's own exposition of the example. For Hitchcock's 
own discussion and analysis of the 'Boulder' example, cf. pp. 295-299 of [cH 01].
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The resulting structural equations for the endogenous variables D and S in 
Hitchcock's model were:
0 , if  B = 0
1, if  B = 1
and S =
0, if  B = 1 and D = 0
1, if  B = 1 and D = 1
1, if  B = 0 and D = 0
1, if  B = 0 and D = 1
In the actual situation, B took the value 1, which yielded the actual 
solution B = 1, D = 1, and S = 1.
The graphical representation of this model of the 'Boulder' example finally 
was:
Verify first that B = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1 in the analysis by (H AC). 
In order to be precise, this is an elliptical formulation expressing that the 
event-alteration corresponding to B = 1 is an actual cause of the event- 
alteration corresponding to D = 1 in Hitchcock's analysis of the underlying 
situation, i.e. the rolling of the boulder causes the hiker to duck. I will use 
this identification of values of variables in a model with their associated 
events throughout this thesis for reasons of improved clarity.
In order to verify that B = 1 is an actual cause of D = 1 now, we have to 
show that the route (B,D) is active in the actual solution of our causal 
model according to (H AR). Observe that there are no intermediate 
variables between B and D, so that no structural equation is replaced in 
the model. Hence, for route (B,D) to be active now, the actual value 1 of 
variable D has to depend counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable 
B in the actual solution of our model according to (H CDSCM). And this is 
the case, since in our causal model in our actual solution an intervention 
on variable B setting the value of B to B = 0 yields the result D = 0 for 
variable D. Here, I identify the replacing of the equation E b for variable B
D
B
55
with the new equation E ' b := B=0 according to definition (H CDSCM) with 
setting of B to B = 0, in order to achieve a greater simplicity of notation 
again.
Analogously, verify that D = 1 is an actual cause of S = 1 in the analysis by 
(H AC) by showing that the route (D,S) is active in the actual solution of 
our causal model according to (H AR). For this, the actual value 1 of 
variable S has to depend counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable 
D in the actual solution of our model according to (H CDSCM), since 
again there are no intermediate variables between D and S, so that no 
structural equation is replaced in the model. And this is again the case, 
since in our causal model in our actual solution with B = 1 an intervention 
on variable D setting D = 0 yields the result S = 0. With this, the route (D,S) 
is active, so that under Hitchcock's analysis also the ducking of the hiker 
causes him to survive.
Finally, verify that B = 1 is not an actual cause of S = 1 in the analysis by 
(H AC) by showing that neither the route (B,S) nor the route (B,D,S) is 
active in the actual solution of our causal model according to (H AR). 
Show first that route (B,D,S) is not active. Since there are no intermediate 
variables between B and S that do not belong to the route (B,D,S), this 
means that we have to show that the actual value 1 of variable S has does 
not depend counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable B in the 
actual solution of our model according to (H CDSCM). And this is again 
the case, since in our causal model in our actual solution an intervention 
on variable B setting B = 0 yields the result D = 0, and this in turn yields 
S = 0. With this, the route (B,D,S) is not active according to (H AR). Show 
now that route (B,S) is not active. This time, variable D is intermediate 
between B and S and does not belong to the route (B,S). This means that 
we have to show that the actual value 1 of variable S does not depend 
counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable B in the solution of the 
modification of our model, in which the equation E d for D is replaced with
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the new equation E 'd  := D=1 that sets D constant to its actual value 1 in the 
actual solution of the model. And this is again the case, since in this 
modified causal model with variable D frozen at its actual value D = 1 an 
intervention on variable B setting B = 0 still yields the result S = 1. With 
this, the route (B,D) is not active, too, according to (H AR). Taken together, 
the rolling of the boulder does not cause the hiker to survive, since neither 
of the routes (B,S) and (B,D,S) is active.
With this, the verdict that an analysis by Hitchcock's account provides for 
this example is in accord with our causal intuition of this example: The 
falling of the boulder actually causes the hiker to duck, and the ducking of 
the hiker actually causes his survival in this situation. However, the falling 
of the boulder does not cause the survival of the hiker, because the hiker 
would also have survived, if the boulder had not rolled. In this way, 
Hitchcock's account of actual causation can successfully deal with this 
case containing an intransitivity of actual causation.
More importantly, one striking advantage of Hitchcock's account in 
comparison to Lewis's account becomes apparent in this example: For, an 
analysis of this example by Lewis's classic account featured in his article 
'Causation' delivers a verdict that contradicts our causal intuition. Since 
this account of actual causation has the assumption of transitivity built in, 
it rules in this example that the rolling of the boulder causes the survival 
of the hiker. This can easily be verified. Lewis's original account of token 
causation for events that actually occur can be summarized by the 
following two definitions:41
41 Cf. [dL 73], pp. 198-200 for Lewis's original definition of counterfactual dependence.
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Definition (Causal Dependence, Lewis) (L CD)
For two actually occurring events c and e, event e is causally 
dependent on event c if and only if the following counterfactual 
holds:
If c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred.
Definition (Actual Causation, Lewis) (L AC)
For two actually occurring events c and e, event c actually causes 
event e if and only if the following holds:
There is a chain of events d i , . . . , d n ,  such that d i  is causally 
dependent on c, d i  is causally dependent on di, ... , and e is 
causally dependent on d n .
Lewis gives certain criteria under which a counterfactual as mentioned in 
(L CD) is true. For this reason, Lewis gives an elaborate semantics of 
so-called possible worlds in order to account for the truth of 
counterfactuals.42 However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe 
this semantics in detail. For our discussion in this chapter, and in the rest 
of the thesis, it is absolutely sufficient to take definition (L CD) at face 
value and to assume a naive pre-theoretic understanding of the truth of a 
counterfactual.
There is just one condition that has to be followed with regard to this 
definition (L CD). Lewis calls this condition non-backtracking.43 In essence, 
non-backtracking requires that in evaluating the featured counterfactual 
Tf c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred/ in definition 
(L CD), the other events g in the situation S that cause event c but not vice 
versa are held fixed. The main idea behind this requirement is to prevent
42 Cf. [dL 73], pp. 196-198 for Lewis's own discussion of criteria governing the truth of 
counterfactuals in this context. For a more elaborate discussion of Lewis's possible world 
semantics, cf. his book Counterfactuals, [dL 73b].
43 Cf. mainly the elaborate discussion of the non-backtracking criterion in [dL 79]. Cf. also 
p. 275 of [cH 01].
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the account from incorrectly ruling that g  is also causally dependent on c. 
The functioning of this criterion will become clearer in the discussion of 
the following three examples featured in this chapter. For further 
discussion of the non-backtracking criterion, I would like to refer the 
reader to Lewis's original text.44
The immediate observation that can be made form these two definitions is 
that Lewis's builds a transitivity of causation into his account. This 
becomes obvious by realizing that for two events c and e, if event e is 
causally dependent on event c according to definition (L CD), then c 
already causes e. For, the two events c and e form a trivial causal chain 
according to definition (L AC), consisting only of these two events. This is 
the stipulation of transitivity in Lewis's classic account of causation, 
against which Hitchcock argues. And this example 'Boulder' delivers 
strong evidence for this case, as will see now:
Consider, how Lewis's account analyzes this example: Let b\ denote the 
event that the boulder rolls, corresponding to B = 1 in Hitchcock's causal 
model. Analogously, let di and si denote the events that the hiker ducks 
and that the hiker survives respectively, corresponding to D = 1 and S = 1 
respectively in Hitchcock's causal model.
Observe that first the event di causally depends on the event fri according 
to (L CD), if we take this definition at face value. For, if the boulder had 
not rolled, the hiker would not have ducked in the situation. Observe 
second that also the event si causally depends on the event di according to 
(L CD), such that the survival of the hiker is causally dependent on the 
ducking of the hiker in Lewis's analysis.
Here, the non-backtracking criterion enters. When we consider the 
situation in which the hiker did not duck, we hold the rolling of the 
boulder fixed. Two things are achieved by this: First, we prevent bi from 
being incorrectly analyzed as causally dependent on di. Second, we limit
44 Cf. again [dL 79].
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the disturbance of the situation to a minimum. The interesting 
consequence of this minimal disturbance is that the event si changes as a 
result of not letting the change in event di track back to bi.
Both these observations are firmly supported not only by our causal 
intuition, but also by our pre-theoretic understanding of counterfactuals: If 
the boulder had not rolled, the hiker would not have ducked in our 
example; and if the hiker had not ducked in this situation with the boulder 
rolling, he would not have survived.
However, the result that an application of Lewis's definition of actual 
causation (L AC) provides stands in contradiction our causal intuition. 
For, if di causally depends on bi and if si causally depends on di, then there 
is a trivial chain bi,di,si of causally depending events, such that according 
to (L AC) bi actually causes si. So, the verdict of an application of Lewis's 
definition (L AC) to this case is that the rolling of the boulder causes the 
survival of the hiker, strongly contradicting our causal intuition about this 
case.
Lewis's only way out of this problem would be to deny that di causally 
depends on bi and that si causally depends on di. He could for example 
argue that the survival of the hiker is hardly an event in our usual 
understanding, much more a fact that is dependent on its description. In 
this line of argument, Lewis could limit his account to events in our 
natural understanding. However, I regard this way out as not being 
satisfactory. For, I take it that we have a strong intuition in this case that 
the ducking of the hiker actually causes his survival in the given 
circumstances with the boulder rolling. And an account of actual 
causation that cannot account for this intuition of ours falls short in its 
intended goal in my opinion.
On the first glance, another possible line of argument for Lewis to deny 
that di causally depends on bi and that si causally depends on di could also 
be that our given causal model is not appropriate for the example
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situation. However, in my view, such a line of argument would be on a 
par with the one above discrediting the survival of the hiker as not being a 
proper event. For, apart from extracting the events bi, d\ and si and their 
alterations, the only other ingredient for the generation of a causal model 
is the complete counterfactual information that is stipulated about the 
situation in the modeling procedure. And I take this counterfactual 
information to be a formal reflection of our intuition about this example. I 
maintain that we are interested in these events or facts b\, d\ and si and 
their alterations in the way we describe them. And we are not only 
interested, but we also have clear intuitions about them. In my view, not 
being able to account for these intuitions is not a satisfactory result when it 
comes to formalizing causation.
Let me now deal with the second of Hitchcock's favorite examples that 
contains a case of asymmetric over-determination in which one event 
causally pre-empts another one. This is the example 'Backup' with the 
following cover story:45
Backup: 'An assassin-in-training is on his first mission. Trainee 
is an excellent shot: if he shoots his gun, the bullet will fell the 
victim. A supervisor is also present, in case the trainee has a last 
minute loss of nerve and fails to pull the trigger. If the trainee 
does not shoot, the supervisor will shoot the victim herself. In 
fact, the trainee performs admirably, firing his gun and killing 
the victim.'
Hitchcock assumes the following assignment of values of variables to 
event-alterations:
45 Cf. [cH 01], p. 276 for the cover story and pp. 287-288 for Hitchcock's original 
discussion of this example.
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f O , if  the trainee does not shoot 
T =  \
[1, if  the trainee does shoot
f O , if  the supervisor does not shoot
[ l , if  the sup ervisor does shoot
f O , if the victim does not die
[ \ , if  the victim does die
With this, the resulting structural equations in Hitchcock's causal model 
are the following:
0 , if  T = 0 and S = 0
1, if  T = 0 and S = 1
1, if T = 1 and S = 0 ’
1, if  T = 1 and S = 1
fO, if T = 1 
S = \  and V =
1, if T = 0
yielding the actual solution T= 1, S -  0 and V  = 1.
The graphical representation of this model of Hitchcock's is finally:
S
T * V
In my opinion, our causal intuition in this case is rather unambiguous: 
In our understanding, the shooting of the trainee actually causes the death 
of the victim and pre-empts the shooting of the supervisor that would 
have otherwise killed the victim. In this way, we have a clear case of 
asymmetric over-determination here, in which the actual cause, namely 
the shooting of the trainee, pre-empts another event, namely the shooting 
of the supervisor, from actually causing the result, i.e. the death of the 
victim.
Let me verify now that the verdict that an analysis by Hitchcock's account 
of actual causation provides for this example is again in accord with our 
causal intuition. I demonstrate that in an application of my reconstructed 
definition (H AC) to the causal model given above the shooting of the
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trainee, formalized by T = 1, is an actual cause of the death of the victim, 
formalized by V  = 1. For this purpose, route (T,V) has to be active 
according to my reconstructed (H AR) in the actual solution T = 1, S = 0 
and V  = 1 of our causal model. Apparently, variable S is intermediate 
between T and V  and does not belong to the route (T,V). This means that 
we have to show that the actual value 1 of variable V  does depend 
counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable T  in the solution of the 
modification of our model, in which the equation Es for S is replaced with 
the new equation E's := S=0 that sets S constant to its actual value 0. And 
this is again the case, since in this modified causal model with variable S 
frozen at its actual value S = 0 an intervention on variable T  setting T = 0 
yields the result S = 0, in this way changing the value of V. Hence, the 
route (T,V) is active according to (H AR), and T = 1 is an actual cause of 
V  = 1 according to (H AC), so that Hitchcock's analysis is again in accord 
with our causal intuition in this example.
To explore Hitchcock's analysis a little further, let me also verify that 
under Hitchcock's analysis the shooting of the supervisor would have 
actually caused the death of the victim, if the trainee had not shot. With 
this, an analysis by Hitchcock's account of actual causation would again 
be in accord with our causal intuition by being able to work out the pre­
emption structure in this example. I demonstrate that in an application of 
definition (H AC) to the causal model given above the shooting of the 
supervisor, formalized by S = 1, would be an actual cause of the death of 
the victim, formalized by V = 1, under the changed circumstances in which 
the trainee did not shoot, formalized by T = 0. For this purpose, I have to 
show that in the new solution T = 0, S = 1 and V  = 1 of the causal model, 
resulting from changing the value of the exogenous variable to T = 0 and 
letting this information propagate in the model, the route (S,V) is active 
according to (H AR). For this, the actual value 1 of variable V  has to 
depend counterfactually on the actual value 1 of variable S in this changed
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solution of our model. And this is again the case, since in this actual with 
T = 0 an intervention on variable S setting S = 0 yields the result V  = 0. As a 
result, the route (S,V) is active in this changed solution, so that under 
Hitchcock's analysis the shooting of the supervisor would have caused the 
death of the victim, if the shooting of the trainee had not pre-empted this.
Consider now, how Lewis's account analyzes Hitchcock's example 
'Backup': Let h denote the event that the trainee shoots, corresponding to 
T = 1 in Hitchcock's causal model. Analogously, let si and ui denote the 
events that the supervisor shoots and that the victim dies respectively, 
corresponding to S = 1 and V  = 1 respectively in Hitchcock's causal 
model.
Observe that first the event m does not directly causally depend on the 
event h according to (L CD). For, if the trainee had not shot, the supervisor 
would have shot, and the victim would still have died in the situation. So, 
for Lewis's account to rule that the shooting of the trainee is an actual 
cause of the death of the victim, we have to find a causal chain between h 
and vi. The only possible candidate for an intermediate link in a chain 
between h and v\ in this situation is si. However, v\ is not causally 
dependent on si in the actual situation. For, if the supervisor had shot in 
addition to the trainee, the victim would have been at least as dead as 
before. As a result, the events h, si, and v\ do not form a causal chain 
according to (L AC).
For Lewis's account to work in this example, another event would have to 
be introduced into this situation to form a causal chain between h and vu 
In his discussion of Lewis's account applied to this example Hitchcock 
pointed out that the standard attempt to rescue Lewis's account here 
would be to introduce the intermediate event of a bullet en route from the 
trainee's rifle to the victim.46 Admittedly, the artificial introduction of this
46 Cf. [cH 01], p. 276 and pp. 287-289.
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event n would allow Lewis's account to get around this problem: Event n 
would causally depend on h, and v\ would causally depend on n.47 
However, there are two problems in my view with this ad hoc addition of 
event n. First, the ad hoc introduction of this new event amounts to 
maintaining that our given causal model is not appropriate for the 
example situation However, with the same argumentation as I brought 
forward against the second possible rescue strategy of Lewis's account for 
the previous 'Boulder' example, I maintain this model is very well 
justified. We extracted the events, or facts, h, si and vi out of the 
description of the situation according to the questions that we had about 
this situation. And again, we were not only interested in these facts, but 
we also had clear intuitions about them. The introduction of this new 
event n does not really answer these questions of ours that led to the 
construction of our causal model, but avoids them.
Second, the core idea of this rescue attempt is to take advantage of the 
stipulated transitivity in Lewis's definition of actual causation (L AC). But 
the previous example 'Boulder' delivered a strong argument against such 
a general stipulation.
Hitchcock's account can analyze this example 'Backup' in accord with our 
causal intuition without having to assume a transitivity of causation. And 
this is the second advantage of Hitchcock's account that I wanted to 
highlight.
47 For a verification of this, cf. again [cH 01], pp. 287-289.
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H it c h c o c k 's N o t io n  o f  A ppr o pr ia t e n e ss
o f  a  Ca u s a l  M o d el  
a n d  h is  Cla im  t o  R educe  Ca u s a t io n
t o  C o u n t e r fa c t u a l s
I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis that token causal modeling 
can be understood to split the problem of analyzing token causation into 
two sub-problems: the first being the generation of a suitable causal model 
M  to analyze a situation S, and the second is the definition of token 
causation according to this given model M.
In this section, I will argue that this differentiation into two sub-problems 
has a great advantage over classic metaphysical theories of causation: 
In qualifying causation to a given causal model M in the second sub­
problem, our formal analysis can account for the fact that there is a 
multitude of possible descriptions of this situation that may all be equally 
justified, depending on which kinds of events are of interest in S. 
For, I will argue that the individuation of events and their alterations 
heavily depends on the questions that we would like our analysis of the 
situation S to answer. And very often we are not merely interested in 
causal relationships between events in a physical sense, but also between 
facts of the matter that are dependent on our descriptions of them.
Of course, an account of token causal modeling cannot be complete 
without clarifying how the first sub-problem is solved, i.e. how such a 
causal model M is generated. I tried to reconstruct Hitchcock's modeling 
procedure with steps M l) and M2) in the first section of this chapter. In 
this section I will examine Hitchcock's notion of the appropriateness of a 
causal model. I will argue that his original formulation of appropriateness 
(HMO AM) has an underlying metaphysical spirit, but that it can
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successfully be reduced to a requirement of non-backtracking (H NB) that 
is consistent with my steps M l) and M2). I will summarize my 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's answer to the problem of model generation 
in the following way: Hitchcock has to start out with a certain description 
of a situation S which specifies the events and their alterations in which 
we are interested. This description can be represented as a basic set of 
super-exhaustive counterfactuals that has the non-backtracking property. 
This set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals uniquely determines a causal 
model M  in such a way that the model rewrites the counterfactual 
information in this basic set in a more condensed way.
I will conclude this section with a short discussion of another remarkable 
tendency of Hitchcock's original account, namely to conceptually reduce 
causation to counterfactuals. Hitchcock attempts to express the central 
concept in his account, i.e. the activity of a route, with the aid of a special 
kind of counterfactual, a so-called Explicitly Non-Foretracking (ENF) 
counterfactual. I will maintain that this reduction falls short, since the 
concept of a surgical intervention has to enter in definition (H AR) and 
Hitchcock does not give any clues how an intervention could be expressed 
by counterfactuals.
In my opinion, the decisive notion in causal modeling is the one of a 
causal model. I do not regard this as a platitude however. The 
introduction of a causal model for me marks the transition from a 
metaphysical theory of causation that attempts to account for 'causation as 
such' to a more pragmatic modeling account with the more modest claim 
to analyze causal relationships according to a given model.
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Lewis's classic account of token causation attempted to clarify under 
which conditions a certain event c causes another event e. These events 
were usual physical events in a naive scientific understanding, or to 
formulate it crudely, 'events in the real world'.48 In particular, c and e were 
understood to be independent of the descriptions employed for their 
individuation.
Lewis did not stop with this bold claim to account for 'causation as such'. 
Instead, he attempted to conceptually reduce the notion of causation to 
counterfactuals. This reductive idea becomes obvious in my 
reconstructions of Lewis's definitions of causal dependence (L CD) and 
actual causation (L AC). According to (L CD), the actually occurring event 
di is causally dependent on the actually occurring event di if and only if 
the following counterfactual holds: 'If d\ had not occurred, then di would 
not have occurred.'. Definition (L AC) then rules that for two actually 
occurring events c and e, event c actually causes event e if and only if there 
is chain of causally dependent events di,...,dn linking c and e.
In this way, the auxiliary concept of causal dependence is expressed as a 
counterfactual relationship for Lewis. And with this, actual causation 
indirectly reduces to a counterfactual relationship, too, in Lewis's 
framework. Finally, Lewis defines conditions for the truth of these 
counterfactuals via a semantics of possible worlds employing a naive 
underlying notion of truth in a possible world.49 However, I do not want 
to go into the details of this attempt of Lewis to express token causation in 
purely acausal terms. I just wanted to emphasize the metaphysic nature of 
Lewis's project not only to account for token causation independently of 
our description but also to conceptually reduce causation to counter- 
factual relations.
48 Cf. [dL 73] and also [dL 73b].
49 Cf. [dL 73b].
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In stark contrast to this, the introduction of a causal model in my opinion 
allows a clear formal analysis of various causal notions by a given model 
with a well-defined ontology. In the following, let me briefly mention the 
advantages that the introduction of a causal model together with a clear 
ontology delivers for the analysis of causal relations on the token level in 
my view.
The starting point for the construction of a structural causal model is a 
description of a given situation S, consisting of various singular events. 
The distinctive feature of a structural theory of modeling token causation 
is that it exploits counterfactual information about the occurring events in 
S for the analysis of their causal relationships. As a result, the first decisive 
problem in the introduction of a structural causal model for the analysis of 
token causation is what we admit as an event and its possible alterations. 
I argue that this individuation of events and their alterations heavily 
depends on the questions that we would like our analysis of the situation 
S to answer.
Consider the 'Boulder' example again: In analyzing this example our 
interest was in the question whether the rolling of the boulder is an actual 
cause for the survival of the hiker. The survival of the hiker is though 
hardly an event, even in the most liberal understanding of events. In 
classic philosophical terminology, the survival or not-survival of the hiker 
are classified as facts of the matter. So, if we want to answer whether the 
rolling of the boulder caused the hiker to survive, we have no other choice 
than to treat the survival of the hiker as a quasi-event with its possible 
alteration, the not-survival of the hiker. Questions like this concerning 
causal dependencies between facts that are individuated according to our 
interests in and descriptions of certain quasi-situations, rather than 
between physical events, are in no way far-fetched. On the contrary, in my 
view they are the norm in ordinary causal discourse.
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Nevertheless, a treatment of these questions poses a problem for Lewis's 
account of causation, in which events and their alterations were 
understood as being strictly physical.50 And problems do not stop here. 
Kim put forward a popular criticism of Lewis's classical counterfactual 
account in which he showed that there are types of quasi-situations 
containing quasi-events between which there are counterfactual 
dependencies that are not causal.51 These quasi-events could be 
counterfactually dependent in virtue of the meaning of their descriptions, 
because they are logically or mathematically related, or because of certain 
non-causal laws or boundary conditions.52
This is what I regard as the main advantage of limiting causal analysis to a 
model: A model brings with it a well-defined ontology, and this ontology 
can contain exactly the quasi-events or facts and their alterations in which 
we are interested. In this way, the events which we analyze with the aid of 
this model do not have to be physical events and do not even have to be 
independent of our description of them. They can be abstract entities like 
facts that are individuated according to our descriptions.
In this way, apart from the three main problems of Lewis's classic 
counterfactual account that I stated in the introduction of this thesis -  
symmetric over-determination, asymmetric over-determination and 
stipulation of transitivity -  I would like to count this as a fourth problem: 
Inability to account for a wide array of events and facts. Furthermore, let 
me also finally remark that definitions (L CD) and (L AC) can only deal 
with the occurrence or non-occurrence of events and not with more 
complicated alterations of events as can be done in a causal model 
containing multi-valued variables.
50 Cf. again [dL 73] and [dL 73b].
5’ Cf. [jK 73].
52 Cf. [nC 89].
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Remarkably, despite this in my view major advantage of a restricted 
understanding of causal modeling to relativize causal relationships to 
given models, Hitchcock himself still champions the metaphysical aim to 
account for causation as such, independent of our description. For, his 
original definition of actual causation (HMO AC) ruled that c is an actual 
cause of e if and only if there is an active causal route from X to Z in an 
appropriate causal model (V, E).53 In the following I will hence briefly discuss 
his original notion of appropriateness of a causal model. According to 
Hitchcock, there are at least the following three requirements for a model 
M := (V, E) to appropriately formalize a given situation S:54
Partial Characterization (Appropriateness of a Model,
Hitchcock's Misleading Original) (HMO AM)
A causal model M := (V, E) is appropriate, only if the following
holds:
i) The equations in E entail no false counterfactuals.
ii) The equations in E do not represent counterfactual 
dependence relations between events that are not distinct.
iii) V  does not contain variables whose values correspond to 
possibilities that we consider to be too remote.
Only the third condition iii) mentions our considerations in describing the 
underlying situation S. Condition i) is formulated in a way that suggests 
that the set of counterfactuals, which I call the basic set of super- 
exhaustive counterfactuals, is independent of our description of the 
situation S. And condition ii) seems to imply that also the individuation 
of events is independent of our interest in situation S. In my view, this 
partial characterization is not only misguided but, with the exception of 
condition i), also rather empty.
53 Cf. [cH 01], p. 287.
54 Cf. again [cH 01], p. 287.
Let me briefly try to motivate this claim and clarify how (HMO AM) can 
be embedded into my reconstruction of Hitchcock's modeling account. 
The third condition iii) reduces to the requirement that we should 
individuate events and their alterations in S in a way that they are relevant 
for our analysis. If this requirement is not further specified, it is already 
contained in my description of the first step in modeling a situation, 
denoted by M l) in the first section of this chapter. Condition ii) can be 
reconstructed similarly as requiring that events and their alterations in S 
also have to be individuated in a way that disjoint variables can only 
formalize disjoint sets of event alterations. And such a criterion can be 
considered to be rather obvious.
Only condition i) of (HMO AM) is more interesting and concerns the 
second step M2) of my reconstruction of Hitchcock's procedure of 
modeling a situation in the first section of this chapter. Since Hitchcock's 
structural equations E encode the counterfactual information that is 
contained in the set of exhaustive counterfactuals describing situation S, 
condition i) reduces to a requirement of this set of counterfactuals. This 
requirement can be reconstructed as demanding that this set may not 
contain certain counterfactuals which we consider not to be admissible. 
Hitchcock is rather vague about which counterfactuals should be excluded 
in this way. There is just one remark of his stating that the counterfactuals 
which are encoded by his structural equations E should not backtrack.55 
Unfortunately, Hitchcock does not clarify what such a non-backtracking 
requirement really means. In my opinion, it can be reconstructed in 
analogy to Lewis's non-backtracking criterion which I briefly mentioned 
in the last section of this chapter. In this way, I suggest the following 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's non-backtracking requirement:
55 Cf. [cH 01], p. 280.
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Constraint (Non-Backtracking, Hitchcock) (H NB)
The basic set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals constituting 
the causal model M  := (V, E) describing a situation S has to be 
comprised in a way so that the following holds:
For all variables Y and W  in set V, if W is counterfactually 
dependent on Y according to definition (H CD), then Y is not 
also counterfactually dependent on W.
This way, it is excluded that a change of the value w of variable W in the 
model automatically tracks back to the parents Y of W, if we test whether 
w  might be an actual cause of another value 2  of a variable Z in model M.
In order to illustrate this criterion (H NB), consider again the 'Boulder' 
example. In the last section of this chapter, I demonstrated that in our 
causal model with the actual solution B=l, D=l, and S=l, an intervention 
on variable D setting D = 0 yielded the result S = 0. This was because the 
change in the value of D to D = 0 did not track back to its parent variable 
B, for otherwise the value of B would have changed to B = 0, too, so that 
the route (D,S) would no longer have been active.
This is the only requirement that I would like to keep from Hitchcock's 
original notion of the appropriateness of a causal model expressed in 
(HMO AM): In Hitchcock's causal models M defined by (H CM), 
backtracking is excluded by requiring that the condition in (H NB) is 
fulfilled in the underlying set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals that 
constitutes M. Apparently, Hitchcock took this non-backtracking 
condition requiring that no variable Y can be both parent and child of 
another variable VV very seriously. For, he repeatedly emphasized that his 
structural equations are asymmetric in this way.56
56 Cf. for example [cH 01], pp. 275 and 280.
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Summarizing, this brief argumentation has shown that Hitchcock's 
original notion of the appropriateness of a causal model (HMO AM) 
certainly has an underlying metaphysical spirit, but that it can successfully 
be reduced to a requirement that is consistent with my reconstruction of 
the modeling procedure with steps Ml) and M2) in the first section of this 
chapter. I hope that I have given enough reason and motivation for the 
pragmatic view that M l) and M2) express: In qualifying causal analysis of 
a situation S to a model, we acknowledge that this analysis is driven by 
our interests in the situation and that the way we individuate events and 
quasi-events in S reflects these interests.
I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis that token causal modeling 
splits the problem of analyzing token causation into two sub-problems: 
the first being the generation of a suitable causal model M to analyze a 
situation S, and the second is the definition of token causation according 
to this given model M. I argue that this differentiation into two sub­
problems has the great advantage over classic metaphysical theories of 
causation of being able to account for the dependency of the causal 
analysis of a situation S on our interests in this situation. In qualifying 
causation to a given causal model M in the second sub-problem, our 
formal analysis can account for the fact that there is a multitude of 
possible descriptions M  of this situation that may all be equally justified, 
depending on which kinds of events are of interest in S.
Of course, an account of token causal modeling cannot be complete 
without clarifying how the first sub-problem is solved, i.e. how such a 
causal model M  is generated. I tried to reconstruct Hitchcock's modeling 
procedure with steps M l) and M2) in the first section of this chapter. The 
discussion of Hitchcock's notion of appropriateness of a causal model in 
this section has added my definition of the non-backtracking criterion 
(H NB) to this procedure. In this way, I summarize my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's answer to the problem of model generation in the following
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way: Hitchcock starts out with a certain description of a situation S which 
specifies the events and their alterations in which we are interested. This 
description can be represented as a basic set of super-exhaustive 
counterfactuals that has the non-backtracking property. This set of super- 
exhaustive counterfactuals uniquely determines a causal model M  in such 
a way that the model rewrites the counterfactual information in this basic 
set in a more condensed way. In this way, I regard Hitchcock's answer to 
the problem of model generation to be rather empty and to be more an 
account of model stipulation. However, this thesis is mainly concerned 
with the second problem of causal modeling, i.e. the definition of 
causation according to a given model. In this way, I settle for this result 
and do not attempt to clarify how a description of a situation can be 
reconstructed by a basic set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals.
Let me conclude this section with a short discussion of another remarkable 
tendency of Hitchcock's original account, namely to conceptually reduce 
causation to acausal terms. Hitchcock explicitly claims that if Lewis 
offered a reductive analysis of causation in purely acausal terms with the 
aid of counterfactuals, then his own account offers a reductive analysis of 
causation with the aid of active routes.57 To be more precise, Hitchcock 
attempts to express the central concept in his account, i.e. the activity of a 
route, with the aid of a special kind of counterfactual, a so-called Explicitly 
Non-Foretracking (ENF) counterfactual,58 In my understanding, Hitchcock's 
motivation for this is to conceptually reduce his notion of actual causation 
to purely counterfactual and hence acausal notions.
57 Cf. [cH 01], p. 274.
58 Cf. [cH 01], pp. 285-287 for Hitchcock's own comments about ENF counterfactuals and 
their correspondence to the notion of an active route.
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Reconstructing Hitchcock's view in my terminology, a route 
(Y/Xi/ . . . /Xn,W) is active in a solution R(V) of the causal model M  := (V, E) 
according to definition (H AR) if and only if there are two true 
counterfactuals
11) Y=y & Z\—z\ &...& Zk=zk □—» W=w and
12) Y=y' & Zi=zi &...& Zk=zk D-> W=w'
such that the following holds: In the counterfactual II), y and w are the 
actual values of variables Y and W  in the solution R(V), and Zi,...,Zk are 
exactly the variables in V  that are descendants of Y and ancestors of W, but 
do not belong to the route (Y,Xi,...,Xn,W ) in question, and zi,...,zk are their 
respective actual values in the solution R(V). In the counterfactual 12), 
y Vy and w’±w are non-actual values of variables Y and W.
Indeed, the truth of these counterfactuals under these circumstances is 
equivalent to the conditions required in definition (H AR) for the route 
(Y,Xi,...,Xn,W ) to be active. For having Zi=zi Zk=zkin the antecedents
of these counterfactuals corresponds to freezing the intermediate variables 
between Y and W  at their actual values, in this way constructing a new 
system of structural equations E' as required by definition (H AR). The 
truth of both the first and the second counterfactual then literally 
expresses the counterfactual dependence of W=w on Y=y in this new 
solution R'(V) of E', again as required by definition (H AR). In order to 
briefly motivate calling these counterfactuals explicitly non-foretracking, 
observe that the freezing of variables Zi,...,Zk at their actual values zi,...,zk 
exactly achieves that the change in the value of Y to yVy cannot propagate 
or foretrack along other routes between Y and W  than the one specified 
(Y,Xl,...,Xn,W ).
With this, Hitchcock wants to express the activity of a route in purely 
counterfactual terms and hence reduce his notion of actual causation to 
purely counterfactual and hence acausal terms. However, I maintain that 
the reduction aimed for falls short. For, in my view the essence of
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definition (H AR) not only lies in the way, in which a change of the value 
of Y propagates in the causal model, but also in the notion of a change in 
the model itself. For, both for freezing the intermediate variables Z i,...,Zk 
at their actual values zi,...,zk and for changing the actual value of Y into 
yVy we have to intervene in the causal model M. In my understanding, the 
concept of a surgical intervention is clearly a causal notion, and Hitchcock 
does not give any clues how an intervention could be expressed with the 
aid of a counterfactual. Hence, the mere equivalence of the truth of the 
two counterfactuals II) and 12) above to the condition expressed in 
definition (H AR) for a route to be active is not enough for reducing 
(H AR) to counterfactual notions. Instead, we would also have to explain 
in counterfactual terminology how we can intervene on the variables in 
the antecedents of these counterfactuals, and this is where Hitchcock falls 
short.
The problem of keeping the notion of an intervention as an irreducible 
causal concept in an account of causation, like my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's account with definitions (H AR) and (H AC), is rather 
profound and the debate about this is rather extensive. For this reason, I 
do not go deeper into this problem here and refer to W oodward's 
illuminating discussion of the notion of an intervention.59
59 Cf. [jW 03], pp. 94-107.
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H it c h c o c k 's D e f in it io n  
o f  C o n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n  
Em p l o y in g  W eakly A ctive  R o u t e s  
fo r  A n a l y z in g  Ca s e s  of 
S ym m etr ic  O ver-D e t e r m in a t io n
In this section, I will deal with Hitchcock's account of contributory 
causation for cases of symmetric over-determination. Admittedly, the term 
contributory causation is my terminology, and it is borrowed from Pearl.60 
Hitchcock does not give this account a special name, he just states that his 
previous definition of actual causation, reconstructed by my (H AC), is not 
capable of analyzing cases appropriately in which an effect has two or 
more causes that work in parallel. For cases of this form, Hitchcock 
introduces his definition of a weakly active route, which I will reconstruct 
as (H WAR), and his definition of token causation for these cases, which I 
dub contributory causation and which I reconstruct as (H CC).
In my reconstruction of Hitchcock, an event c is then a contributory cause 
of another event e according to a certain model if and only if there is a 
weakly active causal route between the variables formalizing these events 
in this causal model. In this account of contributory causation with my 
reconstructed definitions (H WAR) and (H CC), Hitchcock deviates from 
his previous rationale of equating a causal process with an active route in 
a model. Now the formalization of a causal process between a 
contributory cause c and its effect e in a situation S is a weakly active route 
in a causal model M  between the variables X and Z whose actual values x 
and z formalize these events c and e.
60 Cf. my discussion of Pearl's account of m odelling token causation in the next chapter of 
this thesis.
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Still, a chain of mechanisms linking c and e in situation S corresponds to 
this route. However, in the criterion for this route to be weakly active this 
chain of mechanisms is no longer isolated, so that a change in event c can 
propagate along other mechanisms outside the chain to event e.
Again, Hitchcock himself does not relativize his original account of token 
causation for cases of symmetric over-determination to a given model, but 
wants to account for causation as such in these cases. However, referring 
to my argumentation before, I will continue to maintain that such an 
understanding is misguided.
As a point of application and comparison, I will show how my 
reconstructions of Hitchcock's definitions (H WAR) and (H CC) are 
applied in an analysis of Lewis's classic example of symmetric over- 
determination, the Firing Squad. Lewis famously claimed to have no clear 
intuition in this case. Many other people have one, though, and I will 
demonstrate that in the analysis of this example Lewis's account fails to 
analyze two events as contributory causes that are contributory causes 
according to our pre-theoretic causal understanding. In striking contrast to 
this, my reconstruction of Hitchcock's account with definition (H WAR) 
and (H CC) successfully detects these two contributory causes.
Let me start my discussion with my reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
definition of a weakly active route, which is the following:61
Definition (Weakly Active Route, Hitchcock) (H WAR)
The route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is weakly active in a solution R(V) of the
causal model M  := (V, E) if and only if there exists a set (possibly
empty) of variables {Wi,...,Wm} in V \  {X,Yi,...,Yn,Z}, and values
61 Cf. [cH 01], pp. 289-290 for Hitchcock's original discussion of cases of symmetric over­
determination.
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that lie within the redundancy range of {Wi,...,Wm} for 
this route and its values in R(V), such that the following holds:
The value z of Z depends counterfactually upon the value x  of X  
within the resulting solution R'(V) of the new system of 
equations E', constructed from E as follows:
For each W i, replace the equation Ews for W\ with the new 
equation E'wi := W\=Wi that sets Wi constant to its redundant 
value Wi.
In this context, the values w\,...,wm lie within the redundancy range of 
W i,...,W m for the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) with actual values Yi=yi, Yn=yn, 
Z=z, if the following holds: If for each Wi its equation Ewi is replaced with 
the new equation E'wi := Wi=Wi that sets Wi constant to this value w\r this 
does not alter the actual values Yi=yi, Yn=yn, Z=z of the variables in the 
route in question.
Notably, the variables Wi,...,W m in no way have to be intermediate 
between X and Z, which is a remarkable deviation from my previous 
reconstructed definition (H AR). In this definition (H WAR), the 
redundancy criterion only requires that variables Wi,...,W m are disjoint 
from the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) and that the setting of the values W i,. . . ,W n  
does not alter the values of this selected route for the actual solution R{V) 
in the model.
My reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation then 
incorporates this notion of a weakly active route in a completely 
analogous way as my reconstruction of his definition of actual causation 
incorporates the notion of an active route.62
62 Cf. [cH 01], p. 289 for Hitchcock's original version of this definition.
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Definition (Contributory Causation, Hitchcock) (H CC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let 
Af := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the 
following holds: There are variables X and Z in V, such that the 
values x of X and z of Z in the actual solution R{V) of (V, E) 
represent the actually occurring events c and e in S and such 
that their non-actual values x' and z' represent alterations of 
c and e respectively.
Then c is a contributory cause of e according to the model M  if and 
only if in the actual solution R{V) of M there is a weakly active 
route from X to Z.
The basic idea of Hitchcock's account of actual causation with my 
reconstructed definitions (H AR) and (HAC) was that c is a cause of e in a 
situation S if and only if there is a causal process linking these events c and 
e. A causal process was a concatenation of the mechanisms that were at 
work in the given situation S and that were linking events c and e. 
Concretely, Hitchcock formalized a causal process between c and e by an 
active route in a causal model M between the variables X and Z whose 
actual values x and z formalized these events c and e. In essence, an active 
route formally filtered out a chain of mechanisms linking c and e, so that 
an alteration of event c would propagate along this chain to change the 
event e. Formally, this isolation of a chain of mechanisms linking c and e 
was achieved by freezing the other variables Y  in the model M that are 
intermediate between X and Z but do not belong to the route in question.
In this way, the mechanisms in situation S not belonging to the causal 
chain in question were screened off, so that a change in event c could 
propagate only along the chain to event e.
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In this account of contributory causation now with my reconstructed 
definitions (H WAR) and (H CC), Hitchcock deviates from this rationale of 
equating a causal process with an active route in a model. Now the 
formalization of a causal process between a contributory cause c and its 
effect e is weakly active route in a causal model M  between the variables X 
and Z whose actual values x  and z formalize these events c and e. Still, a 
chain of mechanisms linking c and e in situation S corresponds to this 
route. However, in the criterion for this route to be weakly active this 
chain of mechanisms is no longer isolated, so that a change in event c can 
propagate along other mechanisms outside the chain to event e.
For, in definition (H WAR), the other variables Y in the model M that are 
intermediate between X and Z but do not belong to the route in question 
no longer all have to be frozen. Instead, some of these variables Y, denoted 
by Wi, may be frozen at certain arbitrary values w\, that may in particular 
be non-actual, with the only proviso that this freezing does not alter the 
actual values of the variables along the route.63 However, there may be 
others of these variables Y  that are intermediate between X and Z but do 
not belong to the route in question that are not frozen and that retain their 
original equations. As a result, some of the mechanisms in situation S not 
belonging to the causal chain corresponding to the route are not screened 
off, so that a change in event c can also propagate along other mechanisms 
outside the chain to event e.
I will discuss this difference between my reconstructions of definitions 
(H AR) and (H WAR) more deeply in the last chapter of this thesis, where 
I will apply them in the analysis of certain paradigmatic examples. For 
now, I settle for the remark that (H WAR) is a generalization of (H AR) 
designed to deal with cases of a special structure by relaxing the rationale
63 In order to prevent any misunderstandings: Of course, as already mentioned, the 
variables Wi in the contingency set in definition (H WAR) that are frozen at arbitrary 
values do not have to be intermediate between X and Z, they just have to be disjoint from 
the featured route between X and Z.
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of isolating causal chains. As a trivial corollary, note that in this way actual 
causation defined by (H AC) is a special case of contributory causation 
defined by (H CC).
Let me finally highlight the idea behind this freezing of variables Wi being 
disjoint from the featured route between X and Z at certain arbitrary 
values w\, as long as this freezing does not alter the actual values of the 
variables along this route: It is exactly this freezing that is intended to 
screen off the influence of another contributory cause d in the situation S 
from the effect e. For, observe that for another cause d to symmetrically 
over-determine the effect e together with cause c, this event d has to work 
in parallel to c. This means that in the model M formalizing the situation S 
this additional cause d has to be formalized by a variable Wi that is disjoint 
from the route between X and Z and not intermediate between X and Z. 
Freezing Wi at a non-actual value w\ alters the actual event d and 
graphically removes its influence from the situation. The redundancy of 
value w\ ensures that in the actual situation the influence of cause c along 
the featured route to e is not disturbed.
In the following, I will illustrate the application of my above
reconstruction of Hitchcock's two definitions (H WAR) and (H CC) with 
Lewis's classic example 'Firing Squad'. But before this, let me for reasons 
of fairness state Hitchcock's original formulation of a weakly active route. 
My reconstruction given above is a slight deviation from it, because I
regard Hitchcock's original formulation as misleading. In his original
formulation of a weakly active route, Hitchcock suppressed the
dependence on a solution of a causal model. This dependence is though 
vital for a functioning of the definition. However, the reader my compare 
Hitchcock's original formulation with mine and form a judgment for him- 
or herself. Hitchcock's original is the following:64
64 Cf. again [cH 01], p. 289 for Hitchcock's original discussion.
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Definition (Weakly Active Route,
Hitchcock's M isleading Original) (HMO WAR)
The route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is weakly active relative to (VfE), if and 
only if there exists a set (possibly empty) of variables 
{W i,.. vWm} in V  \ |X ,Yi,...,Yn,Z}, and values that lie
within the redundancy range of {Wi,...,Wm} for this route and 
its actual values, such that Z depends counterfactually upon X  
within the new system of equations E' constructed from E as 
follows: for each Wi, replace the equation for Wi with the new 
equation that sets Wi equal to w\.
Regarding my reconstruction of definition (H CC), Hitchcock did not give 
an explicit original formulation, since he only shortly discussed the 
problem of symmetric over-determination. Instead, Hitchcock just 
mentioned that his originally formulation of (H AC) has to be carried over 
analogously, just replacing the notion of an active route with the one of a 
weakly active route.65 In the same spirit as in the case of Hitchcock's 
account of actual causation, I take Hitchcock's original formulations as 
practical abbreviations of my elaborate reconstructions (H WAR) and 
(H CC).
Let me now finally come to the discussion of the example 'Firing Squad', 
which has the following cover story:66
Firing Squad: 'A court orders the execution of a prisoner. On 
the signal of their captain, a two man firing squad with both 
riflemen being accurate, alert and law-abiding, executes the 
order. The prisoner dies.'67
65 Cf. again [cH 01], pp. 289-290 for Hitchcock's original discussion.
66 For the original Firing Squad example, cf. section E of [dL 86].
67 The cover story given here is reformulated by me. Pearl himself gives the example with  
an unknown court order, so that the outcome of the situation is also unknown. Moreover,
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For the analysis of this example by my reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
account with the definitions (H WAR) and (H CC), I suggest the following 
causal model: There are five bi-valued variables, 17, C, A, B, and D. U is the 
only exogenous variable and has the following meta-assignment of events 
to its values:
jO , if the court does not order the execution of the prisoner 
| l , if the court does order the execution of the prisoner
Variables C, A, B and D are endogenous representing the following event- 
alterations:
jO , if the captain does not give a signal 
[1, if the captain does give a signal
fO, if rifleman A does not shoot 
A = \
[ \ , if rifleman A does shoot
fO, if rifleman B does not shoot 
B = \
[1, if rifleman B does shoot
jO , if the prisoner does not die 
[ l , if the prisoner does die
With this, the resulting structural equations for the variables C, A, B and D 
are the following:
and
1, if A = 1 or B = 1 
0 , otherwise
or in short form: C -U , B = C, A  = C and D = max{A,B}.
he explicitly excludes other possible mechanisms that could affect whether the prisoner 
dies or not.
The graphical representation of Tiring Squad' finally is:
A
U D
B
The actual situation described in the cover story is then modeled by the 
following value distribution: The exogenous variable U receives the value 
U = 1, yielding the actual solution C = 1, hence A  = 1 and B = 1, and in turn
Suppose we want to analyze whether B = 1 is a contributory cause of D = 1 
in the given situation. I maintain that we have an unequivocal causal 
intuition in this case. The shooting of rifleman B causally contributes to the 
death of the victim, if both riflemen A  and B shoot. However, we would 
not say that the shooting of rifleman B actually causes the death of the 
victim, since rifleman A  would still shoot, if rifleman B did not, and the 
victim would still die.
In this way, I argue, we see a clear difference between actual and 
contributory causation in his case. Furthermore, the question whether 
A  = 1 is a contributory cause of D = 1 in the given situation is analogously 
judged by our pre-theoretic causal intuition in my view: We take the 
shooting of rifleman A  as causally contributing to the death of the victim, 
but not see it as actually causing it.
Verify first that B = 1 is not an actual cause of D = 1 under Hitchcock's 
analysis with definitions (H AR) and (H AC), since the route (B, D) is not 
active according to (H AR): Changing the value of B to B = 0 still brings 
about D = 1. For, the equation £ a  of D's other parent A remains unaffected, 
since A  is no descendant of B and hence may not be frozen at its actual 
value.
D = 1.
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However, B = 1 is very well a contributory cause of D = 1 under the 
analysis with definitions (H WAR) and (H CC). For, observe that the route 
(B, D) is weakly active according to (H WAR) in the actual solution of our 
model given above: Obviously, variable A  is disjoint from the route from B 
to D. And the non-actual value 0 lies in the redundancy range for A  and 
the route (B, D); for, altering the value of A  to A  = 0 does neither affect the 
value of B nor of D in the actual situation. However, in the modified set of 
equations E', in which A  is set to A  = 0, an intervention on variable B 
changing its value to B = 0 brings about D = 0, i.e. a change in the value of 
D. With this, route (B, D) is weakly active and according to definition 
(H CC), B = 1 is a contributory cause of D = 1.
With an exactly analogous argumentation one can also show that the route 
{A, D) is weakly active according to (H WAR) in the actual solution of our 
model given above, but not active according to (H AR). In this way, A = 1 
is also a contributory cause of V -  1, but no actual cause, in Hitchcock's 
analysis.
Consider now, how Lewis's classic counterfactual account would analyze 
this example 'Firing Squad': Let fa denote the event that rifleman B shoots, 
corresponding to B = 1 in our causal model above. Analogously, let a\ and 
vi denote the events that rifleman A  shoots and that the victim dies 
respectively, corresponding to A  = 1 and V  = 1 respectively in Hitchcock's 
causal model.
Discuss first whether fa actually causes v\ according to Lewis's definition 
(L AC). There are no intermediate events between fa and m, so that there is 
only the trivial chain consisting of events fa and v\ themselves that 
connects fa and m. In this way, fa is an actual cause of m according to 
(L AC) if and only if v\ is causally dependent on fa according to (L CD). 
And according to our definition of causal dependence, vi was causally 
dependent on fa if and only if the following counterfactual held: If fa had
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not occurred, then v\ would not have occurred. We detect that if fa had not 
occurred, then vi would still have occurred, since a\ still occurred.
Note that the non-backtracking requirement for definition (L CD) 
decisively enters here. In evaluating the counterfactual "If fa had not 
occurred, then ...' we keep the event a  fixed that denotes the order of the 
captain to fire, corresponding to C = 1 in our causal model. If the change of 
event fa were allowed to track back to this event ci, on which fa causally 
depends, this backtracking would alter the result. Then with the captain 
not ordering to shoot, rifleman A  would not shoot as well, so that the 
victim would survive. However, with prohibiting backtracking, we have 
the result that fa is not an actual cause of v\ according to (L AC).
With an analogous argumentation one can show that fli is not an actual 
cause of v\ according to (L AC) as well.
In this way, the verdicts that Lewis's account delivers stand in a clear 
contradiction to what I take to be our causal intuitions about this example. 
Lewis tried to avoid this problem by simply claiming that he did not have 
any clear intuitions about such cases, i.e. cases in which two or more 
events symmetrically over-determine an effect.68 However, I view this 
more as a desperate move than as a proper solution of the problem. In my 
opinion, we have clear intuitions about this example, and see a clear 
difference between actual and contributory causation. Not being able to 
account for these intuitions cannot be satisfactory for Lewis.
As a result, the last of my featured three advantages of Hitchcock's 
account in comparison to Lewis's account becomes apparent: Hitchcock's 
account analyzes a case symmetric over-determination in accord with our 
causal intuition, whereas Lewis's account fails to do this.
68 Cf. again section £  of [dL 86].
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W o o d w a r d 's  A c c o u n t  
o f  In c l u siv e  T o k e n  Ca u s a t io n  
Be in g  Eq u iv a l e n t  t o  H it c h c o c k 's A c c o u n t  
o f  Co n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n
In this section I will give a brief synopsis of the basic facts of Woodward's 
account of token causation that is featured in Woodward's influential 
book Making Things Happen.69 In a certain way, this presentation will do 
injustice to Woodward, because he does not really intend to give an 
account of his own for dealing with token causation. Only a comparatively 
small part of the book deals with modeling token causation. Instead, 
Making Things Happen gives an overview of an interventionist theory of 
causation and explanation. It touches on topics like the notion of an 
intervention and its justification, the notion of invariance and the way in 
which it offers a new understanding of the concept of a law in causal 
explanations, and the issue of how causal relationships can be exploited 
for purposes of manipulation and control. In my view, the book more than 
succeeds here, and it does so in a very illuminating way.
Concerning the issue of modeling token causation, Woodward's intention 
is merely to give a sketch of certain characteristics that a successful 
account of token causation has to fulfill in his view. For many details of 
this sketch Woodward explicitly refers to Hitchcock's article 'The 
Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs', with which 
the other sections of this chapter have dealt.70
My presentation and discussion of W oodward's sketch that I will offer in 
this section will be very short compared to the way in which I have dealt
69 Cf. [jW 03].
70 Cf. for example [jW 03], p. 83.
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with Hitchcock. I see my justification for this mode of presentation in the 
following fact: The relevant definitions in W oodward's sketch of token 
causation are all taken over from Hitchcock. In particular Woodward's 
final definition of token causation that I will denote (W TC) is equivalent 
to Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation (H CC). In this way, 
most of the remarks that I have made about Hitchcock's account in the 
other sections of this chapter equally apply to W oodward's account. My 
reason for focusing on Hitchcock's account of token causation in this 
chapter is mainly that Woodward explicitly refers to it, that it is more 
detailed, and finally that it has been in strong need of a conceptual 
clarification.
In strong contrast to Hitchcock, Woodward does not distinguish between 
actual and contributory causation in his account. For Woodward, there is 
only one inclusive notion of singular event causation that also applies to 
cases of symmetric over-determination. However, Woodward's definition 
of token causation (W TC) is equivalent to Hitchcock's definition of 
contributory causation (H CC) employing the notion of a weakly active 
route defined by (H WAR). The difference from Hitchcock is that 
Woodward does not limit the extension of his definition (W TC) to cases of 
symmetric over-determination, as Hitchcock does, but that Woodward 
takes his definition to cover all cases of singular event causation. 
However, for reasons of fairness, I have to mention that the term 'token 
causation' is not Woodward's original terminology. Instead, Woodward 
calls the concept with which this section will deal 'actual causation'. I have 
chosen this way of talking because I consider it to be more suggestive and 
also to avoid confusion.
Since I consider my remarks about the relevant concepts in Hitchcock's 
account of token causation to translate into results about the analogous 
concepts in W oodward's account, I mainly aim to show that the concepts 
Woodward employs are equivalent to Hitchcock's.
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I will confine myself to a short demonstration that W oodward's definition 
of token causation (W TC) is equivalent to my reconstruction (H CC) of 
Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation. For this aim I will also 
mention a preliminary version of this definition that Woodward gives for 
heuristic reasons, and I will argue that this preliminary version is 
equivalent to my reconstruction (H AC) of Hitchcock's definition of actual 
causation.
I will save the reader a lengthy argumentation that the relevant concepts 
in the modeling procedure, i.e. the definitions of a causal model, of 
counterfactual dependence, of exogeneity, endogeneity and structural 
equations, and of parenthood and childhood of variables, which I have 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, all translate into W oodward's 
modeling framework for analyzing token causation. Instead, I refer the 
reader to W oodward's original discussion in order to verify that my 
definitions (H CM), (H CD), and (H EESE) all have equivalent analogues 
in W oodward's account, even if only implicitly, and that also my 
reconstruction of the modeling procedure for analyzing token causation 
by steps M l) and M2) is compatible with W oodward's account. 
Admittedly, Woodward does not explicitly deal with the generation of 
causal models for analyzing token causation, and moreover he avoids 
precise formal definitions of most of these concepts. This is due to the fact 
that the modeling of token causation is only of minor importance for him. 
Nevertheless, I maintain that his understanding of the respective notions 
can be extracted from his discussion more or less straightforwardly.71
71 In this way, cf. [jW 03], pp. 42-45 and pp. 327-336 for Woodward's notion of a causal 
model for the analysis of token-level causal dependencies, also called a 'system of 
structural equations' by him. For his definition of counterfactual dependence, also called 
'direct causation' by him, cf. [jW 03], p. 55. For Woodward's understanding of structural 
equations, cf. [jW 03], pp. 42-48, pp. 52-53, and again pp. 327-336. For my assertion that 
Woodward's sketchy modeling framework for analyzing token causation is compatible 
with steps M l) and M2), cf, again [jW 03], pp. 42-45 and also pp. 74-76. Finally, for 
Woodward's discussion of the notion of an intervention, cf. [jW 03], pp. 94-114.
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Let me start my discussion with some broad considerations about unified 
token causation. Certainly such an understanding of token causation as a 
unified notion comprising both actual and contributory causation has 
appeal. After all, Hitchcock's basic rationale of a causal process linking 
token cause and token effect is the same in both cases.
The difference between actual and contributory causation for Hitchcock is 
located in the kind of circumstances in which a causal process operates.
For actual causation this process has to operate in the very circumstances 
prevailing in the situation to be modeled: Hitchcock freezes the variables 
not immediately involved in the process at their actual values. For 
contributory causation, he allows the process to operate in non-actual 
circumstances that correspond to freezing variables not immediately 
involved in the process at arbitrary values, with the only constraint being 
that this does not disturb the actual value of the effect variable.
Also the formal definitions (H AC) and (H CC) of actual causation and 
contributory causation are related: We saw this in the previous section of 
this chapter, when we noticed that an active route defined by (H AR) is a 
special case of a weakly active route defined by (H WAR), so that for 
Hitchcock actual causation is a special case of contributory causation.
The starting point of Woodward's discussion of modeling token causation 
is the construction of the following preliminary account.72
Definition (Token Causation Preliminary, Woodward) (W TCP)
X=x is a preliminary token cause of Z=z if and only if the following
two conditions are both satisfied:
(i) The actual value of X is x and the actual value of Z is z.
72 Cf. [jW 03], p. 77. My description here is very close to Woodward's original in order to 
give the reader a better impression of the comparatively low level of formalization in 
Woodward's account.
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(ii) There is at least one route r from X to Z for which an 
intervention on X will change the value of Z, given that 
other direct causes Yi of Z that are not on this route have 
been fixed at their actual values.
(It is assumed that all direct causes of Z that are not on any 
route from X to Z remain at their actual values under the 
intervention on X.)
In this context, Woodward takes a direct cause to be defined as follows:73
Definition (Direct Causation, Woodward) (W DC)
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of 
Z  with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible 
intervention on X that will change Z when all other variables in 
V  besides X and Z are held fixed at some value by 
interventions.
I maintain that this condition (W DC) is in essence a less formal expression 
of my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of counterfactual 
dependence of variables in definition (H CD). In order to verify this, 
suppose that V = |X ,Yi,...,Yn,Z} is the set of variables selected to be 
relevant for the analysis of causal dependencies in a given situation S. In 
my view, the condition in (W DC), i.e. that there is an intervention on X  
that will change Z when all other variables in V  besides X and Z are held 
fixed at some value by interventions, is equivalent to the following 
condition: There are values x * x' of X  and z * z ' of Z, and values y; for the 
other variables Y;, such that
X = x & Yi = yi & ... & Y« = y« □-» Z = z and 
X = x' & Yi = yi & ... & Yn = y« 0—> Z = z’.
73 Cf. [jW 03], pp. 42 and 55.
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And this is the defining condition of counterfactual dependence according 
to my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition (H CD). The only difference 
between these two formulations (H CD) and (W DC) is their ontology: 
Woodward talks of interventions in (W DC), whereas my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock in (H CD) employs counterfactuals. Apart from this, (H CD) 
and (W DC) express the same condition, i.e. Z is counterfactually 
dependent on X, given V, according to (H CD) if and only if X is a direct 
cause of Z, given V, according to (W DC). This difference in ontology 
concerns the procedure of constructing a causal model M suitable for 
describing the situation S, with which Woodward does not deal. In this 
way, I propose to leave this issue aside and to settle for the equivalence of 
(H CD) and (W DC) in principle.74
With this, I come to W oodward's preliminary definition of token causation 
for heuristic reasons (W TCP). I maintain that (W TCP) expresses in less 
formal terminology more or less exactly the condition that is required in 
my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of actual causation (H AC). In 
order to scrutinize this, let the prerequisites of (H AC) be met, i.e. let c and 
e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let M  := (V, E) be a 
causal model formalizing S, such that the following holds: There are 
variables X and Z in V, such that the values x  of X and z of Z in the actual 
solution R{V) of (V, E) represent the actually occurring events c and e in S 
and such that their non-actual values x' and z' represent alterations of c 
and e respectively. On the foil of this prerequisite, the defining condition 
in (H AC), namely that c is an actual cause of e according to the model M  if 
and only if in the actual solution R(V) of M  there is an active route from X 
to Z is equivalent to clauses (i) and (ii) in (W TCP). First, observe that with 
the prerequisite, clause (i) of (W TCP) is already fulfilled. Second,
74 Nevertheless, I still maintain that a basic set of super-exhaustive counterfactuals is a 
straightforward way of describing the complete counterfactual information about a 
situation S that a causal m odel M  has to incorporate,
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according to definitions (H AR) and (H CDSCM) a route r from X  to Z is 
active in a solution R(V) of the causal model M  = (V, E) if and only if an 
intervention on X  will change the value of Z, when all intermediate 
variables Wj between X  and Z that are not on route r have been fixed at 
their actual values and the structural equations of all other variables in V 
remain the same. Third, observe that the value of Z is determined only by 
the parent variables of Z and not by more remote ancestor variables, and 
that the parents of Z are exactly its direct causes, as can be seen in 
definition (W  DC). Fourth, for this reason, fixing all intermediate variables 
Wj between X  and Z that are not on route r at their actual values, as 
demanded by (H AR) and (H CDSCM) in this context, brings about exactly 
the same result for variable Z as fixing only the intermediate variables LZj 
between X  and Z that are not on route r and direct causes of Z, as 
demanded by clause (ii) of (W  TCP). Analogously fifth, the remaining of 
the direct causes Yi of Z that are not on any route from X  to Z at their 
actual values, as demanded by clause (ii) of (W TCP) in this context, brings 
about exactly the same result for variable Z as keeping the structural 
equations of all variables in V  that are not intermediate between X  and Z, 
as demanded by (H AR) and (H CDSCM). All in all, on the foil of the 
mentioned prerequisite, the condition in (H AC) is equivalent to clauses (i) 
and (ii) of (W TCP). In this way, Woodward's preliminary definition 
(W TCP) is a less formal expression of exactly the underlying rationale 
that I attributed to Hitchcock, namely to identify a causal process in a 
situation S with a corresponding route in an appropriate model M. 
Admittedly, W oodward's preliminary definition (W TCP) does not 
directly mention models M and hence seems to canonically account for a 
notion of causation that is independent of our description. However, with 
the same argumentation as in the fourth section of this chapter applying to 
Hitchcock's account, I consider such an undertaking, if it should be 
intended by Woodward, to be misguided. I still maintain that relativizing
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token causation to a given model M  allows us to analyze the causal 
relationships between exactly the kinds of events in which we are 
interested in a situation S.
A side observation that can be made concerning W oodward's definitions 
(W TCP) and (W DC) is that they seem to use interventions in two 
different ways. In definition (W TCP), interventions operate on a set of 
structural equations, whereas in definition (W DC), interventions operate 
in a set of variables, before structural equations have been set up. Instead, 
it is these interventions that allow setting up structural equations. 
Woodward gives an illuminating formal account of interventions, in 
which he describes what conditions an intervention has to meet so that it 
can formalize an ideal experimental manipulation on the reference object 
of a variable X. However, a discussion of this account would lead me too 
far astray here. Thus, I would like to refer the reader to W oodward's 
original remarks.75
As mentioned, for Woodward, the above preliminary definition (W TCP) 
is just a heuristic step on the way to a more adequate definition of token 
causation. Woodward correctly observes that (W TCP) cannot account for 
cases of symmetric over-determination,76 an observation that Hitchcock 
also made about his account of actual causation. However, Woodward 
draws a different conclusion than Hitchcock. Instead of devising a 
separate account for contributory causation applying to exactly these 
cases, Woodward wants to extend his preliminary definition of token 
causation to uniformly cover all cases of singular event causation. In this 
way, no matter whether an effect e is over-determined by two or more 
causes a and c that work in parallel or whether there is no such over­
determination, such that for example there is just one cause d for e, 
Woodward champions the intuition that the over-determining causes a
75 Cf. [jW 03J, pp. 98-107.
76 Cf. [jW 03], p. 82.
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and c are token causes of e in the same sense as d is.77 I call the 
understanding of causation that is expressed by this intuition Woodward's 
inclusive understanding of token causation. Woodward proposes the 
following semi-formal definition of this inclusive notion.78
Definition (Token Causation, Woodward) (W TC)
X = x  is a token cause of Z = z if and only if the following two
conditions are both satisfied:
(TCI) The actual value of X is x  and the actual value of Z is z.
(TC2) For each route r from X to Z, fix by interventions all
direct causes Yi of Z that do not lie along r at some 
combination of values within their redundancy range.
Then determine whether, for each route from X to Z 
and for each possible combination of values for the 
direct causes Yi of Z that are not on this route and that 
are in the redundancy range of Yi, whether there is an 
intervention on X that will change the value of Z.
Clause (TC2) is satisfied if and only if the answer to
this question is 'yes' for at least one route and possible 
combination of values within the redundancy range of 
the Y.
As in the case of the preliminary definition of token causation (W TCP), 
also this definition (W TC) is borrowed from Hitchcock. The difference is 
that this time Woodward explicitly refers to Hitchcock's original. He does 
this on the occasion of taking over Hitchcock's definition of a redundancy 
range.79
77 Cf. [jW 03], pp. 82-83.
78 Cf. [jW 03], pp. 83-84. Again, my description almost literally Woodward's original.
79 Cf. [jW 03], p. 83.
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Let me close with my main claim in this section, namely that this 
definition (W TC) is a less formal expression of my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation (H CC) employing a 
weakly active route (H WAR). My argument proceeds in exactly the same 
way as with definition (W TCP). Again, let the prerequisites of (H CC) be 
met, i.e. let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let 
M  := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the following holds: 
There are variables X and Z in V, such that the values x  of X and z of Z in 
the actual solution R(V) of (V, E) represent the actually occurring events c 
and e in S and such that their non-actual values x’ and z' represent 
alterations of c and e respectively. On the foil of this prerequisite, the 
defining condition in (H CC), namely that c is a contributory cause of e 
according to the model M if and only if in the actual solution R{V) of M 
there is a weakly active route from X to Z is equivalent to clauses (i) and 
(ii) in (W TC). Again, with this prerequisite, clause (i) of (W TC) is already 
fulfilled. And according to definitions (H WAR) and (H CDSCM), a route r 
from X to Z is weakly active in a solution R(V) of the causal model 
M  = (V, E) if and only if the following condition is fulfilled: There is a set 
{Wi,..,Wn}, possibly empty, of redundant variables Wi that do not lie along 
r and a combination of values ( w i ) for these Wi within their redun­
dancy range, such that an intervention on X will change the value of Z 
if these Wi are frozen at these values w\. Again, freezing the whole set of 
redundant variables Wi at their redundant values brings about the same 
result for variable Z as merely freezing the subset of {Wi,..,Wn} that 
consists of exactly the direct causes of Z. For, again, the value of Z is 
determined only by the parent variables of Z and not by more remote 
ancestor variables. All in all, on the foil of the mentioned prerequisite, the 
condition in (H CC) employing (H WAR) is equivalent to clauses (i) and
(ii) of (W TC).
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Again, this definition (W TC) of Woodward's does not really mention 
models. However, with the same argumentation as before I still maintain 
that relativizing token causation to a model M  offers a pragmatically more 
successful approach to analyzing a wide range of situations S with their 
constituting events for causal relationships.
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his chapter is devoted to a thorough discussion of Pearl's account of
modeling token causation. Coming from an engineering background 
and not being a philosopher by training, Judea Pearl started his study of 
causation from an empiricist tradition. Pearl mainly conducted research in 
probability theory and artificial intelligence and had the conviction that 
causal relationships were just useful abbreviations of probabilistic 
patterns. Pearl's main work in this field is his book Probabilistic Reasoning 
in Intelligent Systems,80 in which he maintained that probabilistic 
relationships are the foundation for our understanding of the world and 
that causation is just a secondary and more graphical concept.81 Since then, 
Pearl's view of causation has changed dramatically. In his book Causality -  
Models, Reasoning, and Inference,82 which is commonly regarded as a 
milestone in the study of causation, Pearl regards the probabilistic 
relationships as mere surface phenomena and takes the causal 
relationships as the fundamental building blocks both of physical reality 
and of our understanding of this reality.83 In my view, Pearl's work on 
causation culminated in this later book Causality, and without a doubt it 
has been more influential in the philosophical community than any other 
of his publications. What remains from Pearl's engineering background is 
a rather high level of formal apparatus in his account of causation.
In this chapter, I focus on the account of modeling token causation that 
Pearl gives in Causality. In this book, Pearl gives accounts of many aspects 
of causal discourse. Pearl deals with causation on both the type and the 
token level, discusses the problem how to derive causal models from raw 
data and gives examples of plenty of applications in various fields of 
science.
80 Cf. [jP 88].
81 Cf. the introduction of [jP 88].
82 Cf. [jP 00].
83 Cf. the introduction of [jP 00].
101
Regarding causation on the token level, Pearl discusses two concepts: The 
first is in fact token causation, i.e. the relation that holds between two 
singular events c and e, when c in fact causes e.84 The second is the 
probability of necessity, or sufficiency respectively, of token causation, i.e. the 
probability that an event c was a necessary cause, or sufficient cause 
respectively, of another event e 85
In this chapter, as in the whole thesis, I only deal with in fact token 
causation, which I have been denoting, and will continue to denote, shortly 
as token causation. In my view in fact token causation is the more 
paradigmatic concept of the above, for more than one reason. First, we 
have the strongest pre-theoretic causal intuitions when we are asked to 
judge whether in a particular situation S a certain event c in fact causes 
another event e. Second, from an explanatory point of view, a concept of 
in fact token causation is the purest and simplest to convey, since it 
does not involve other problematic notions like necessity and sufficiency. 
And finally, from a pragmatic point of view, the formal apparatus 
required to analyze in fact token causation is the most developed 
so far.
Furthermore, the focus in this chapter is, as in the whole thesis, on the 
second problem of causal modeling, i.e. the definition of token causation 
relativized to a given causal model. The first problem of causal modeling, 
i.e. the derivation of an appropriate causal model from a given situation, 
is only dealt with marginally.
84 Cf. [jP 00], chapter 10.
85 Cf. [JP 00], chapter 9.
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The first section deals with the basic building block of Pearl's account of 
token causation, his definition of a causal model. In essence, his causal 
model M is devised to analyze a given situation S that contains certain 
token events c, d, e, etc., in whose causal relationships we are interested. 
For this purpose, Pearl's causal model M  is comprised of two sets of 
variables, exogenous variables IZ and endogenous variables V. The 
exogenous variables U formalize admissible alterations of background 
events in the situation S, whose development is either unknown to us, or 
at least not represented in the causal model M. Analogously, the 
endogenous variables V  formalize admissible alterations of the events in 
situation S, whose development represented in the causal model M. 
A set of functions F in the causal model M  is devised to determine the 
values of exactly these endogenous variables V  from the values of the 
exogenous ones. The underlying rationale is that these functions F 
formalize deterministic mechanisms, or laws, that are at work in the 
situation S. Since Pearl's way to define his deterministic causal models is, 
apart from terminological differences, in essence the same as for 
Hitchcock, I refrain from an elaborate description of Pearl's definition and 
instead try to explain and motivate it by working out the differences to 
Hitchcock's definition of a causal model. Remarkably, and in contrast to 
Hitchcock's account, Pearl's definition of a causal model is able to serve 
not only in an analysis of token causation, but can also be employed to 
analyze causal claims on the type level. For this reason, I also briefly 
describe the probabilistic extension of Pearl's deterministic causal model 
in this section. The next sections of this chapter are then devoted to the 
peculiarities of Pearl's account of token causation, and in their discussion 
and motivation I will no longer draw any comparisons to Hitchcock. 
Instead, the next chapter is devoted to a thorough comparison of their 
accounts.
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In the second section, I discuss the main concept that underlies Pearl's 
account of token causation, the concept of sustenance. Pearl's basic idea is 
that for an event c to qualify as a cause for another event e in an arbitrary 
situation S, event c has to be able to sustain event e against certain 
contingencies. As will turn out in this discussion, these contingencies are 
structural in nature, which means that they correspond to surgical 
interventions in a causal model M  that is employed for formalizing the 
situation S that is to be causally analyzed. Because of this decisive entering 
of interventions in his conception of sustenance and also because of the 
counterfactual information encoded in the functions in Pearl's models, his 
account of token causation can rightfully be classified as both 
counterfactual and interventionist.
The third section clarifies in precisely what form a cause c has to sustain 
its effect e in a given situation S with a certain constellation of background 
conditions. I maintain that this can be most easily understood with the aid 
of the leading idea that c sustains its effect e via a causal process that links 
cause c and effect e. I motivate Pearl's definitions of a causal and a natural 
beam as the decisive step in reaching a formalization of this notion of a 
sustaining causal process. Causal or natural beams M« are projections of a 
causal model M  on its actual state U = u that formalizes the constellation of 
background conditions in the given situation S that is to be analysed for 
causal dependencies. I will show in this section that a causal or a natural 
beam M« describe under which conditions a set of parent variables S> 
locally sustains the actual value v\ of their child variable V\, and this for 
every endogenous variable V\ in the causal model M in the state u. Pearl's 
notion of sustenance though also gives guidelines on what it means for the 
value x  of an arbitrary variable X to sustain a value y  of another arbitrary 
variable Y. These guidelines are put into concrete terms by Pearl's 
definitions of actual and contributory causation, with which I deal in the 
fourth section.
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The fourth section is devoted to a thorough discussion of Pearl's 
definitions of actual and contributory causation, which are the two kinds 
of token causation he distinguishes. Pearl's definition of actual causation 
decisively employs the notion of a natural beam, whereas his definition of 
contributory causation does the same with the notion of a non-natural 
causal beam. In essence, x is called an actual cause, or contributory cause 
respectively, of y  in a causal model M  in the state u, if and only if x 
sustains y  against certain structural contingencies in a natural beam, or in 
a non-natural causal beam. Pearl intends his definition of contributory 
causation to formalize a weakened notion of actual causation that 
exclusively applies to cases of symmetric over-determination. I argue that 
such a distinction between two mutually disjoint kinds of token causation 
is not necessary, and I offer a trivial unified definition of token causation 
that contains actual causation as a special case. Furthermore, I argue that 
Pearl's definitions of actual and contributory causation only give a 
pragmatic account of what token causation relatvized to a given model 
amounts to. Finally, I maintain that a causal process can be understood to 
be the concatenation of the projection functions f," in a causal or natural 
beam M# of exactly the variables V\ that are intermediate between the 
cause variable X and the effect variable Y.
In the fifth section, I illustrate how a natural beam is constructed. I focus 
on the discussion of natural beams since they are simpler and in a certain 
way more paradigmatic than non-natural causal beams. A remarkable 
observation that I make in this illustration is that treatment of exogenous 
variables in constructing local sustaining sets is not unequivocally 
covered by Pearl's definition of a natural beam.
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In the sixth section, I point out striking differences between Pearl's 
formalization of a causal process with the aid of natural and causal beams 
on the one hand and Hitchcock's formalization of a causal process by a 
simple causal route on the other. Moreover, I draw attention to the fact 
that values of exogenous variables can neither be actual nor contributory 
causes for Pearl, mainly since he excludes exogenous variables from 
sustaining sets in the construction of both a natural and a causal beam.
In the seventh section, I give a brief synopsis of how Pearl generates his 
causal models and compare this to the way in which Hitchcock arrives at 
his causal models for a given example situation. Pearl's approach to 
generating causal models is mainly geared to analyzing causal 
relationships on the type level. Pearl's starting point is the definition of 
conditional probabilistic dependence for a set of random variables 
T  := U uV  with a joint probability distribution P extending over all 
admissible, in particular over all non-actual, combinations of values of the 
variables in UuV. Pearl utilizes this probability distribution P and this 
definition of conditional probabilistic independence in his so-called 
algorithm of inductive causation to determine an equivalence class [D], a 
so-called pattern, of basic causal structures D that can all generate this 
probability distribution P. In this way, the result of Pearl's model 
generating procedure is not a complete causal model M  with a set of 
deterministic functions F, but instead, the result is the equivalence class 
[D] of basic causal structures D that are in essence just the set of variables 
UuV together with a relation R  describing parenthood between these 
variables.
Admittedly, my synopsis is in no way complete nor is it self-contained. 
Instead, I would like to refer the reader to Pearl's own discussion of the 
model generation procedure, which is far more thorough and 
comprehensive. I mention Pearl's model generation procedure merely for 
the following reasons:
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First for drawing the conclusion that in the application of Pearl's 
definitions of actual or contributory causation, the causal model M  out of 
which the beams M« are constructed is strongly underdetermined, because 
the set of functions F determining the values of the variables in V  has to be 
stipulated. Second, to compare Pearl's approach with the one of 
Hitchcock.
Apart from this, the only critical remark that I have to make regarding 
Pearl's account of model generation is that his stipulation of a probability 
distribution P over a set of random variables UkjV  that formalize possible 
alterations of singular events could be problematic and is definitely in need 
of motivation.
In a final comparison with Hitchcock's account of model generation, the 
following striking difference becomes apparent: Pearl has a strictly 
pragmatic strategy employing probability distributions to extract causal 
patterns out of them and ending up with a multitude of basic causal 
structures that can all serve as blueprints for a complete causal model. 
Hitchcock's strategy is more metaphysical in nature because the complete 
counterfactual information about a situation is stipulated at the outset of 
model construction and uniquely and completely determines a causal 
model on which Hitchcock's definitions of actual or contributory 
causation are applied.
In this way the advantage of a causal modeling account over classic 
metaphysical accounts of causation, namely to divide the analysis of 
causation into two sub-problems -  first the generation of a suitable causal 
model to formalize a given situation and second the definition of 
causation qualified to such a model -  is lost. As a result, I finally maintain 
that Hitchcock fails in his attempt to simplify Pearl's account of the first 
problem of causal modeling, namely the generation of a suitable causal 
model to formalize a given situation S.
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P e a r l ' s  D e t e r m in is t ic  C a u s a l  M o d e l s  
f o r  T o k e n -L e v e l C a u s a t io n  
AND THEIR PROBABILISTIC EXTENSION
This section deals with the basic building block of Pearl's account of token 
causation, his definition of a causal model. In essence, his causal model M 
is devised to analyze a given situation S that contains certain token events 
c, d, e, etc., in whose causal relationships we are interested. For this 
purpose, Pearl's causal model M  is comprised of two sets of variables, 
exogenous variables U and endogenous variables V. The exogenous 
variables U formalize admissible alterations of background events in the 
situation S, whose development is unknown to us. Analogously, the 
endogenous variables V  formalize admissible alterations of the events in 
situation S, about whose development we are not ignorant. A set of 
functions F in the causal model M  is devised to determine the values of 
exactly these endogenous variables V  from the values of the exogenous 
ones. The underlying rationale is that these functions F formalize 
deterministic mechanisms, or laws, that are at work in the situation S. 
Since Pearl's way to define his deterministic causal models is, apart from 
terminological differences, in essence the same as for Hitchcock, I refrain 
from an elaborate description of Pearl's definition and instead try to 
explain and motivate it by working out the differences to Hitchcock's 
definition of a causal model. Remarkably, and in contrast to Hitchcock's 
account, Pearl's definition of a causal model is, though, able to serve not 
only in an analysis of token causation, but can also be employed to 
analyze causal claims on the type level. For this reason, I also briefly 
describe the probabilistic extension of Pearl's deterministic causal model 
in this section.
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The next sections of this chapter will be devoted to the peculiarities of 
Pearl's account of token causation. In their discussion and motivation I 
will no longer draw any comparisons to Hitchcock. Instead, the next 
chapter is devoted to a thorough comparison of their accounts. The 
question finally, how Pearl generates a suitable causal model M  to 
formalize a given situation S will be addressed in the last section of this 
chapter.
Pearl's formal definition of a causal model is now the following:86
Definition (Causal Model, Pearl) (P CM)
A causal model is a triple M  = (U,V,F), where
(i) II is a set of background variables, also called exogenous, 
whose values are determined by factors outside the 
model;
(ii) V  is a set {Vi,...,Vn} of variables called endogenous, whose 
values are determined by variables in the model, i.e. by 
variables in l lu V ;
(iii) F is a set of functions (/i,...,/n}, such that each f> is a 
mapping from the respective value-domains of l l u  (V \
Vi) to that of Vi and such that the entire set F forms a 
mapping from U to V  and the entire set F has a unique 
solution.
86 Cf. [jP 00], p. 203.
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Symbolically, the set of equations F can be represented 
by writing
v\ =fi (pm, Mi), i = 2,..., n,
where pa\ is any realization of the unique minimal set of 
variables PAi in V \ Vi sufficient for representing f\. 
Likewise, lii c: U stands for the unique minimal set of 
variables in If sufficient for representing/.
One can identify Pearl's notions of exogeneity, endogeneity and 
parenthood with Hitchcock's respective notions introduced in the last 
chapter. There is only one important difference, namely that Hitchcock 
establishes the exogeneity, endogeneity, and the parent relationship for 
the variables that he employs starting out from a basic set C of underlying 
counterfactuals, whereas Pearl stipulates the exogeneity, endogeneity, and 
the parent relationship for his variables directly in his causal models.
Pearl's functions / i , . . . , / n  in set F are just a more natural notation for 
Hitchcock's structural equations. I already remarked in the last chapter 
that Hitchcock's structural equations are not really equations, but 
functions that encode the counterfactual relationships between the 
argument variables and the image variable. The same difference can be 
found here again, namely that Hitchcock's structural equations are 
condensed out of the complete counterfactual information contained in 
this set C of basic counterfactuals, whereas for Pearl the functions/ i , . . . , / n  in 
set F are stipulated directly in the causal models. Apart from that, for both 
Pearl and Hitchcock these functional relationships fi share the underlying 
rationale of representing the mechanisms, or laws, that are at working in 
the situation that is to be modeled and causally analyzed. I will deal with 
Pearl's methodology of generating his causal models more elaborately in 
the last section of this chapter. For now, let me settle for some more 
technical remarks about the above definition (P CM):
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First, for an arbitrary sequence W of variables, a realization it; is a sequence 
of values of the respective variables in W. Second, a set of variables X is 
sufficient for representing a function y = f{x, z), if f(x, z) is independent of 
the set of variables Z := V  \ X, i.e. if for all realizations x of X and z, z ' of Z 
we have f(x, z) =f(x, z').87 Finally, PA\ and U\ are the intersections with the 
set of endogenous variables, and the set of exogenous variables 
respectively, of the unique minimal set T\ := P A iu lIi that is sufficient for 
representing fi -  neither PA\ nor Ui are individually sufficient in this 
respect; Pearl's description is a bit misleading here.88
A very remarkable feature of Pearl's causal models M  = (U,V,F) defined by 
(P CM) is that they can be employed to model general as well as singular 
causation. According to Pearl, this classification into general and singular 
causation depends on the amount of scenario-specific information that is 
required to evaluate these causal claims. For Pearl, causal claims are 
categorized as singular or token-level if they refer to information about 
special events in a certain scenario, whereas they are classified as general 
or type-level if they are relative to types of events. In definition (P CM), 
such a scenario is formalized by model state U = u, which describes all 
relevant details of the situation at hand, and which completely determines 
the value distribution, a so-called solution, for all endogenous variables V  
in the model. In particular, this means that Pearl's causal models as 
defined by (P CM) are clearly deterministic.
87 Again with the same qualification as in the above footnotes, observe that this notion of 
sufficiency is equivalent to Hitchcock's definition of counterfactual dependence of 
variables (H CD).
88 The variables PAi can be understood to be simply the parents of variable Vi that are 
endogenous, whereas Hi are the parents of Vi that are exogenous in this understanding. 
To be accurate, Pearl does not give an explicit definition of parenthood. However, I take 
it he assumes the following: Variable X is a parent of variable Z iff the values of X occur 
in the argument of/z.
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Another motivation for the distinction between token-level and type-level 
causation is given according to Pearl by the fact they have different 
sources for their explanatory power: If cause x  receives its explanatory 
power by its tendency to produce y, compared to the weaker tendencies of 
the alterations of x to produce y , we have a case of general causation. If the 
explanatory power of cause x is due to x being necessary for triggering a 
specific chain of events leading to y  in the specific situation at hand, we 
have a case of singular causation.89
In cases of general causation, model state U = u is not determined for 
Pearl, but there is a natural measure for the probability that a certain state 
prevails. This measure is given by a probability function P(u) over the 
possible model states. Such a probability function P(u) then also induces a 
probability distribution for the set of endogenous variables V. Pearl hence 
extends his definition of a causal model (P CM) by a probability function, 
in order to deal with cases of general causation. This extension is given by 
his following definition:90
Definition (Probabilistic Causal Model, Pearl) (P PCM)
A probabilistic causal model is a pair {M, P(u)), where M  is a 
causal model and P(u) is a probability function defined over the 
domain of II.
This probability function P  then also induces a probability distribution 
over the whole set V  of endogenous variables in M, given by
P (y )s P (Y= y)=  X  p (“ )-
89 For Pearl's distinction between general and singular causation, cf. [jP 00], p. 222 as well
as pp. 253 -  256 and pp. 309 and 310.
90 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 205 and 206.
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I do not intend to pursue this topic of probabilistic causal models and their 
applications in dealing with cases of general causation further in this 
thesis. I mentioned this definition of a probabilistic causal model mainly, 
because it motivates two things: First, that claims of token causation are 
extreme or marginal cases in which all relevant information about a 
scenario, represented by model state u, is given. And second, that Pearl 
gives a unified formal account that can deal both with general and 
singular causation. Clearly, this feature of a uniform account for both 
singular and general causation forms a huge advantage of Pearl's account 
over Hitchcock's.
Let me conclude this introductory section of this chapter with a last brief 
comparison of Pearl's causal model as defined by (P CM) and Hitchcock's 
causal model given by (H CM). The immediate observation to be made is 
that, apart from terminological differences and marginal cases, the formal 
definition of a causal model is the same for both Hitchcock and Pearl. 
Hitchcock's notion of a structural equation for a variable Y  is in essence 
just the one of a function fi from the set of values of the parents of Y  to the 
set of values of Y. In particular, Hitchcock's requirement of asymmetry, 
demanding that ordinary mathematical operations, like inverting, are not 
admissible, is met by Pearl's functions/.
There is only one marginal difference between Pearl's (P CM) and 
Hitchcock's (H CM): For Pearl, the system of functions F, corresponding 
to Hitchcock's set of structural equations E, may contain cycles and thus 
also symmetries, as the marginal case of cycles consisting only of two 
variables, for certain of its variables. Pearl explicitly discusses a case in 
which such a symmetry prevails: the equilibrium of supply and demand, 
in which the set F also has a unique solution, although being cyclic.91 
Hitchcock explicitly also allows cycles, but implicitly rules out
91 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 215-217.
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symmetries.92 On the other hand, in clause (iii) of his definition (P CM) 
Pearl explicitly demands that the set of functions F in his causal model 
has a unique solution, whereas Hitchcock does not mention this property 
at all.93
Also in the same way as for Hitchcock, Pearl's causal models can be 
graphically represented. This representation follows exactly the same 
rules, namely drawing an arrow between two variables X and Z, starting 
at X and pointing to Z, if and only if X is a parent of Z. There, variable X 
is a parent of variable Z, iff the values of X occur in the argument of fz. 
Sharing, modulo notation, the same definition of a causal model, the 
differences between Hitchcock's and Pearl's account lie in the way in 
which the model is generated and in their definitions of causation, which 
make use of the model. These were the two problems of causal modeling, 
as I called them in the introduction of this thesis: the first being the 
generation of a causal model, and the second being the definition of 
causation according to a model. I will briefly deal with the first problem 
in the last section of this chapter, whereas the remainder is devoted to the 
second problem, the definition of token causation according to a model.
92 Cf. for example [cH 01], p. 281.
93 On p. 203 of [jP 00], Pearl mentions that if the functions in the set F are determined by 
recursion, then this ensures that for every realisation u of U, the value v  of every variable 
of V is uniquely determined, or in short, that the system of variables has a unique 
solution. However, uniqueness of solution does not imply recursiveness, as Pearl's 
discussion of the supply-demand example on p. 280 of [jP 00] shows. For obvious reasons 
though, the following holds: Recursiveness of F is the property that the system of 
functions can be ordered in a hierarchy H  = \f i , . . . , / n], such that for all k eH  the value of 
function fv is completely determined by the values of the functions fi,  ..., fk-u This 
property is equivalent to the property that the model does not contain any cycles. Cf. also 
Pearl's discussion of causal ordering on pp. 227 and 228 of [jP 00].
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Pearl's N o t io n  o f  S u s t e n a n c e  
In c o r p o r a t in g  Pr in c iples  
o f  Pr o d u c t io n  a n d  D e pe n d e n c e
In this section, I will discuss the main concept that underlies Pearl's 
account of token causation, the concept of sustenance. Pearl's basic idea is 
that for an event c to qualify as a cause for another event e in a situation S, 
event c has to be able to sustain event e against certain contingencies. As 
will turn out in this discussion, these contingencies are structural in 
nature, which means that they correspond to surgical interventions in a 
causal model M that is employed for formalizing the situation S that is to 
be causally analyzed. Because of this decisive entering of interventions in 
his conception of sustenance and also because of the counterfactual 
information encoded in the functions in Pearl's models, his account of 
token causation can rightfully be classified as both counterfactual and 
interventionist. In the next sections, I will work out in what way the 
notion of sustenance enters in Pearl's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation, his two versions of token causation.
I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis that according to Hall 
causation has two aspects in our pre-theoretic intuition: production and 
dependence. I also mentioned that Hall established that the classic 
counterfactual account of Lewis only captures the dependence aspect and 
not the production aspect of causation. Pearl in his account of token 
causation now takes up this view of Hall's and expresses these two aspects 
in the formal framework of his causal models.
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Consider a situation S that contains, among others, events c and e. 
Suppose that we want to analyze whether c causally produces e and 
whether e causally depends on c. Let M be a suitable causal model to 
formalize situation S and suppose in particular that the background 
variables U of M have the realization u. This realization u is called the state 
of the model M and is intended to formalize the background 
circumstances that determine the situation S. Furthermore, let X and Y  be 
variables in the causal model M that formalize the possible alterations of 
the events c and e respectively in situation S. Finally, let X(u) = x  and 
Y(u) = y denote the actual solution for variables X and Y  in the model M  
that results from model state U = u, and let these actual values X(u) = x and 
Y(u) = y  formalize the actual events c and e respectively.
If we now for reasons of greater simplicity identify the formal devices in 
the causal model M with their references in situation S, we yield the 
following characterization of production and dependence:94
Characterization (Production and Dependence, Pearl) (P PD)
The dependence aspect of causation appeals to the necessity of a 
cause x  in maintaining its effect y in the actual circumstances u 
in the face of certain contingencies, which otherwise negate y:
Suppose X(u) = x and Y(u) = y.
Then y causally depends on x if and only if Yx(u) - y f  ^ y 
for all other values x’ of X.
94 For Pearl's own remarks about production and dependence cf. [jP 00], p. 316. My 
characterization here deviates from Pearl's original formulation in order to add clarity. 
Observe in particular that Pearl himself does not even distinguish the formal devices in  
the model M  from their references in the situation S.
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The production aspect of causation appeals to the capacity of a 
cause x to bring about the effect y  in certain circumstances u ', 
which are counter to fact and in which both x  and y  were 
previously be absent:
Suppose X(tt') = x' and Y(u') = y '
for a certain value xVx of X and certain circumstances u'*u.
Then x produces y  if and only if Yx(n') = y.
Clearly, both these aspects of token causation appeal to surgical 
interventions. In the case of dependence, an intervention on variable X 
takes place, changing its value from the actual X(u) = x to a value xVx of X 
that is counter to fact. In the case of production, an intervention then 
changes the value xVx of X being counter to fact, which was brought 
about by the different circumstances u'±u that were counter to fact, to the 
actual value x of X.
These interventions are denoted by the expression Y*{u) in the above 
characterization (P PD). Yx(u) formalizes the potential response of variable 
Y to the surgical intervention do(X=x) in the model M  in state u and is 
defined via the two following definitions:95
Definition (Sub-model and Effect of Action, Pearl) (P SEA)
Let M = (JU,V,F), be a causal model, X a set of variables in V, and 
x  a particular realization of X. The effect of the surgical 
intervention do(X -  x) on the model M is given by the following 
sub-model M x:
M x = <17,V,F*>, where Fx = \fi: Vi e XJh „ u  {X = x}.96
95 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 204 and 205.
96 Pearl does not use the term 'surgical intervention'; instead, he refers to these operations 
as 'actions'. Both terms can be regarded to be synonymous.
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Definition (Potential Response
and Counterfactual, Pearl) (P PRC)
Let M  be a causal model, X and Y  two subsets of variables in V.
The potential response Yx(u) of variable Y  to action do(X = x) in 
model M  is the solution for Y  of the set of equations Fx.
Yx(u) can be interpreted as giving a formal expression to the 
counterfactual phrase "the value that Y  would have obtained, 
had X been x'.
In this way, clearly Pearl's do(X = x) operator formalizes the notion of a 
surgical intervention on a set of variables X. For, observe that in the above 
sub-model Mx, variables X are lifted from the influence of their old 
functional mechanisms and placed under the influence of new stipulated 
quasi-mechanisms that set their values x  constant; and obviously, no other 
mechanisms f\ are perturbed in by this operation. In this way, the values of 
variables X are changed without creating a logical contradiction, namely 
by turning to a new model Mx.
If the set of functions F in the causal model M does not contain any cycles, 
so that no variable Z can be an ancestor and a descendant of variables X at 
the same time, then also backtracking from this intervention by do(X = x) is 
excluded, since these value changes cannot propagate to the ancestor 
variables of X.97 However, I do not want to go into any details with regard 
to the problem of backtracking here.
97 For a more elaborate description of Pearl's formalization of interventions, cf. [jP 00], 
pp. 70 and 205.
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Note in particular that in the above definitions (P SEA) and (P PRC) the
mechanisms \fi : V e X}i=i n in the model M are not employed for
intervening on the variables in X by do(X = x ). Neither the associated
functions \fi : Vi e X}m n themselves nor any information that they convey
are utilized for the intervention on the set X. On the contrary, the 
functions {/I : Vi e  X}i=i,...,n are overridden by setting all Vi e  X  to constant 
values, thereby rendering all V e X quasi-exogenous.
A peculiar feature of the above notion of production is that production in 
a certain model state u applies only to different states u' of the model 
where both x  and y are absent. This raises two problems, as Pearl notes:98 
First, evidence about the actual state u cannot be used in the state u' which 
is used to determine whether x produces y. And worse, second, the fact 
that x produces y  in state u' being counter to fact cannot explain why the 
value of Y is y  in the actual state u.
For this reason, Pearl defines a new concept, called sustenance, which 
forms the core concept in his account of actual causation. Sustenance 
captures modified notions of dependence and production, the main 
difference being in the type of contingencies against which x  is expected to 
protect y: In (P PD), the contingencies were circumstantial, namely 
evolving from a specific model state u. Sustenance protects y from 
structural modifications of the model itself, that is interventions, which 
override the equations for a certain set of endogenous variables W by 
setting them to constant values w. Pearl's definition is the following:99
98 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 316 and 317.
99 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 316 and 317.
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Definition (Sustenance, Pearl) (P S)
Let W c  V be a set of variables with realizations w, w ', etc., and 
let u be an arbitrary realization of the set of background 
variables II. We say that x causally sustains y  in u  relative to 
contingencies in W if and only if
(i) X(u) = x;
(ii) Y(u) = y ;
(iii) Yxw(m) = y  for all w; and
(iv) Yx'w'(m) = y ’ * y  for some x' * x  and some w \
In this formulation (P S), the sustenance feature is mainly expressed by the 
last two clauses (iii) and (iv). Clause (iii) requires that x  alone is sufficient 
for maintaining y. In other words, if variable X is set to its actual value x in 
model state u then, even if W  is set to any value w that is different from the 
actual, variable Y still retains its actual value y. In this way, clause (iii) 
expresses the remainder of the notion of production, for x  produces y  in all 
different value distributions of the model, corresponding to the structural 
modifications by interventions do(W  = iv). Clause (iv) rules that x is 
responsible for sustaining y  under these conditions. For, there is at least 
one setting W = w ', in which Y takes a value y' * y, if X is set to x' * x. 
Thus, clause (iv) expresses the remainder of the notion of dependence. 
Taken together, clauses (iii) and (iv) imply that there is one setting W = w ' 
in which x  is both necessary and sufficient for y.100
100 For Pearl's own remarks about the concept of sustenance, cf. [jP 00], p. 317.
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Let me end this section with a last comment about interventions. 
Definitions (P SEA) and (P PRC) illustrate that a causal model M  in a 
certain way generates a whole set of models that consists of the respective 
models that correspond to the possible settings of the do operator. In this 
way, Pearl's models defined by (P CM) already anticipate all admissible 
surgical interventions on variables. And although I might emphasize a 
platitude here, let me stress that the functions fi {pa\, Mi) in a causal model 
M defined by Pearl's (P CM) not only formalize independent mechanisms 
but also have a counterfactual interpretation because they are defined for 
all admissible values of parent variables. These two facts, the counter- 
factual meaning of the functions in a causal model given by (P CM) and 
the entering of surgical interventions defined by (P SEA) and (P PRC) in 
Pearl's notion of sustenance, in particular clearly show that Pearl's account 
of token causation can be classified as being counterfactual as well as 
interventionist.
In the next section of this chapter I will motivate how this notion of 
sustenance enters in Pearl's definitions of a causal and a natural beam, the 
basic building blocks of his definitions of actual and contributory 
causation, his two versions of token causation. A remark that I can already 
make at this point is that in the above definitions of sustenance 
(P S) only endogenous variables W c V  formalize structural contingencies. 
This distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables especially 
with regard to he fact that Pearl does not admit interventions on 
exogenous variables will occupy us for the rest of this thesis.
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Pearl 's N o t io n s  
o f  a  Ca u s a l  a n d  a  N a t u r a l  Be a m
After having discussed Pearl's notion of sustenance that incorporates 
principles of production and dependence, it is time to clarify in precisely 
what form a cause c has to sustain its effect e in a given situation S with a 
certain constellation of background conditions. I maintain that this can be 
most easily understood with the aid of the leading idea that c sustains its 
effect e via a causal process that links cause c and effect e. In the following, 
I motivate Pearl's definitions of a causal and a natural beam as the decisive 
step in reaching a formalization of this notion of a sustaining causal 
process.
Causal or natural beams M« are projections of a causal model M on its 
actual state U = u. This state formalizes the constellation of background 
conditions in the given situation S that is to be analysed for causal 
dependencies. I will show in this section that a causal or a natural beam 
M u  describe under which conditions a set of parent variables Si locally 
sustains the actual value w of their child variable V , and this for every 
endogenous variable Vi in the causal model M  in the state u .
In the next section I will then clarify what it means for the value x of an 
arbitrary variable X  to sustain a value y  of another arbitrary variable Y in a 
causal model M in the state u. These conditions are given by Pearl's 
definitions of actual and contributory causation. With this, it will then be 
possible to determine precisely what a sustaining causal process is for 
Pearl.
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I remarked in the last section that Pearl's definition of sustenance (P S) 
regulates against which kind of contingencies a cause, formally described 
by X = x, must sustain its effect, modeled by Y = y. These contingencies are 
structural in nature, meaning that they are brought about by interventions 
on a set of variables W c; V. What definition (P S) is missing is a 
characterization of what choices are admissible for these contingency 
sets W.
Clearly the choice of these sets is crucial. For example, an unrestricted set 
W could contain a variable Z, that is a descendant of X and ancestor of Y 
at the same time. Obviously, under these circumstances we cannot 
intervene on X and Z and set them to values X = x’ and Z = z' that are 
incompatible. Otherwise we would disrupt the functions in the causal 
model M, thereby distorting the formal representation of the mechanisms 
at work in the situation to be modeled.101
For this reason, namely to specify which choices of contingency sets to be 
intervened on are admissible, Pearl defines a causal beam. Causal beams 
are projections of a causal model M  to its actual state u, devised to make 
the choice of contingency sets W minimally disruptive. Pearl's definition is 
the following:102
Definition (Causal Beam, Pearl) (P CB)
For causal model M  = (Ur V, {/i}i=i n) and state U = u, a causal
beam is a new model Mu = (u, V, (/iM}i=i n), in which the set of
functionsyiM is constructed from {/!} as follows:
101 In particular, w e would risk that clause (iv) in the definition of sustenance (P S) could 
be wrongly fulfilled by this setting, so that w e would wrongly analyze X = x as being a 
cause of Y = y.
102 Cf. [jP 00], pp. 318 and 319.
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1. For each variable Vi e V, partition PAi into two subsets 
PA\ = SiuSi, where Si is any subset of PAi satisfying
fi(S\(u), s\, u) =  fi(S\(u), Si' ,  u) 
for all realizations Si and Si of Si.
In words, Si is any subset of PAi sufficient to entail the 
actual value of Vi(u), regardless of how we set the other 
members of PA i. 103
2. For each variable V e V, find a subset Wi of Si, for which 
there exists some realization Wi = w  that renders the 
function fi(si, Siw(w), u) nontrivial in sr, that is
f \ s  i ,  Siw(tt), u) * f i (Si ,  Siw(tt), u) = Vi(u) 
for some realizations s/ of Si.
Si should be chosen not to intersect the sustaining set Sj of 
any other variable V\, for yn . Likewise, setting Wi = w  
should not contradict any other setting Wj for ]Vi.104
3. Replace/i(S i, Si, u) by its projection f i u{Si),  given by
_/iM(Si) — ji S^i, Siv/(tl), U)-
103 Note that such a sustaining set Si always exists, since it can always be chosen to 
exhaust the whole endogenous parent set PAi.
104 In case the sustaining set Si exhausts the set PAi, its complement, the contingency set Si, 
is obviously empty, and with this also the non-actual contingency subset Wi. In this case, 
the above clause 2. is trivially fulfilled, since the projection function fr{s\)  is then identical 
to the original function tii).
For the same reason that Si can always be chosen to equal PAi, the requirement of 
Si r> §  = 0  for all j * i can always be achieved. Since Wi is a subset of Si, it can likewise not 
interfere with any other sustaining set Sj for j *  i. In the same way, interference of W with 
another Wj for j * i can also be avoided by again setting W  = 0 .
Note finally that in general the existence of a set W  c  Si rendering the function 
fi(s i, Siw(w), u) nontrivial in Si is not guaranteed. Even if set Wi exhausts set Si, the function 
/(Si, Si(w), u) can still be constant, despite being dependent on Si. In this case, Si is not an 
admissible choice as a sustaining set.
A discussion of an example, in which a resulting constant projection function rules out 
the choice of a certain sustaining set, can be found in the next section where I elaborately 
illustrate the construction of a causal beam.
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In the above definition (P CB), the information that the actual state of the 
causal model M  is u is used to simplify the original functions fi in the 
model M. This simplification is achieved by determining for each 
endogenous variable V which of its endogenous parent variables in PAi 
are responsible for sustaining its actual value Vi in this solution brought 
about by model state U = u.
Clause 1. describes the determination of a sustaining set Si that is a subset 
of the endogenous parent set PAi for an arbitrary endogenous variable Vi 
with its actual value V. The set Si consists of any endogenous variable v\ 
that sustains the actual value v\ of V against certain structural 
contingencies in the causal model. These structural contingencies are 
formalized by possible interventions on the variables in the contingency 
set Si := PAASi, which is the complement of Si, in the set of endogenous 
parents of V. In this way, clause (iii) in Pearl's definition of sustenance 
(P S) is put into concrete terms in this definition of a causal beam.
Clause 2. of definition (P CB) requires that the set Si is responsible for 
sustaining the actual value v\ of V\ under these conditions. This 
requirement is implemented by demanding that there is at least one 
realization Wi = w, in which Siw(tt), u) ^ v\ for a certain realization 
Si' * Si of Si. By this, also clause (iv) of Pearl's definition of sustenance (P S) 
is put into concrete terms in the definition of a causal beam.
Taken together, clauses 1. and 2. of (P CB) imply that there is at least one 
setting Wi = w  of the parent variables of V that are contained in the 
contingency set Si such that the following holds: The actual realization Si of 
the set of parent variables of V contained in Si is both necessary and 
sufficient for bringing about the actual value v\ of V.
Clause 3. finally just rules that the original function f\(pa\, u) for variable V 
is to be replaced by its projection fiu(s\) on the sustaining set. By this, the 
exogenous variables U and the variables in the contingency set Si are
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excluded from the argument set of the projection fiu(si) and thereby frozen 
at model state u and the possibly non-actual realization Siw(w).
Let us examine closer in what way Pearl's definition of a causal beam 
(P CB) puts his notion of sustenance expressed in (P S) into concrete terms. 
The definition of sustenance (P S) declared under which conditions a value 
x  of an arbitrary variable X sustains a value y  of another arbitrary variable 
Y  against certain structural contingencies. Formally, these conditions were 
expressed with the aid of interventions on X and on a certain set of 
endogenous variables W . These interventions froze X and W  at various 
realizations x, x' and w, w ', so that then the potential response of Y to 
these interventions Yxw(w) = y, and Yxw{u) = y' * y  respectively, could be 
computed. Remarkably, the background variables U were not frozen at 
their actual values u by an intervention in this procedure.
The definition of a causal beam (P CB) differs in slight respects from this 
procedure. First of all, the background variables U are frozen at their 
actual values u by an intervention. Second, the definition of a causal beam 
distinguishes between two kinds of contingencies: The variables in the 
non-actual contingency subset Wi c: Si may be frozen by interventions at 
non-actual values, whereas the variables in Si \  Wi may only be frozen at 
their actual values by intervening on them.
Finally and most important, clauses 1. -  3. of definition (P CB) only 
regulate under which conditions a certain set of parent variables Si locally 
sustains the actual value v\ of their child variable Vi, and this for every 
endogenous variable V. The question what it means for the value x  of an 
arbitrary variable X to sustain a value y  of another arbitrary variable Y, is 
not answered by this yet. It will be answered though by Pearl's definitions 
of actual and contributory causation, with which I will deal shortly.
Let me discuss the second difference noted above a bit more elaborately. 
By allowing non-actual realizations w  for the variables in Wi in clause 2 . of 
definition (P CB), one obviously allows a much wider range of
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contingencies than if one would require that all variables in the 
contingency set Si be frozen at their actual values S\(u) brought about by 
model state U = u.
Trivially, clauses 1. -  3. of (P CB) are much easier to fulfill with such a non­
actual contingency subset Wi cz Si set to a non-actual realization w  than if 
one would require that Wi = 0 , so that all variables in the contingency set 
Si were frozen at their actual values S\{u). For, clearly the requirement that 
the projection function fiu(s\) is non-trivial in its argument Si is much 
stronger if it applies to the actual realization in the model Si(u), so that 
f i u{Si) = /(S i, Si(tt), u ) , than if it could be met by a non-actual realization 
Siw(t/), so thatfiu(s\) = / ( s i ,  Siw(tt), u).
Pearl distinguishes the causal beams M« in which for all endogenous 
variables V\ the non-actual contingency subsets Wi are empty as being 
paradigmatic, since they still describe the actual state of affairs in the 
situation for which causal model M was constructed. He calls these beams 
natural and gives them the following definition:105
Definition (Natural Beam, Pearl) (P NB)
A causal beam M« is said to be natural, if condition 2. in the
above definition (P CB) is satisfied with Wi = 0  for all V\ e V.
It is constructive to spell this definition out in detail, because this 
condition of empty non-actual contingency subsets W simplifies clauses
2. and 3. in the definition of a causal beam considerably. For this reason, in 
the following I give my own spelled out version of a definition of a natural 
beam, which is entirely equivalent to Pearl's original definition.
’05 Cf. [jP 00], p. 319.
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Definition (Natural Beam, Spelled-Out Pearl) (SP NB)
For causal model M  = (U , V, {/j}i=i,...,n) and state II = u, a natural 
beam is a new model Mu = (u, V, (/i"}i=i,...,n), in which the set of 
functions^" is constructed from {fi} i=i n as follows:
1. For each variable V\ e V, partition PAi into two subsets 
PA. = SiuSi, where Si is any subset of PAi satisfying
fi(Si(u), Si, u) = fi(Si(u), S i ',  u) 
for all realizations Si and s/ of Si.
In words, Si is any subset of PAi sufficient to entail the 
actual value of V\{u)r regardless of how we set the other 
members of PAi.
2. For each variable V\ e  V, Si renders the function 
f\(s\, Si(u), u ) nontrivial in ss; that is
Si(n), u) *  Si(u), u) = V\(u) 
for some realizations Si' of Si.
Here, Si should be chosen not to intersect the sustaining set 
Sj of any other variable V\, for j * i.
3. Replace/ i ( s i ,  S i, u) by its projection f\u(s\), given by
fiu(s\) Si(ii), m).
In this formulation, it becomes more obvious that a natural beam is 
formed by freezing all parent variables in Si = PAASi that are outside the 
sustaining set S. at their actual values S\(u), thus yielding the projection 
fiu(s\) Si(u), u).
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As a final observation that applies both to natural and non-natural causal 
beams, observe that for different realizations u of the exogenous variables 
U, the form of a causal beam, and also a natural beam, M« can vary. This is 
brought about by clause 1. of Pearl's definitions (P CB) and (P NB) 
respectively. For different values V\ (u) the set of endogenous parent 
variables Si sufficient for entailing this value of V,(u) may be different, so 
that the corresponding set of parent variables Si that are frozen are also 
different. Furthermore, note that also for one and the same realization u 
there can be more than one causal beam with different sets Si reaching 
from minimally sufficient sets for entailing the actual value of V\(u) to the 
full endogenous parent set PAi and different subsets Wi of Si.
As I already mentioned in the introduction of this section, the definitions 
of a causal and a natural beam, (P CB) and (P NB) respectively, are the 
decisive step in reaching a formalization of the notion of a causal process 
by which a cause c sustains its effect e. And as we observed in the 
discussion in this section, (P CB) and (P NB) accomplish this by 
incorporating Pearl's notion of sustenance. More concretely, we saw that a 
causal or a natural beam Mu describe under which conditions a set of 
parents Si locally sustains the actual value v\ of their child variable V\, and 
this for every endogenous variable V\ in the causal model M in the state u. 
Pearl's notion of sustenance expressed in (P S) though also gave guidelines 
on what it means for the value x  of an arbitrary variable X to sustain a 
value y  of another arbitrary variable Y. These guidelines are put into 
concrete terms by Pearl's definitions of actual and contributory causation, 
with which I will deal in the next section.
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Admittedly, Pearl himself does not talk about causal processes elaborately 
and only marginally mentions that the formalization of such a process is 
the guiding idea of his whole account of token causation.106 So, my 
reconstruction of his account here is slightly biased. I opted for this 
motivation of Pearl's account, since his definitions employed are rather 
technical, and it is easy to overlook the guiding ideas behind them. I am 
convinced that emphasizing that a formalization of a sustaining causal 
process linking cause and effect is the leading idea behind his account will 
aid in developing an intuitive understanding of Pearl's rationale.
In the next section, I will discuss in detail what in my view is the precise 
formal rendering of a causal process by which a cause c sustains its effect 
e. In the section after that, I will with the aid of an example illustrate how 
exactly an application of Pearl's definition of a natural beam functions on 
the formal level.
106 For one of Pearl's short remarks about causal processes, cf. for example [jP 00], p. 313.
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Pearl's  N o t io n s  
of A c t u a l  a n d  C o n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n  
a n d  t h e  Fo r m a l iz a t io n  o f  a  Ca u s a l  Pr o c e ss
After having discussed Pearl's definitions of a causal and a natural beam, 
I now turn to Pearl's definitions of actual and of contributory causation, 
which finally clarify what it means for the value x of an arbitrary variable 
X to sustain a value y  of another arbitrary variable Y in a causal model M  
in the state u. Pearl distinguishes between two kinds of token causation: 
actual causation and contributory causation.
His definition of actual causation decisively employs the notion of a 
natural beam, whereas his definition of contributory causation does the 
same with the notion of a non-natural causal beam. In essence, x  is called 
an actual cause of y  in a causal model M  in the state u, if and only if x  
sustains y  against the following structural contingencies: for all 
endogenous variables Vi in M  all variables in the local contingency sets Si 
are frozen at their actual values. Analogously, x  is called a contributory 
cause of y  in a causal model M  in the state u, if and only if x  sustains y  
against the following structural contingencies: for at least one endogenous 
variable Vi in M  there is a non-empty local non-actual contingency sub-set 
Wi c i Si, whose variables are frozen at certain non-actual values.
Pearl intends his definition of contributory causation to formalize a 
weakened notion of actual causation that exclusively applies to cases of 
symmetric over-determination. However, I argue that such a distinction 
between two mutually disjoint kinds of token causation is in no way 
necessary. For this reason, I offer a trivial unified definition of token 
causation that contains actual causation as a special case.
After this discussion of Pearl's definitions of actual and contributory 
causation, I will draw two main conclusions in this section:
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My first conclusion concerns my distinction, which I made in the 
introduction of this thesis, namely between metaphysical accounts of 
causation as such and pragmatic modeling accounts of causation 
according to a model. I maintain that Pearl's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation clearly only give a pragmatic account of what 
token causation according to a given model amounts to. Although Pearl 
himself does not explicitly point this out, the concept of a causal model 
decisively and irreducibly enters in these definitions.
My second conclusion concerns the way in which both Pearl's definitions 
of actual and contributory causation, employing the concepts of a natural 
and a causal beam, respectively, formalize the notion of a causal process.
I argue that a causal process can be understood to be the concatenation of 
the projection functions fiu in a causal or natural beam M« of exactly the 
variables Vi that are intermediate between the cause variable X  and the 
effect variable Y.
Let me start my discussion with Pearl's definition of actual causation. This 
is the following:107
Definition (Actual Cause, Pearl) (P AC)
An event X  = x is said to be an actual cause of Y  = y  in a state u if
and only if there exists a natural beam Mu such that:
Yx = y  in M«, (Cl)
and
Y.v’ * y  in Mu for some x' * x. (C2)
107 Cf. [jP 00], p. 319.
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This definition of an actual cause now regulates under precisely which 
conditions the value x of an arbitrary variable X sustains the value y  of 
another arbitrary variable Y in the causal model M  in the state u  against 
structural contingencies of a special type: These contingencies are given by 
freezing all variables in the local contingency sets Si at their actual values 
for all endogenous variables V in M.108
An actual cause x  according to this definition (P AC) fulfils all clauses 
(i) - (iv) in Pearl's definition of sustenance (P S): The first three clauses 
(i) - (iii) of (P S) are fulfilled by clause (Cl) of (P AC), the last clause (iv) of 
(P S) by clause (C 2) of (P AC). For, the natural beam M u  identifies a special 
contingency setting W  = w ' in the terminology of (P S), in which x is both 
necessary and sufficient for y, and in which no endogenous variable in the 
model M  is frozen at a non-actual value. More concretely, this contingency 
set W  of definition (P S) is constructed by iterating the operation of 
identifying local sustaining sets Si and their complements Si, the local 
contingency sets, for all endogenous variables Vi in the causal model M. 
Since M« is a natural beam, all local non-actual contingency sub-sets Wi c: 
Si are empty, so that all variables in the local contingency sets Si are frozen 
at their actual values. The total contingency set W in definition (P S) finally 
is the union of all these local contingency sets Si, i.e. it is W = (J  Si.
iejl n)
In other words, the counterfactual test in (C2) in definition (P AC) ensures 
that the value y  of variable Y  would not be sustained by some value x' of 
X, if for all variables Vi in the causal model M in state u all variables 
outside the sustaining sets Si are frozen at their actual values Si(u). 
Condition (Cl) would in itself not be enough for making x necessary and 
sufficient for y , for there could be another value x"  of X bringing about 
Yx- = y.m
108 For Pearl's own discussion and further remarks about his definition of actual 
causation, cf. [jP 00], pp. 319 and 320.
109 The existence of such a value x” of X w ould be admissible by clause 2. in the definition 
of a natural beam (SP NB).
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How can we now graphically understand how according to the definitions 
of actual causation (P AC) and of a natural beam (P NB) an actual cause c 
sustains its effect e in a given situation S with a certain constellation of 
background conditions? I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that 
the functions fi in a causal model M  formalize the mechanisms that are at 
work in the given situation S that is to be analyzed for causal 
dependencies. In a natural beam M« now, the projection functions f i4 
formalize special reduced mechanisms for this situation S, if this situation 
is in a certain fixed state, represented by II = u.
These mechanisms are reduced in such a way that all influences that are 
not immediately involved in sustaining the actual constellation in the 
situation are screened off. Formally, this screening off of influences from 
mechanisms is achieved by freezing all variables in the local contingency 
sets Si in the construction of the projection functions f u. The actual 
constellation in the situation is formalized by the actual value distribution 
in the model M . However, the variables in the local contingency sets Si are 
not only arbitrarily frozen, they are frozen at their actual values. And this 
amounts not only to screening off the influences that are not immediately 
involved in sustaining the actual constellation in the situation, but also to 
fixing these influences at their actual condition.
An actual cause c in this way sustains its effect e against the structural 
contingencies that correspond to a canonical reduction of the mechanisms 
at work in situation S to the ones that are able to sustain the actual 
constellation in the situation, while all not immediately relevant influences 
are screened off and fixed at their actual condition.
More comments about the graphical understanding of PearTs definitions 
of token causation can be found at the end of this section, where I describe 
what the formal rendering of a causal process is in my view. A first
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example illustrating this definition of actual causation (P AC) can be 
found in the next section of this chapter.110
One concluding remark about the role of interventions in Pearl's account 
of actual causation: Definitions (SP NB) and (P AC) involve surgical 
interventions in three ways in defining actual causation: First, in the 
construction of the various natural beams Mu, interventions are used for 
freezing the causal model M  at its actual state U = u. Second, the variables 
in the local contingency sets Si, are frozen by interventions at their actual 
values for defining the projection functions fiu(s\) = f\(s\, S\{u), u ) for the 
endogenous variables Vi in model M . Third, interventions on variable X 
are used in order to test whether the actual value x of X is necessary and 
sufficient for the actual value y  of Y in the beam Mu.
I mentioned in the last section of this chapter that natural beams are 
special or paradigmatic causal beams, namely causal beams in which for 
all variables V in the causal model M  in state u all variables outside the 
local sustaining sets Si are frozen at their actual values S\(u). Non-natural 
causal beams contain non-empty local non-actual contingency sub-sets 
Wi e  Si, whose variables are frozen at non-actual values.
What does admitting a freezing of variables in Wi at non-actual values for 
the construction of projection functions f\u(si) = f\(s\, S;™{u), u) in a non­
natural causal beam Mu amount to graphically? Again, the projection 
functions / i M(Si) = S\w(u), u ) formalize reduced mechanisms in the
situation S to be analyzed for causal dependencies. And again, these 
mechanisms are reduced in such a way that all influences that are not 
immediately involved in sustaining the actual constellation in the situation 
are screened off. However, this time the variables in the local contingency 
sets Si are not all frozen at their actual values, some of them are frozen at 
non-actual values, under the proviso that this is compatible with the actual
110 Further and more interesting examples can be found in the following chapter.
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value distribution in the model. And this amounts to screening off the 
influences that are not immediately involved in sustaining the actual 
constellation in the situation, while fixing some these influences at 
conditions that are counter to fact.
If now an event c sustains another event e against the structural 
contingencies that correspond to a reduction of the mechanisms at work in 
situation S  to the ones that are able to sustain the actual constellation in 
the situation, while all not immediately relevant influences are screened 
off with some of them being fixed at conditions that are counter to fact, 
then Pearl calls this event c a contributory cause of e. His formal definition 
is the following:111
Definition (Contributory Cause, Pearl) (P CC)
An event X = x is said to be a contributory cause of Y = y  in a state 
u if and only if there exists a causal beam M u, but no natural 
beam, such that:
Yx = y  in Mu, (Cl)
and
Yx" * y  in Mu for some x' * x. (C2)
Pearl defines this notion of contributory causation in order to account for 
cases of symmetric over-determination.112 In essence, a contributory cause 
is a weakened version of an actual cause for these situations, in which an 
effect e is symmetrically over-determined by at least two other events c. By 
employing non-natural causal beams for the definition of contributory 
causation (P CC), Pearl graphically isolates a set of reduced mechanisms 
with a decisive property: Although these reduced mechanisms bring 
about the actual constellation in the situation, they violate the original
111 For Pearl's definition of contributory causation, cf. [jP 00], p. 319.
112 For Pearl's own remarks about contributory causation, cf. |JP 00], p. 313.
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mechanisms, since some influences that are not immediately relevant for 
bringing about the actual constellation in the situation are fixed at 
conditions that are counter to fact.
It is exactly this property that allows the screening off of the influence of 
an event a  that in fact, together with another event ci, symmetrically over­
determines an effect e. And this screening off of the influence of a  and 
fixing it at a condition counter to fact in turn allows determining whether 
event ci would sustain effect e in these slightly altered circumstances. If a  
sustains e in this way, then ci is called a contributory cause of e.
In this way, the rationale behind Pearl's definition of actual causation is 
straightforwardly adapted to cover cases of symmetric over­
determination. Technically, contributory causation could be understood to 
be the wider and more fundamental concept than actual causation. For, 
the sustenance of an effect e by a cause c is tested for a wider range of 
circumstances, namely not only for the actual constellation of the situation, 
but also for constellations that are counter to fact. Nevertheless, I mainly 
deal with Pearl's definition of actual causation in this chapter, since I 
regard this to be the simpler and paradigmatic one, and also since it is the 
more accessible one. Moreover, situations containing a symmetric over­
determination of an effect by at least two events seem to be marginal cases 
of the type of situations in which we are usually interested.
In any case, Pearl does not really distinguish between actual and 
contributory causation as being two kinds of token causation. His 
definitions of actual and contributory causation, (P AC) and (P CC) 
respectively, share the same underlying rationale of an event sustaining 
another one in certain circumstances. Also on a formal level, definitions 
(P AC) and (P CC) are completely analogous, the first employing natural 
beams in exactly the same way as the second employs non-natural causal 
beams. For this reason, my remarks made above after introducing the 
notion of actual causation are equally valid for contributory causation.
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In the next chapter, I will present two examples in order to illustrate how 
Pearl's account of contributory causation is practically applied. For the 
moment, I would like to draw attention to another point, namely that 
Pearl's way of formulating actual and contributory causation as being 
mutually exclusive concepts arbitrarily brings about an unnecessary 
distinction. Simply deleting the phrase 'but no natural beam' from Pearl's 
definition of contributory causation (P CC) yields an inclusive notion of 
contributory causation that comprises actual causation as a special case, 
since as said every natural beam is in particular a causal beam. With this 
modification, one could rightfully call this an inclusive definition of token 
causation containing actual causation as a special case:
Definition (Token Cause, Modified Pearl) (MP TC)
An event X = x  is said to be a token cause of Y = y  in a state u if
and only if there exists a causal beam M« such that:
Yx = y  in M«, (Cl)
and
Yx' in M u  for some x ’ ^ x. (C2)
I will return to this topic of a modification of Pearl's account to yield a 
definition of inclusive token causation in the next chapter, where I 
propose such a modification for my extension of Pearl's account. In the 
present context, let me just say that in my view this distinction between 
actual and contributory causation as being mutually exclusive concepts is 
a purely terminological issue and not a philosophical problem.
Before I come to my promised conclusion about the way in which Pearl 
formalizes a causal process, let me make a final comment about Pearl's 
definitions of (P AC) and (P CC) that might otherwise not be noticed: Both 
definitions (P AC) and (P CC) make decisive use of the concept of a causal
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model. For, literally they regulate under which conditions a value x  of a 
variable X sustains the value y  of another variable Y in a given causal 
model M in state u. In particular, the choice of the causal model M and its 
state u completely determine the set of admissible causal beams M« that 
are tested for conditions (Cl) and (C2).
As a trivial, but important, result, definitions (P AC) and (P CC) only 
define pragmatic notions of what it is for an event c to cause another event 
e according to a model M  that is given beforehand. In the introduction of 
this thesis I mentioned the great advantage of a pragmatic account of 
token causation qualified to a model over a metaphysical account of 
causation as such. In essence, I argued that such a pragmatic account 
allows splitting up the problem of analyzing causal dependencies into two 
smaller and more tangible problems: The first is the generation of a 
suitable causal model for a given situation, and the second is the definition 
of token causation according to a given model. This thesis is almost 
exclusively concerned with the second problem.
Pearl himself does not explicitly make this distinction between 
metaphysical accounts of causation and pragmatic accounts of causal 
modeling. Moreover, Pearl nowhere mentions that his definitions (P AC) 
and (P CC) only account for token causation according to a given causal 
model. His formulation in (P AC) and (P CC) is even misleading, since it 
uses a mixed terminology. Although (P AC) and (P CC) only talk of values 
x  and y  of variables X and Y in a causal model M and sustaining 
relationships among them, Pearl refers to X = x and Y = y  as events, in this 
way identifying formal devices in a causal model with the very 
constituents of a situation the former are intended to formalize. I do not 
know whether Pearl just intended to present his account more 
suggestively by this rather casual terminology, or whether he really 
wanted to account for a kind of causation as such, although I strongly 
assume the former. In any case, I just wanted to emphasize by this
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comment that Pearl's account of token causation is a pure account of 
causal modeling, and I consider this to be a great advantage.
Let me now draw my final conclusion about the way in which both 
natural and causal beams formalize the notion of a causal process for 
Pearl. I argue in the following that a causal process can be understood to 
be the concatenation of the projection functions f \u in a causal or natural 
beam M« of exactly the variables V\ that are intermediate between the 
cause variable X and the effect variable Y.
Let me start with general observations about the way in which Pearl 
formalizes a causal process. Basically, both a natural and a causal beam Mu 
are a projection of the causal model previously given on its actual state u 
incorporating the notion of sustenance. In essence, the exogenous 
variables U are frozen on their actual values u, and this information is 
used to simplify the functions fi in the original model to yield the 
projection functions fi" in the causal or natural beam Mu.
Here, for each endogenous variable Vi, the projection function f\u is formed 
by determining a set of parent variables Si e  PA, that can sustain the actual 
value Vi of variable V against certain contingencies. These contingencies 
have a structural nature, which means that they are brought about by 
interventions. A contingency set Si = PAi \ Si that is comprised of the 
endogenous parents of V\ that are dispensable for sustaining its actual 
value Vi is formalizing these contingencies. In case of a natural beam 
defined by (P  NB), all variables in Si are frozen at their actual values with 
the aid of interventions. In case of a causal non-natural beam defined by 
(P  CB), the variables in a subset W i e  Si can be frozen at arbitrary non­
actual values Wi  with the aid of interventions. None of these interventions 
on W i cz Si or on Si itself affects the value of Vi of V , since this is sustained 
by Si. This construction of projection functions fiu that contain only the 
variables in the sustaining set Si as arguments is conducted for every
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endogenous variable in the previous causal model M to yield  the causal or 
natural beam Mu.
In what way does a causal or natural beam M u  now formalize the notion of 
a causal process linking cause and effect? This brings us to the definitions 
of actual and contributory causation, (P AC) and (P CC) respectively. 
These definitions rule that a value x  of variable X is said to be an actual, or 
a contributory cause respectively, of the value y  of variable Y, if and only 
if there is a natural beam M«, or a causal beam M« but no natural beam 
respectively, such that clauses (Cl) and (C2) hold. Clause (Cl) now 
demands that in the actual solution of the beam M« variable X has the 
value x and variable Y the value y, and clause (C2) requires that an 
intervention on variable X setting X to a certain value x' * x propagates in 
the beam Mu in such a way that this changes the value of Y.
Having made these observations, I understand a causal process to be the 
concatenation of projection functions fi" of exactly the variables V\ that are 
descendants of X and at the same time ancestors of Y in the causal or 
natural beam Mu. For, first this concatenation of projection functions/!" for 
the intermediate variables V\ is responsible for bringing about the actual 
value y of Y in the actual solution of M« that contains the actual value x of 
X, thereby fulfilling the requirement posed by clause (Cl). And second, 
this concatenation of projections/!" for the intermediate variables Vi is also 
exactly the way in which the intervention on variable X setting X=xVx 
propagates in the beam M« so that a change in the value of Y is brought 
about. In this way, causal or natural beams are the framework in which 
causal processes operate. More precisely, value x  of variable X is an actual, 
or a contributory cause respectively, of the value y of variable Y, if and 
only if there is a natural beam M u, or a causal beam M« but no natural 
beam respectively, in which there is a causal process in which x  sustains y. 
But how can we graphically understand a causal process now? I 
mentioned already at the beginning of this chapter that the functions/! in a
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causal model M formalize the mechanisms that are at work in the given 
situation S that is to be analyzed for causal dependencies. In a causal or 
natural beam M*» now, the projection functions fi" formalize the reduced 
mechanisms that are at work in the given situation S, if this situation is in 
a certain fixed state. This means the information that the external factors 
determining the situation are fixed at a certain constellation is formalized 
by freezing the model state at U = u and letting this information propagate 
in the model M. This procedure certainly yields exactly one value 
distribution for the model M, but for every endogenous variable Vi in M 
there are possibly more than one reduced mechanism fi" that can sustain 
its value Vi in this solution. This explains why there is usually a family of 
causal or natural beams Mu associated to a model M at a certain state IT. In 
this picture, a causal beam can be understood as formalizing a collection 
of reduced mechanisms at work in the situation S that is able to sustain the 
actual constellation in S, if the external factors determining S were 
previously fixed at a certain state.
An event c in this situation S being fixed at a certain state now is an actual 
or contributory cause of another event e in S fixed at this state, if and only 
if there is a causal process linking c and e. With this a causal process is 
finally a concatenation of reduced mechanisms that is able to sustain the 
actual constellation of events that are intermediate between c and e in S 
fixed at this state. In particular this means that this concatenation of 
reduced mechanisms on the one hand brings about event e if event c is 
given, and on the other hand that this concatenation of reduced 
mechanisms also brings about an alteration of event e if c is altered in a 
certain way. In my view, Pearl's formal constructions expressed in this 
way capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about a causal process linking 
token cause and token effect in a situation very well.
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A n  Exem plary  Co n s t r u c t io n  
of  a  N a t u r a l  Bea m
After heaving dealt with Pearl's definitions of actual and contributory 
causation employing natural and causal beams and having established 
that beams play the decisive role in formalizing the notion of a causal 
process, I now illustrate how a natural beam is constructed according to 
Pearl's definition (P NB). I focus on the discussion of natural beams here, 
since they are simpler and in a certain way more paradigmatic than non­
natural causal beams. Admittedly, natural beams are special causal beams 
that are developed to analyze actual causation. In this way causal beams 
describe a wider concept, and certainly my modified definition of 
inclusive token causation that employs causal beams contains actual 
causation as a special case. However, Pearl's original definition of 
contributory causation is not inclusive, and non-natural causal beams are 
only applied in analyzing cases of symmetric over-determination.
The functioning of Pearl's definition (P AC) of actual causation, and with 
this also the functioning of his definition of a natural beam (P NB), can be 
most easily illustrated with the aid of an example, omitting a cover story 
and only focusing on a causal model M.
For this purpose I will in the following consider a causal model M  
containing 7 variables, A, B, C, D, E, F and G, all of them two-valued, with 
F and G exogenous and the following functions for the endogenous 
variables:
/ A(g) = idc, ft>(a) = idA, / e ( a) = idA,
fl, if A = 1 and D = 1 , ^ fl, ifB  = lorF = l
Ma,d) = < , and /c(b,f) = I
0 otherwise 0 otherwise
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I further suppose that the actual state of the model is F = 1 and G = 0, 
yielding the solution A = 0,E = 0, D = 0, B = 0 and C = 1.
The associated graph to the model is:
D F
▼
 ►  ►
G A B
▼
E
I mainly examine the question whether in this model, M, in the state 
F = 1 and G = 0, the actual value A  = 0 of A  is an actual cause of the actual 
value C = 1 of C.
As a first step, I show that for this model M in state F = 1 and G = 0, there 
are 3 natural beams, Mf-^g-o1, Mf^oo2, and Mf=i,g=o3 that accord with 
definition (SP NB). For, observe that for every model M in state u  there are 
k natural beams M u \  . .. , M#k, with k being the number of possible 
combinations of sustaining sets for all the variables in the model; the 
following determination of all sustaining sets for all endogenous variables 
in M  will show that exactly 3 of such combinations exist.
A remarkable observation that I will make in this determination of 
sustaining sets is that treatment of exogenous variables in constructing 
sustaining sets is not unequivocally covered by clauses 1. to 3. in Pearl's 
definition of a natural beam (P NB).
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The exogenous variables G and F do not have any sustaining sets at all. 
Causal beams, and natural beams in particular, are projections of the 
original model M  to its actual state u. In this case, the actual state of the 
model is F = 1 and G = 0. As a result, F and G are frozen at these actual 
values.
Variable A  has only the exogenous variable G as parent in model M, so 
that the endogenous parent set PAa is empty, since according to Pearl's 
definition (P CM), only endogenous variables can qualify as members of 
these parent sets. Astonishingly, this case of an endogenous variable that 
has only exogenous parents is not unequivocally covered by the clauses 1. 
to 3. in Pearl's definitions of a causal beam (P CB) or a natural beam 
(P NB), respectively.113 The reason for my astonishment is that this case of 
an endogenous variable having only exogenous parents clearly marks the 
transition from exogenous to endogenous variables in a causal model. 
However, I see two straightforward variants for the construction of 
projection function here: First defining as the constant
function a  = 0, embracing the intuition that freezing of the exogenous 
variables at their actual value should propagate in the beam and hence 
simplify the projection functions. Second leaving the original function / a  =  
id G  in model M unaltered in going over to the beam, so that a  = / a  =  
idG. This second variant is guided by the underlying idea that parent 
relations between variables should be conserved, so that former 
endogenous variables are not rendered as being quasi-exogenous, and that 
projection functions should be non-trivial, in order to allow a propagation 
of value changes in the beam.
1131 remarked in the last section that natural beams are special causal beams, in which the 
contingency subsets W are empty. Pearl designed non-natural causal beams to be applied 
to cases of symmetric over-determination, whereas he took natural beams to apply to all 
other cases. Since Pearl himself by (P NB) only gave an abbreviated definition of a natural 
beam, I offered a more elaborate version (SP NB), in which the simplified clauses 1. to 3. 
with empty contingency subsets W  occur.
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In my opinion, the second variant is more natural, because it matches 
Pearl's treatment of endogenous variables that have endogenous parents 
more harmoniously. For observe that the decisive notion in definitions 
(P CB) and (P NB) is the notion of sustenance that is expressed by clauses 
1. and 2: A projection function should be able to sustain the actual value of 
an endogenous variable and should moreover be non-trivial. A constant 
function with no arguments in this way violates both of these conditions. 
Hence, in our example here, I set the projection function A to be 
identical to the original function / a  = id G  in M.
However, observe that one could also make a case for the other variant. 
One could argue that exogenous and endogenous variables should play a 
fundamentally different role and that exogenous variables should 
systematically be excluded from sustaining sets. Pearl definitely has this 
understanding, at least implicitly. For, in (P CB) and (P NB) he requires 
the sustaining set Si for an endogenous variable V\ to be a subset of P A i, 
the set of endogenous parents of Vi. What Pearl seems to overlook is that 
this understanding of exogenous variables collides with the endeavor to 
reach projection functions that sustain the values of variables that were 
previously endogenous in the original model. In my view, it is the notion 
of sustenance that fundamentally underlies the construction of a beam, the 
distinction between exogenous variables and endogenous variables is at 
best secondary in this respect. In this way, preserving functions that are 
able to sustain the actual value of endogenous variables should be more 
important, forcing a strict distinction between exogenous and endogenous 
variables.
Nevertheless, coming back to our example model here, for Pearl's account 
of actual causation both variants yield the same result. For, in definition 
(P AC) Pearl does not allow an intervention on exogenous variables, so 
that every beam always has the unaltered state U = u.
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If interventions on exogenous variables were allowed though, there would 
be a difference between the two variants: For variant one, an intervention 
on variable G setting G = 1 would not propagate through the beam, 
because a  is the constant f u n c t i o n a  = 0. In variant two, such an 
intervention would propagate, because a  = idG is clearly dependent of 
the value of G. Variant one would then appear somehow unnatural and 
counterintuitive, and it could even be conjectured that the motivation for 
Pearl not to allow interventions on exogenous variables was mainly to 
keep this distinction into two variants innocuous.
Variables D and E have variable A  as an endogenous parent in the original 
model M. Hence, clause 1. of definition (P CB) entails that their sustaining 
sets S d  and S e equal their parent sets P A d  and P A e  in model M. This 
renders the projection functions and Z > o f=1e equal to the original
functions f o  = idA and /k = idA in M according to clause 2. of definition 
(P CB). For, observe that in (P CB) the sustaining sets are constructed 
using the functions f  in the original model M.
For variable D, this yields that a choice of S d  =  0  as sustaining set and of 
S d  = {A} as contingency set is not admissible, since in the original function 
fo  = idA, the empty set cannot sustain the value D = 0 against the 
contingency A  = 1.
Analogously for variable E, setting S e = {A} as sustaining set and of S e  =  0  
as contingency set is the only admissible choice. Obviously, the projection 
functions Z ^ ' ^ d  and Z ^ =0'f=1e constructed in this way are non-trivial in their 
arguments according to clause 2. of definition (P CB), because the original 
functions f o  = idA and /e = idA are non-trivial in A.
For variable B, there are three possible choices of sustaining sets, {D}, {A} 
and {A,D}, for obviously A  = 0 as well as D = 0 and also the conjunction 
A  = 0 & D = 0 can sustain the actual value of B, namely B = 0.
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For variable C, we have a similar situation as for variable A, because C has 
one exogenous and one endogenous parent. Practically, both the sets {B} 
and 0  could sustain the actual value C = 1 of C, because the exogenous 
variable F is frozen at value F = 1. However, in my understanding, the set 
Sc = 0  is not admissible as a sustaining set according to Pearl's definition 
(P CB), because the resulting projection function would be the constant 
f u n c t io n /^ ^ c  = 1 and hence be trivial. Apparently, also this case is not 
unequivocally covered by Pearl's definition of a causal beam (P CB), 
because this constant f u n c t i o n = 1 does not have any arguments, 
and Pearl does not clarify whether such a function has to be understood as 
a marginal case of a trivial function or not.
However, with the same underlying rationale as in the case of variable A, 
namely preserving parent relationships and not rendering former 
endogenous variables as quasi-exogenous, I understand the choice of 
Sc = 0  as being unnatural and not homogenously fitting to Pearl's general 
treatment of endogenous variables. In this way, there is only one choice 
for the sustaining set of variable C left, namely Sc = {B}.
Note though that again for Pearl's account of actual causation with 
definition (P AC), both choices of sustaining sets yield the same results. 
For, a value change of a predecessor variable brought about by an 
intervention cannot propagate through the beam via variable C by either 
of the resulting projection functions /c, as the following discussion will 
show. As an overall observation, we can note that there is an ambiguity in 
the treatment of exogenous variables in constructing causal beams.
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The above discussion shows that there are 3 possible combinations of 
sustaining sets for the variables in model M  with state F = 1 and G = 0: For, 
variable B there are three possible choices of sustaining sets, for all other 
endogenous variables there is only one choice each. It follows that there 
are 3 natural beams to consider, and one can show that in none of them an 
intervention on variable A  setting A  = 1 brings about C = 0. In accordance 
with definition (P AC), this means that A = 0 is also no actual cause of C = 
1 in Pearl's account.
As an illustration of how the projection functions in natural beams are 
computed, construct the natural beam M f=i,g=o3,  with the sustaining set 
Sb = |A,D} for variable B.
As already mentioned, the exogenous variables F and G are frozen at their 
actual values, F = 1 and G = 0, and the projection function for
variable A  is identical to the original function in M, i.e. = / a  = idG,
yielding the solution A  = 0.
For variables D and E, the projection functions f ^ ' MD = idA and
= idA have also been established above, so that the solution for these 
variables is D = 0 and E = 0.
Since for variable B, the choice of sustaining set Sb = {A,D} and
complement Sb = 0  again exhausts the parent set PAb of B in M, the
projection function is once more identical to the original function fa
f l , i f A  = landD = l 
i n  M w i t h / B  =  < ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  B = 0.
[0 otherwise
The same finally applies to variable C. The sustaining set Sc = {B} and
contingency set Sc = 0  result in the projection function being
• , i- • m  • r f1’ if B = lorF = lidentical to the ongmal function fc= <
[0 otherwise
The graph associated to this natural beam M f= i,g = o 3 is hence still the 
following one:
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Returning to our short discussion of the choice of sustaining sets for 
variable C, note that in all three beams Mf-i.g-01, Mf=i,g=o2, Mf=i,g=o3 with 
sustaining set Sc = {B} the projection function />0'w c gives the same value 
/ ^ ■ ’c = 1, as long as the value of the exogenous variable F is preserved. 
For trivial reasons the same would hold for the beams Mf=i,g=o4, Mf=i,g=o5, 
M m  ,g=o6 with sustaining set Sc = 0 , if such a choice was admissible, since 
there we would have the constant function v a lu e /^ ^ c  = 1.
As a result, the claim from above is validated, namely that in none of the 
three beams for model state G = 0, F = 1 an intervention on variable A  
setting A  = 1 brings about a change in the value of variable C, so that A  = 0 
is not an actual cause for C = 1 according to Pearl.
Finally note that he number and form of the natural beams to be 
considered can vary significantly between different value distributions in 
the causal model M. E.g. for the state G = 1, F = 0, and the resulting 
solution A  = 1, E = 1, D = 1, B = 1 and C = 1, we have only one natural 
beam, since there is only one sustaining set for variable B, namely {A,D}. 
Observe that this beam Mg=i,f=o has different features from the above three 
beams for state G = 0, F = 1. Although Mg=i,f=o still has the same sustaining 
set S ^ '^ c  = |B) for variable C, this time an intervention on variable A  
setting A  -  0 would propagate through the beam, thereby changing the 
value of C to C = 0.
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A  Co m p a r is o n  o f  th e  Fo r m a l iz a t io n s  
of  a  Ca u s a l  Pr o c e ss  by  Pearl a n d  H it c h c o c k  
a n d  Pearl's  Pr o blem  
W it h  Ex o g e n o u s  V a r ia bl e s  a s  Ca u s e s
In the last section, I have illustrated how a natural beam according to 
Pearl's definition (P NB) is constructed for a given causal model. I settled 
for an illustration of the construction of a natural beam, since I considered 
natural beams in a certain way to be simpler and more paradigmatic than 
causal beams. In the section before that, I argued that a causal process for 
Pearl can be understood to be the concatenation of the projection functions 
fi* in a causal or natural beam M« of exactly the variables V\ that are 
intermediate between the cause variable X and the effect variable Y. In 
this section, I point out striking differences between Pearl's formalization 
of a causal process with the aid of natural and causal beams on the one 
hand and Hitchcock's formalization of a causal process by a simple causal 
route on the other. Finally, I draw attention to the fact that values of 
exogenous variables can neither be actual nor contributory causes for 
Pearl, mainly since he excludes exogenous variables from sustaining sets 
in the construction of both a natural and a causal beam.
After having worked out the motivation behind Pearl's natural and causal 
beams and the way in which they formalize the idea of a causal process in 
a previous section, let me now briefly point out some formal differences 
between a causal process for Pearl and Hitchcock's formalization of a 
causal process by a route in a model. I will deal with Hitchcock's 
methodology of formally identifying a causal process with a route in 
greater detail in the next chapter, where I also claim that this identification
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is responsible for a failure of Hitchcock's account with regard to examples 
of a certain type.
As became obvious, both Pearl and Hitchcock share the conviction that a 
causal process in a situation S should link cause and effect via the 
intermediate events, or in the formal setting, that cause variable X and 
effect variable Y  should be linked by variables intermediate between 
them. Hitchcock and Pearl just differ in the way in which these 
intermediate variables are selected and in which variables are frozen in 
this procedure.
Hitchcock formally identifies causal processes with routes r between X 
and Y in the causal model and freezes intermediate variables between X 
and Y that do not belong to r at their actual values in order to give an 
account of actual causation. In order to account for contributory causation, 
Hitchcock allows a freezing of variables W  at arbitrary values 
independently from whether they are intermediate between X and y  or 
not. The only conditions are that these variables W  do not belong to r and 
that their new values do not affect the actual value of y.
Pearl's proceeding differs from this mainly by first freezing the exogenous 
variables to simplify the given situation and then freezing the variables Si 
at certain values that are not involved in sustaining the actual values v\ of 
the endogenous variables V in the model. Whether these variables Si are 
all frozen at their actual values or whether a certain subset W  c  Si is frozen 
at non-actual values depends on whether Pearl wants to account for actual 
or contributory causation. In any case only the variables Vi matter that are 
intermediate between X and Y. This difference between Pearl's and 
Hitchcock's strategies in selecting intermediate variables and freezing 
others results in a divergence of their formalizations of a causal process in 
mainly two respects:
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First, for Pearl a causal process is dependent on the actual values Vi of the 
endogenous variables Vi being intermediate between X and Y that are to 
be sustained. Since a causal model is deterministic, though, these values v\ 
of the intermediate V are determined by the actual state U at which the 
model is frozen. We saw in the discussion of the formal causal model in 
the last section that for model state G = 1 and F = 0 there existed only one 
natural beam M g=i,f=o, whereas state G = 0 and F = 1 had three associated 
beams M g=o,f=i. In contrast to this, Hitchcock's causal routes are 
independent from the value distribution in a model; the only constraint 
for the selection of intermediate variables V is that they are descendants of 
X and ancestors of Y.
Second, a process in Pearl's understanding can contain several routes. For, 
as we saw this, too, in the discussion of the formal causal model in the last 
section, one sustaining set for variable B contained two variables, namely 
A  and D. In this way, the intermediate variables between A  and C that 
were responsible for sustaining the actual value 1 of C were B and D, and 
A  was a parent variable of both B and D. This means the set of 
intermediate variables responsible for sustaining C at its value C = 1 
contained the two routes (A, B, C) and (A, D, B, C). Admittedly, we had no 
real causal process here linking A  and C, since A  = 0 was not an actual 
cause for C = 1 according to Pearl. However, in the next chapter we will 
encounter two examples in which we have proper causal processes linking 
cause and effect and containing two routes.
As a close of this discussion of causal processes and for reasons of 
instructiveness, I finally apply Hitchcock's account to the causal model 
given in the last section. Hitchcock despite having a static criterion of 
identifying causal processes with routes yields the same result as an 
application of Pearl's account: In our original model M  in state G = 0, F = 1 
an intervention on A  setting A  =1 does not alter the value of C. In this way, 
A = 0 is not an actual cause of C = 1 for Hitchcock either.
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Hitchcock's definition (H AC) rules that A  = 0 is a cause of C = 1, if and 
only if one of the two causal routes, (A,B,C) and (A,D,B,C), leading from A  
to C are active. Verify with the aid of Hitchcock's definition (H AR) that 
both (A,B,C) and (A,D,B,C) are inactive:
Route (A,B,C) is active iff in the associated dual model (a ,b ,qM', which is 
identical to the original model M  with the sole exception of the equation 
for variable D, intervening on A  setting A  = 1 yields C = 0. Since an 
intervention on A  only affects descendants of A, and of these only the ones 
are relevant that are ancestors of C at the same time, all equations apart 
from the one for variable D remain unaltered in the transition from M  to 
(a ,b ,qM'. Only variable D is intermediate between A  and C in this respect, 
being disjoint from route (A,B,C), so that only its equation is overridden 
by D = 0, thereby freezing D at its actual value. Apparently, then an 
intervention setting A = 1 in the dual model (a ,b ,qM ' still brings about 
C = 1. This shows that route (A,B,C) is not active.
For route (A,D,B,C), the dual model (a,d,b(q M '  is identical to the original 
model M, since there are no intermediate variables between A  and C that 
do not belong to route (A,D,B,C). Also in this model, an intervention 
setting A  = 1 yields C = 1. This shows that route (A,D,B,C) is not active 
either. As a result, according to Hitchcock, A  = 0 is not a cause of C = 1. In 
this way, the analysis of this example by Hitchcock's account of actual 
causation with definitions (H AR) and (H AC) yields the same verdict as 
an application of Pearl's account of actual causation with definitions 
(P NB) and (P AC).
This example conclusively illustrates that whether in the transition in 
Hitchcock's account from M to rM' for a certain route r a certain variable X 
is frozen at its actual value depends only on whether X is intermediate 
between the two variables in question. This criterion of being intermediate 
is static, i.e. independent of the concrete distribution of values of the 
variables in the model, always the same variables are frozen. More
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formally, for Hitchcock, the dual models M '  are the same for all possible 
states of the model, modulo the value at which the intermediate variables 
are frozen. For example, for state F = 0, G = 1, model (a,d,b,qM f=o,g=i' is still 
identical to the original model M ,  and (a,b,qM f=o,g=i' is identical to the above 
(a ,b ,q M ', with the only difference being that variable D is frozen at D = 1.
As seen above, this rationale of Hitchcock's to identify a causal process 
with a route in a causal model differs in two important ways from Pearl's 
methodology to formalize a process by a causal beam. First, the projection 
functions in a causal beam, and with this the causal beam itself, are 
dependent on the actual values in the model. And second, projection 
functions can have more than one argument.
After having made this comparison of Pearl's and Hitchcock's ways to 
formalize causal processes, let me turn to another topic. We already 
noticed in the last section of this chapter that clauses 1. to 3. in Pearl's 
definitions of a causal and a natural beam, (P CB) and (P NB) respectively, 
contain an ambiguity in the treatment of exogenous variables in forming 
certain sustaining sets. However, this ambiguity is part of a bigger 
problem regarding the general role of exogenous variables.
In the last section I argued for including exogenous variables in sustaining 
sets for endogenous variables if this is the only way to reach a non-trivial 
projection function that would otherwise have no arguments and be 
constant. My argument for this was that I regarded the notion of 
sustenance to be more fundamental than a strict distinction between the 
roles of exogenous and endogenous variables. However, it became clear 
that in this way Pearl's rationale of attributing a different role to 
exogenous variables than to endogenous variables would violated. For, 
Pearl constructs his causal and natural beams in such a way that in general 
exogenous variables are to be excluded from sustaining sets and in this 
way do not enter as arguments of the projection functions. This general
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formulation of a causal beam though results in the fact that changes in the 
values of exogenous variables brought about by interventions, if such 
interventions were allowed, cannot propagate in the beam. In this way, 
values of exogenous variables can neither be actual nor contributory 
causes for Pearl.
However, this exclusion of exogenous variables from sustaining sets in 
general is only the most striking difference that Pearl makes in treating 
exogenous and endogenous variables. All in all, he differentiates the role 
of exogenous variables from the one of endogenous variables in three 
respects. First, observe that in the definition of a causal model (P CM), the 
third clause (iii) differentiates between the endogenous parents PAi and 
the exogenous parents l l i  of an endogenous variable Vi, by representing 
the value v* of V  by the function f\ (pm, u\).
Second and most important, as already mentioned, in the definitions of a 
causal beam (P CB) and a natural beam (P NB) exogenous variables are 
excluded from the construction of sustaining sets. Already the clause 1. 
rules that the sustaining set Si of the endogenous variable V  has to be a 
subset of P A i, already assuming that all exogenous variables U, and in this 
way in particular the exogenous parents U\ of V , are frozen at their actual 
values. Clauses 2. and 3. then ensure a non-triviality of the projection 
function f “(s\) constructed for V  in this way, and replace the original 
function fi {pm, u\) with this projection / " ( S i )  that has significantly fewer 
arguments. In this way, even if an intervention on exogenous variables 
were admissible, it could not propagate through the causal beam, since 
exogenous variables are no longer arguments of the projection functions
/ “ (S i) .
Third and more a trivial notational issue, the definitions of actual and 
contributory causation, (P AC) and (P CC) respectively, in their given 
formulation seem to prohibit an intervention on exogenous variables. For, 
observe that the counterfactual test by clause (C2) still applies to the causal
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beam M«, in which all exogenous variables U are frozen at their actual 
values u, so that the variable X intervened on can only be exogenous.
Pearl neither mentions that exogenous variables can neither be actual nor 
contributory causes, nor does he give a clear rationale for not admitting 
interventions on exogenous variables. An underlying idea can though 
easily be conjectured: Pearl understands the values of exogenous 
variables, or background variables, as he calls them, to be determined by 
factors outside the model. In contrast to this, the derivation of the values 
of the endogenous variables is completely known. It is the mechanisms in 
the example to be modelled reflected by the set of functions F in the model 
that determine the values of endogenous variables. One could argue that a 
manipulability of the value of a variable requires knowledge of a 
mechanism by which this value can be manipulated. In this way, if the 
laws governing the values of variable are unknown, then these variables 
are beyond our control, i.e. an intervention on them is not admissible for 
conceptual reasons.
I argue though such a view is not justified, for the following rather trivial 
reason: Pearl himself does not employ the mechanisms in the model for 
intervening on a certain variable X. The associated function fx for variable 
X is in no way utilized for the intervention on X, nor is any information 
that fx. conveys utilized for this purpose. On the contrary, the function fx is 
overridden by setting the value of X to a constant value, thereby rendering 
X quasi-exogenous.
In the next chapter, I will propose an extension of Pearl's account that 
treats all variables uniformly and allows an intervention on exogenous 
variables. It will show that it can analyze several examples much more 
naturally than Pearl's original approach.
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Pearl 's Pr a g m a t ic  S t r a t e g y  
t o  G ener a te  Ba s ic  Ca u s a l  St r u c t u r e s  
o u t  o f Pro bability  D is t r ib u t io n s
In this section, I will give a brief synopsis of how Pearl generates his 
causal models and compare this to the way in which Hitchcock arrives at 
his causal models for a given example situation. Pearl's approach to 
generating causal models is mainly geared to analyzing causal 
relationships on the type level. Pearl's starting point is the definition of 
conditional probabilistic independence for a set of random variables 
T := LZuV with a joint probability distribution P extending over all 
admissible, in particular over all non-actual combinations of values of the 
variables in liuV. Pearl utilizes this probability distribution P and this 
definition of conditional probabilistic independence in his so-called 
algorithm of inductive causation to determine an equivalence class [D], a 
so-called pattern, of basic causal structures D that can all generate this 
probability distribution P. In this way, the result of Pearl's model 
generating procedure is not a complete causal model M  with a set of 
deterministic functions F, but instead, the result is the equivalence class 
[D] of basic causal structures D that are in essence just the set of variables 
U u V  together with a relation R  describing parenthood between these 
variables.
Admittedly, my synopsis is in no way complete nor is it self-contained. 
Instead, I would like to refer the reader to Pearl's own discussion of the 
model generation procedure, which is far more thorough and 
comprehensive. I mention Pearl's model generation procedure merely for 
the following reasons:
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First, for drawing the conclusion that in the application of Pearl's 
definitions of actual or contributory causation, the causal model M out of 
which the beams Mu are constructed is strongly underdetermined, because 
the set of functions F determining the values of the variables in V  has to be 
stipulated. Second, to compare Pearl's approach with the one of 
Hitchcock.
Apart from this, the only critical remark that I will have to make regarding 
Pearl's account of model generation is that his stipulation of a probability 
distribution P over a set of random variables U u V  that formalize possible 
alterations of singular events could be problematic and is definitely in need 
of motivation.
In comparison with Hitchcock's account of model generation, the 
following striking difference will become apparent: Pearl has a strictly 
pragmatic strategy employing probability distributions to extract causal 
patterns out of them and ending up with a multitude of basic causal 
structures that can all serve as blueprints for a complete causal model. 
Hitchcock's strategy is more metaphysical in nature because the complete 
counterfactual information about a situation is stipulated at the outset of 
model construction and uniquely and completely determines a causal 
model on which Hitchcock's definitions of actual or contributory 
causation are applied.
In this way, the advantage of a causal modeling account over classic 
metaphysical accounts of causation, namely to divide the analysis of 
causation into two sub-problems -  first the generation of a suitable causal 
model to formalize a given situation and second the definition of 
causation qualified to such a model -  is lost. As a result of this 
comparison, I will finally maintain that Hitchcock fails in his attempt to 
simplify Pearl's account of the first problem of causal modeling, namely 
the generation of a suitable causal model to formalize a given situation S.
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Pearl's account of the generation of a causal model addresses the question, 
how we can translate direct observations into causal relationships. His 
main interest is to give a basic rationale for constructing causal models 
analyzing causation on the type level. For this reason, Pearl is mainly 
concerned with the problem of deriving causal relationships from 
statistical data, which give information about the covariation between 
certain events or types of events. Pearl describes the procedure of 
generating a causal model as being in essence an adaptation of the 
procedure of scientific induction to extract causal patterns out of 
probabilistic relationships.114
In the following, I very briefly sketch how in my opinion this procedure of 
extracting causal patterns out of statistical relationships can most easily be 
understood when it is applied to analyze causal dependencies on the 
token level between singular events in a given situation S. As already 
mentioned, my sketch is in no way complete nor is it self-contained. For a 
more thorough and comprehensive description, I would hence like to refer 
the reader to Pearl's own discussion of the model generation procedure.115
In my understanding, the starting point of Pearl's model generation 
procedure has to be a set T := U u V  of random variables formalizing the 
events and their relevant alterations in situation S. The statistical data that 
is available about this situation is given in the form of a joint probability 
distribution P over the set UuV. This distribution P assigns to every 
possible combination of values for all of the variables
( U i , . . . , U m )  e U and ( V i , . . . , V n )  e V a probability p ( w i , . . . , w m , i > i , . . . , i > n )  e [0,1].
114 For an extended motivation of Pearl's view s of the model generating procedure 
cf. pp. 41-43 and also pp. 59-64 of [jP 00).
115 For Pearl's discussion of extracting basic causal structures out of probabilistic 
information, cf. pp. 43-54 of [jP 00). For the causal interpretation of these basic causal 
structures cf. pp. 54-57 of (JP 00).
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Note in particular that only one of these combinations ( M i , . . . , M m , u i , . . . , i > n )  of 
values for the variables in UuV gives their actual values 
M i0, . . . ,M m ° ,u i0, . . .,VrPf all the other combinations are counter
to fact.
Pearl's strategy is first to determine the conditional probabilistic 
independencies in this set UuV for this distribution P. He achieves this by 
the following definition:116
Definition (Conditional Probabilistic Independence, Pearl) (P CPI)
Let P be a joint probability distribution over a set T  := UuV of 
variables, and let X, Y, Z be any three subsets of T.
The set X is said to be conditionally independent of Y  given Z, 
written (Xl 1 Y \ Z  )p , if for all realization s x  of X and all 
realizations y  of Y  and z of Z with P(V=i/, Z=z) > 0 the following 
holds:
P( I Y=i/,Z=z) = P(X=xl Z=z).
In words, learning the realization of set V does not provide additional 
information about the set X, once we know the realization of set Z. In my 
understanding, it is these conditional probabilistic independencies in set 
UkjV  according to probability distribution P out of which Pearl tries to 
extract causal information. In essence Pearl tries to condense a so-called 
basic causal structure out of the statistical data given by probability 
distribution P. Pearl's leading idea for this extraction of causal 
relationships out of probabilistic data is conveyed by the following 
definition of inferred causation:117
116 Cf. [jPOO], p. 11.
117 Cf. jjP 00], pp. 45 and 46 for Pearl's original version. My formulation here slightly 
deviates from Pearl's original, sine Pearl defined inferred causation for so-called latent 
structures containing latent variables that cannot be observed in the data and have to be 
stipulated rather than extracted.
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Definition (Inferred Causation, Pearl) (PIC)
Given a probability distribution P over a set V u  U of variables, 
a variable C has a causal influence on variable E if and only if 
there exists a directed path from C to £ in every minimal basic 
causal structure D  that is consistent with P.
In this context, a basic causal structure is defined as follows:118
Definition (Basic Causal Structure, Pearl) (P BCS)
A basic causal structure D of a set of variables T  := UuV is a 
directed acyclic graph in which each node corresponds to a 
distinct element of UuV, and each link represents a direct 
functional relationship among the corresponding variables.
Pearl does not clarify in which this direct functional relationship consists. 
However, I maintain that prima facie it can just be understood as 
expressing a naive causal relation R  of parenthood, or direct causal 
dependence, between variables. In broad terms, R  holds between two 
variables Z and Y, written jR(Z,Y), if and only if Y  is directly causally 
dependent on Z in pre-theoretic understanding. The relation R  induces a 
natural distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables U and 
V. The only formal requirement that R  has to meet is that it orders the 
variables in UuV in a directed acyclic way. Let me briefly record this 
understanding of mine of a basic causal structure by the following 
characterization:
118 Cf. [jP 00], p. 44 for Pearl's original definition. Pearl himself does not call his causal 
structures 'basic'. This is my addition in order to add clarity to the distinction between 
these structures D and complete causal models M.
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Characterization (Basic Causal Structure, Extended Pearl) (EP BCS)
A basic causal structure D is a pair D = (T, R ) of a set of 
variables T  := UuV and a dyadic directed acyclic relation R  that 
expresses a naive notion of causal parenthood relative to T.
In order to render his definition of inferred causation (P IC) operational, 
Pearl has to clarify what it means for a basic causal structure to be 
minimal. According to Pearl, his notion of minimality is in essence a 
formalization of Occam's razor, the standard norm of scientific induction. 
However, I do not intend to argue for Pearl's notion of minimality here. 
Instead, I would like to refer the reader to Pearl's own argumentation, in 
order to form an independent opinion for him- or herself.119 
Pearl implements this definition of inferred causation (P IC) in his 
algorithm of inferred causation.120 He develops this algorithm with the 
target to reconstruct the structure of a directed acyclic graph from the 
given probability distribution P via queries about the conditional 
independencies that are embodied in P according to his definition (P CPI). 
More precisely, this algorithm is designed to give a graphical 
representation of the equivalence class [D] of some minimal basic causal 
structure D that can generate P.121 Pearl calls this representation of [D] a 
pattern H  and characterizes it as a partially directed acyclic graph, in which 
some edges are directed and some are undirected. Again, I do not intend 
to argue for Pearl's algorithm of inductive causation. Instead, would like 
to refer the reader again to Pearl's own argumentation, in order to form an 
independent opinion for him- or herself.122
119 Cf. mainly pp. 45-48 of [jP 00] for this.
120 Cf. pp. 49-51 of [jP 00] for Pearl's algorithm of inductive causation.
121 Pearl elaborately argues that a minimal basic causal structure that is able to generate a 
probability distribution P of a certain type is only determined up to independency 
equivalence. Cf. [jP 00], pp. 48-51 and p. 19 for this argumentation.
122 This can be found on pp. 49-51. Admittedly, Pearl also discusses a weakened version 
of his algorithm of inductive causation that can deal with latent variables and produces a
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The lesson I would like to draw from this brief exposition of Pearl's way of 
generating causal models is the following: The result of Pearl's model 
generating procedure is not a complete causal model M  with a set of 
deterministic functions F. Instead, Pearl's algorithm of inductive causation 
only produces an equivalence class [D] of basic causal structures D. And 
such a basic causal structure is in essence just the set of variables U u V  
together with a relation R  describing a naive causal notion of parenthood 
between these variables.
However, as seen in this chapter, a complete causal model M is required in 
order to apply Pearl's definitions of actual and contributory causation, 
(P AC) and (P CC) respectively. It is the set of deterministic functions F 
that is the decisive component in a causal model for this purpose. 
For, these functions f, do not only describe the causal mechanisms that are 
at work in the situation to be modeled, but they also determine the 
natural and causal beams M« that can be constructed out of the original 
model M. Such a set of functions F has to be stipulated, if we extend a 
basic causal structure D to a complete causal model. The causal parent 
relation R  contained in D surely delivers constraints on the admissible 
choice of F, but it still leaves this set highly under-determined.
In short, Pearl's model generating procedure is a sophisticated and highly 
interesting way to derive causal parent relationships from statistical data. 
However, this procedure has the severe shortcoming that it does not give 
us any information, where the deterministic functions fi come from, 
without which we cannot analyze token causation according to Pearl.
As a last technical remark before I come to the final comparison between 
Pearl's strategy to construct causal models and Hitchcock's procedure, let 
me note the following: Pearl's algorithm of inductive causation only 
produces an equivalence class [D] of basic causal structures D, and the
weaker result than a pattern [D]. For details about this version of the algorithm cf. pp. 
51-54 of [jP 00].
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latter have the form of a directed acyclic graph. However, according to 
Pearl's definition (P CM) of a complete causal model the set of 
deterministic functions F does not have to be acyclic. (P CM) only requires 
that F has a unique solution. This divergence between a basic causal 
structure and a complete causal model could also be understood as 
suggesting that Pearl's model generating procedure is still in need of 
completion. But be this as it may, the results of this thesis are not affected 
by whether Pearl might in the end want his causal models to be acyclic or 
not. All examples that I employ during my argumentation in the next 
chapter involve sets of functions F that have a unique solution and do not 
contain any cycles.
Let me now finally compare Pearl's strategy for generating causal models 
with Hitchcock's procedure. A rather trivial difference between Pearl's 
and Hitchcock's accounts of model generation is the following: Hitchcock 
attempted to describe how we arrive from a given description of an 
arbitrary example situation S at a causal model M for this situation. The 
essential steps were: a) Establishment of the relevant events and their 
possible alterations; and establishment of corresponding variables and 
assignments of their values to event-alterations. b) Determination of a 
basic set of counterfactuals. c) Formalization of this given counterfactual 
information in a set of structural equations.
The first of these steps -  establishment of the relevant events and their 
possible alterations, and establishment of corresponding variables 
and assignments of their values to event-alterations -  is missing in Pearl's 
account of model generation.
The decisive difference between Pearl's and Hitchcock's accounts of model 
generation is though the following one, which concerns the strength of the 
assumptions that Pearl and Hitchcock entertain, and with this also 
concerns the nature of their accounts:
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Hitchcock implicitly stipulates that at the outset of the modeling 
procedure a complete counterfactual knowledge K  about the situation S to 
be modeled is provided. Once the variables and the assignment of their 
values to event-alterations are established, Hitchcock's basic set of 
exhaustive counterfactuals is completely determined by this complete 
counterfactual knowledge K. Since the structural equations are extracted 
from this basic set of exhaustive counterfactuals, the structural equations 
also inherit this unequivocal determination. The important fact is that this 
procedure uniquely determines the structural equations for all admissible 
value distributions of the variables, in particular the non-actual ones. 
Summarizing, for Hitchcock there is exactly one causal model M  that is 
unequivocally derived from a complete counterfactual knowledge K  about 
the situation S, given the initial choice of variables and their value 
assignments. The only under-determination that remains in Hitchcock's 
account lies in the initial choice of event-alterations considered to be 
relevant in the situation S.
In this way, Hitchcock entertains the strongest assumption possible in a 
model generating procedure -  he in essence stipulates the causal model M. 
In Hitchcock's own view, this may have seemed sensible, because he 
wanted to give a metaphysical account of causation anyway by reducing 
causation to certain kinds of counterfactual dependencies.123 
However, in my view it is a severe disadvantage to stipulate a causal 
model in an account of causation. First, this does no longer allow to split 
the problem of analyzing causation in two sub-problems -  the generation 
of a suitable causal model on the one hand, and the definition of causation 
qualified to such a model on the other. And as I have argued it is exactly 
this division of causal analysis into two sub-problems that marks a 
decisive progress of causal modeling accounts in comparison to classic 
metaphysical accounts of causation.
123 Cf. in particular p. 274 and p. 287 of [cH 01].
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Second, dearly Hitchcock's stipulation of a complete counterfactual 
knowledge K  about a situation S to be modeled leaves two questions open: 
on the one hand, how such a stipulation can be justified, and on the other 
hand where this knowledge K  comes from.
From these observations I draw the following conclusion regarding the 
first problem of causal modeling, as I describe it, namely the generation of 
a suitable causal model to formalize a given situation S: In my view, 
Hitchcock fails in his attempt to simplify Pearl's account of model 
generation. What Hitchcock provides is instead an account of model 
stipulation that just rewrites exactly the same counterfactual information 
that has been put in at the very beginning.
In striking contrast, Pearl's strategy for generating causal models is strictly 
pragmatic. Pearl is much more parsimonious in the assumptions that start 
his model generating procedure. He only assumes a set of random 
variables UuV and some statistical data in the form of a joint probability 
distribution P over these variables to be given.
In the case that we are interested in analyzing causation on the type level 
and these variables UuV formalize types of events and their possible 
alterations, such an assumption seems to be very reasonable. However, if 
we deal with causation on the token level and these variables UuV 
formalize singular events and their possible alterations, the assumption of 
the existence of a joint probability distribution P over the set of variables 
UuV is more problematic.
At least the following questions emerge: First, how can we make sense of a 
probability p(wi,...Mn,ui,...,Um) that is assigned to a combination of values 
(wi,...Wn,U],...,i>m) of the variables in UuV, when (wi,...Wn,ui,...,i;m) 
formalizes a corresponding combination of possible alterations of singular 
events? Second, how can we observe such probabilities, if we are dealing 
with singular events, which we usually only observe once, if at all?
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Certainly, Pearl would have to address these problems in order to argue 
that his account of model generation is applicable in a derivation of 
models for the analysis of token causation. And over and above this, also 
for the generation of models for the analysis of causation on the type level, 
Pearl would at least have to motivate where these probabilities come from 
and in which way they are observable. However, I think in the present 
context an investigation into the foundation of probability theory, in order 
to find out whether Pearl is justified in stipulating such a probability 
distribution P or not, would go too far.
Anyhow, this thesis is mainly concerned with the second discipline of 
causal modeling, as I call it, the definition of causation relativized to a 
given model. For this reason, I have only provided a brief synopsis of 
Pearl's account of model generation here, abstain from any criticism, and 
assume for the sake of Pearl's argumentation that his stipulation of a 
probability distribution P might be justified.
We have seen on the last pages that Pearl's general strategy for 
constructing a causal model starts out with a probability distribution P 
conveying conditional probabilistic dependencies, out of which causal 
patterns are extracted, and ends up with a multitude of basic causal 
structures D that all consistently formalize the given situation S at hand. 
Certainly, Pearl also assumes a sense of completeness of counterfactual 
information about this situation S to be modeled. Namely, a certain causal 
model M  is fixed before causal analysis can take place, since the latter 
requires the construction of causal beams Mu out of this model M. And 
clearly, such a deterministic model M  contains the complete 
counterfactual information about all the variables it contains, since for 
every possible value of the exogenous variables Uk, in particular non­
actual values, the functions fi uniquely determine the value of every 
endogenous variable Vi.
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However, one can understand the basic causal structures D as blueprints 
for a complete causal model M, since these basic causal structures D 
certainly give criteria that a complete causal model M  has to fulfill. 
Summarizing, Pearl delivers a pragmatic account of model generation that 
employs probabilistic information about the given situation S to be 
modeled and does not stipulate the complete causal model as Hitchcock 
does. In this way, Pearl preserves the distinction of causal modeling into 
two disciplines -  generating a suitable causal model for model and 
defining causation according to such a model.
A byproduct of this distinction of causal disciplines is again the following 
result that I already drew earlier: Pearl's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation, (P AC) and (P CC) respectively, only describe 
causation according to a certain previously chosen causal model M, and 
naturally refrain from any bold metaphysical claims about causation as 
such, as Hitchcock makes them.124 Remarkably, Pearl himself seems not to 
be aware of this distinctive property of his account; for in his formulations 
(P AC) and (PCC), he calls an event a cause of another one, unqualified to 
a certain model M.125
124 Cf. Hitchcock's definition of causation 'as such' on p. 287 of [cH 01].
125 Cf. |jP 00], p. 319.
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I n the last two chapters, I have tried to clarify Hitchcock's account of actual and contributory causation, shortly discussed W oodward's 
notion of inclusive token causation, and described the relevant parts of 
Pearl's account of actual and contributory causation. In dealing with these 
accounts of Hitchcock, Woodward and Pearl, I examined the solutions that 
these accounts offer to the two basic problems of causal modeling. The 
first of these problems was the construction of an appropriate causal 
model M  to describe a certain situation S containing singular events in 
whose causal relations we are interested. The second problem was to 
formalize the notion of token causation according to such a causal model, 
once we have agreed on a suitable one.
I maintained that it is a great advantage to generally relativize statements 
about token causation to certain models, since in this way these two 
problems can be tackled separately. Moreover, I motivated that 
Hitchcock's, W oodward's and Pearl's definitions of actual and 
contributory causation, or inclusive token causation respectively, do 
capture exactly such notions of causation that are relativized to a model. 
However, since Hitchcock, Woodward and Pearl all, at least implicitly, 
claim to account for unqualified notions of causation, I briefly discussed 
Hitchcock's and Pearl's procedures of constructing appropriate causal 
models for analyzing token level causal dependencies. I reached the result 
that Hitchcock by assuming total information about the situation to be 
modeled tried to avoid the problem of model generation completely by in 
essence just stipulating a certain model. In contrast to this, Pearl did not 
assume total information about the situation and offered certain criteria 
that a suitable model had to fulfill. However these criteria of Pearl's were 
insufficient to determine a model on which his definition of actual and 
contributory causation could be applied.
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In this chapter I only consider the second problem of causal modeling, 
formalizing the notion of token causation according to a causal model, 
once we have agreed on a suitable one. Concretely, I construct four 
paradigmatic examples to which I apply my reconstructions of 
Hitchcock's definitions of actual and contributory causation, (H AC) and 
(H CC) respectively, Pearl's corresponding definitions (P AC) and (PCC), 
and finally W oodward's definition of token causation (W TC).
This application of these different accounts to my four examples serves 
various purposes: First, it is easy to compare the extensions of the different 
accounts, i.e. one can easily determine whether a cause according to one 
definition is also a cause according to another one. Second, the verdicts of 
these accounts can be compared not only to each other, but can also be 
compared with our causal intuitions in these examples; this allows us to 
find out whether some definitions are more plausible than other ones. 
Third, possible formal difficulties in the application of these definitions 
can become obvious.
The focus of this application is on Hitchcock's account of actual and 
contributory causation with definitions (H AC) and (H CC), and on Pearl's 
account with the corresponding definitions (P AC) and (PCC). Again, I 
only marginally deal with W oodward's account, since his definition of 
token causation (W TC) is equivalent to Hitchcock's definition of 
contributory causation (H CC), and since Hitchcock's account was the 
earlier one and moreover in need of clarification. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will in the following treat my reconstructions of Hitchcock's 
definitions (H AC) and (H CC) as if they were Hitchcock's own version. 
My justification for this treatment is that I consider my reconstruction of 
Hitchcock's account in the first chapter of this thesis to be the 
straightforward formal expression of his rationale, moreover staying as 
closely as possible to the original.
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This chapter has two leading questions: The first question is whether 
Hitchcock, and in this way Woodward, too, succeed in giving a 
simplification of Pearl's account of singular event causation. The second 
question is whether one can improve on their accounts. In the subsequent 
eight sections I answer these questions as follows:
In the first section I show that Hitchcock's project of simplifying Pearl's 
account of actual causation fails. I offer two examples. Example 1 contains 
an actual cause according to Hitchcock's (H AC) that is not a cause 
according to Pearl's (P AC). Example 2 contains an actual cause according 
to (P AC) that does not qualify as a cause for (H AC). In both examples the 
verdict delivered by Pearl's account is in accord with our causal intuition, 
whereas Hitchcock's account reaches verdicts that contradict our 
intuitions. Apart from that, I make the observation that Pearl's account of 
actual causation is not directly applicable to these examples for technical 
reasons, since it does not allow interventions on exogenous variables.
The second section deals with a revocation of his account of token 
causation that Hitchcock makes in a footnote in a later article. This article 
implicitly features two new notions of component and net causation. 
I offer formalizations of token level reductions of these notions. Moreover, 
I argue that my token level reductions of these new notions cannot replace 
the basic notion of actual causation, since the latter is deeply entrenched in 
our causal intuition. Hence, I unify my formalizations of token component 
causation and token net causation to a definition of merged actual 
causation (H MAC). An application of this new definition to my two 
examples from the first section, though, shows that (H MAC) still fails in 
one of them.
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In the third section I offer a natural extension of Pearl's account of actual 
and of contributory causation that allows interventions on exogenous 
variables. I achieve this by slight modifications in Pearl's definitions of a 
causal beam (P CB), a natural beam (P NB), and of actual and contributory 
causation (P AC) and (P CC). These modifications facilitate a uniform 
treatment of exogenous and endogenous variables that is in my view more 
natural than Pearl's original distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous variables in constructing sustaining sets.
In the fourth section I construct canonical extensions, called example 
3 and 4 respectively, of my two examples featured in the first section. This 
is achieved by introducing a parallel mechanism that symmetrically over­
determines the putative effect in examples 1 and 2. Subsequently, I apply 
Hitchcock's account of contributory causation given by definition (H CC) 
and my extension of Pearl's account of contributory causation given by 
my definition (EP CC) to examples 3 and 4. Hitchcock's definition (H CC) 
analyzes example 3 as containing a contributory cause that is not a cause 
according to my extension of Pearl (EP AC). In example 4 the analyses 
yielded by both definitions (H CC) and (EP AC) coincide in the example 
containing a contributory cause. The verdict delivered by my account is in 
both examples in accord with what I take to be our causal intuition, 
whereas Hitchcock's account reaches a verdict in example 3 that 
contradicts our intuitions again.
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The fifth section contains an examination of the reason why Hitchcock's 
account of actual and contributory causation fails in the analysis of my 
examples. I conclude that this reason can be found in Hitchcock's 
underlying rationale that identifies a causal process linking a cause and its 
effect with a route in a causal model. I argue that this understanding of a 
process is misguided, since the notion of a causal process linking a cause 
with its effect in a situation requires a structurally more complicated 
construction to be formalized. I maintain that such a construction is given 
by Pearl's definition of a causal beam that also captures a notion of 
sustenance.
In the sixth section I apply Woodward's account of inclusive token 
causation given by (W TC) to my four examples. As observed in Chapter 
1, Woodward understands (W TC) to express an inclusive notion that 
uniformly applies to all cases of singular event causation. I show that 
Woodward's inclusive understanding of token causation is an 
improvement over Hitchcock's separated notions of actual and 
contributory causation, since in example 2 Woodward's account with 
(W TC) delivers a result that is in accord with our causal intuition; 
Hitchcock's account of actual causation with (H AC) and (H AR) 
previously failed with this example. However, W oodward's account with 
(W TC) still analyzes my examples 1 and 3 in a way yielding results that 
contradict our causal intuition.
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In the seventh section I investigate the reason behind this failure of 
W oodward's account of inclusive token causation. I argue that this is still 
the same as in Hitchcock's case, since W oodward's definition (W TC), 
despite being applicable to all cases of singular event causation, is still 
equivalent to Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation (H CC). This 
failure of W oodward's account of token causation and the fact that it fails 
for the same reason as Hitchcock's account of actual and contributory 
causation finally justifies the fact that I discuss W oodward's account only 
subordinately in this thesis. Furthermore, I give a trivial extension of 
Pearl's account that captures an inclusive notion of token causation as 
well, in this way also covering all cases of singular event causation. In my 
view, the distinction between an inclusive notion of token causation and 
exclusive notions of actual and contributory causation is, though, a mere 
terminological problem.
The eighth section is a final proving ground for my extension of Pearl's 
account of actual and contributory causation given by my definitions 
(EP AC) and (EP CC). I demonstrate that my extension does not fare worse 
than Hitchcock's original account in dealing with the three major 
problems of Lewis's classic counterfactual account: the intransitivity of 
causation, preemption, and symmetric over-determination. For this 
reason, I apply my extension of Pearl's account to the examples 'Boulder' 
and 'Backup' that Hitchcock featured to illustrate intransitivity and 
preemption respectively, and finally to Lewis's classic example 'Firing 
Squad' to give a further worthy representative for cases of symmetric 
over-determination.
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A c t u a l  Ca u s a t io n : 
H it c h c o c k 's  A c c o u n t  
a n d  Pearl's A c c o u n t  
A pplied  t o  Tw o  Ex a m ples
In this section I examine whether Hitchcock's project of simplifying Pearl's 
account of actual causation succeeds. I reach the conclusion that 
Hitchcock's account fails in two respects: first by having a different 
extension than Pearl's account and second by contradicting our pre- 
theoretic causal intuitions.
I present two examples: The first contains an actual cause according to 
Hitchcock's definition (H AC) that is not an actual cause according to 
Pearl's definition (P AC). The second example contains an actual cause 
according to Pearl that does not qualify as an actual cause for 
Hitchcock. In both examples the verdict delivered by Pearl's account is in 
accord with what I take to be our causal intuition. Hitchcock's account 
reaches verdicts that contradict our intuitions.
Remarkably, it becomes obvious that Pearl's account of actual causation is 
not directly applicable to these examples for technical reasons, since 
Pearl's definitions of a natural beam (P NB) and of actual causation (P AC) 
do not allow interventions on exogenous variables. I overcome this 
obstacle by the introduction of dummy variables.
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The first example demonstrates that actual causation according to 
Hitchcock does not imply actual causation according to Pearl by 
containing an actual cause according to (H AC) that is not an actual cause 
according to (P AC).
Example 1
Cover story (Atomic Binding): An experiment is carried out in 
which the binding process of protons and electrons is 
examined. It is conducted in the following way: when a proton 
is released in a void and neutrally charged test chamber, a 
device releasing an electron in the test chamber is triggered, so 
that the following holds: Whenever a proton is released, 
an electron is released; when there is no proton, there is also no 
electron. A perfect detector records the emission of the particles 
in the test chamber (also of the hydrogen atom that 
spontaneously forms); in particular, it records the resulting 
electric charge of the test chamber
Assume that we are particularly interested in the question whether the 
release of the proton affects the electric charge of the system. Such a 
question is not as nonsensical as it might appear on first glance. In a 
calibrating scenario, when we want to compare the behavior of the 
detector in a certain test series to its ideal behavior, questions like this are 
the decisive ones.
The following assignment of events to values of variables
P =
E =
C =
0 , if Proton is not released into the test chamber
1, if Proton is released into the test chamber
0 , if  Electron is not released into test chamber
1, if  Electron is released into test chamber
[0, if  according to detector electric Charge o f system does not stay constant
11, if according to detector electric Charge o f system does stay constant
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yields the functions, or structural equations in Hitchcock's terminology,
f 0 , if E and P have different values
/e(p ) = idp and /c(e,p) = <
[ l , if E and P have the same value
with the associated graphical representation:
E
Let us assume that the actual value of P is P = 1, so that the resulting 
values are E = 1 and C = 1.
An application of Hitchcock's account proceeds in the following way: 
Demonstrate that route (P,C) is active. Intervene on variable P, setting 
P = 0 and freeze variable E at its actual value E = 1. This yields C = 0 
showing that the direct route (P, C) is active and that P = 0 is an actual 
cause of C = 0.
In order to apply Pearl's account meaningfully and non-trivially to this 
example, one first has to add a dummy parent variable F of P. For, as 
remarked in the last chapter, values of exogenous variables can never 
qualify as causes for Pearl's account. So, add the variable F and a new 
function for variable P,
/ P(f) = idF, yielding the following diagram:
F E
iIii
▼
C
Heuristically, variable F could be understood to be modeling the possible 
states of the device generating and emitting the protons, i.e.
|0  , if  the proton releaser is not triggered
11, if  the proton releaser is triggered
179
For the present solution in the model with P = 1, E = 1 and C = 1, 
corresponding to model state F = 1, there is only the trivial natural beam 
that is identical to the original model: For, according to Pearl's definition 
of a causal beam (P CB), the only possible choice of sustaining sets for the 
variables E and C are
Se = {P}, Se = 0  and Sc = {P, £}, Sc = 0 .
That means no variables are frozen, so that the resulting projection 
functions of the beam are still the original functions of the causal model, 
i.e. / e f=1( p )  = fc(p) and /cF=1(p,e) =/c(p,e). Obviously, these projection 
functions are non-trivial in their arguments, as required in definition 
(P CB). In this way, the solution in the beam Mf=i for P = 1 is C = 1, and an 
intervention setting P = 0 in this beam Mf=i still yields C = 1. According to 
Pearl's definition of actual causation (P AC), P = 1 is hence not an actual 
cause for C = 1.
As a result, Pearl's account accords with our pre-theoretic intuition in this 
example, or at least mimics it, whereas the verdict that Hitchcock's 
analysis of this example delivers contradicts this intuition. For, the 
detector reading stays constant, no matter whether there is a proton 
released into the test chamber or not. In this way, it is not only shown that 
actual causation according to Hitchcock does not imply actual causation 
according to Pearl. The example also provides strong evidence against the 
correctness of Hitchcock's account suggesting that it is too wide in certain 
respects, namely in characterizing events as causes that are not causes 
according to our natural understanding.
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The next example demonstrates that the inverse implication from 
causation according to Pearl to causation according to Hitchcock is not 
valid either. It contains an actual cause according to Pearl's account that is 
not an actual cause under Hitchcock's analysis.
Example 2
Cover story (radioactive decay): A radioactive atom a is placed 
in an experimental set-up with a perfect detector. When atom a 
decays into two smaller atoms s and w, the detector registers 
both s and w. The detector is furthermore equipped with an 
analysis program that gives the result 'decay' if the detector 
has been triggered by two atoms.
Suppose that we are interested in the question whether the decay or non­
decay of the atom has an effect on the detector. In particular, the focus is 
on the question whether a non-decay of the atom causes the detector not 
to give the result 'decay'. Again, this is a typical question for calibrating 
the detector, i.e. when we want to adjust the real behavior of the detector 
in certain test series to its ideal behavior represented in the model.
Assignment events to values of variables as follows:
f l , if  atom a decays in particles s and w 
[ 0 , otherwise
f 1, if particle s is registered by detector 
. | o , otherwise
f l , if  particle w is registered by detector 
[0 , otherwise
f l , if  detector s a y s ’decay'
[0 , otherwise
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T h i s  y i e l d s  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  / s ( t )  =  id T , fw(t) = idT , a n d
v f l ,  if  S = 1 and W = 1 
y v ( S ,w )  =  <
[0 , otherwise
With this, the associated graphical representation of the model is:
y / ' *  S
T V
W
Assume that the actual state of the model is T  = 0 with the resulting 
solution S = 0, W  = 0 and V = 0.
An application of Hitchcock's account yields the result that neither the 
route (T, S, V) nor the route (T, W, V) is active: Intervening on T setting 
T = 1 while freezing W  at its actual value W  = 0 does not alter the value of 
V, rendering route (T, S, V) inactive. Analogously, setting T = 1 while 
freezing S at S = 0 does not alter the value of V, rendering route (T, W, V) 
inactive, too. As a result, T = 0 is not an actual cause of V = 0 according to 
Hitchcock.
Again, a meaningful application of Pearl's account requires the addition of 
a dummy parent variable F of T. So, add again the variable F and a new 
function for variable T,
Fr(p) = idF yielding the diagram:
According to Pearl, T = 0 is a cause of V  =  0, if and only if there is a natural 
beam in which an intervention on T setting T = 1 brings about V  = 1. Such a 
natural beam is given by the trivial beam that is identical to the original 
model: An admissible choice of sustaining sets for the variables S, W  and 
V, obviously fulfilling clauses (i) and (ii) of Pearl's definition (P CB), is
Ss= {T}, Ss = 0 ; Sw= {T}, Sw= 0 ; and Sv= {S, W), S v =  0 .
Again, no variables are frozen, so that the resulting projection functions of 
the beam M m  are still the original functions of the causal model, i.e./sF=1(t) 
=/s(t),/wF=1(t) =/w(t) and /v^=1(s,w) = f v ( s,w). Again, the projection functions 
/sF=1, /ivF=1 and are clearly non-trivial in their respective arguments 
according to definition (P CB), since the original functions fs,  f w  and f v  in 
model M were non-trivial. In this beam M m  intervening on T setting T -  1 
brings about V  = 1, so that according to Pearl's definition
(P AC), T = 0 is an actual cause of V = 0.
Again, our pre-theoretic intuition accords with Pearl's account and speaks 
against Hitchcock's analysis of this example, for clearly the net effect of 
the decay of atom a is the detector reading 'decay', and also in the 
complementary case, a non-decay of the atom is responsible for the 
detector not giving the reading 'decay'. Thus also the inversion of the 
above non-implication is shown: causation according to Pearl does not 
imply causation according to Hitchcock. And again, strong evidence is 
provided against the correctness of Hitchcock's account, this time 
suggesting that it is also too narrow in certain respects, namely in not 
characterizing events as causes that are causes in our natural 
understanding.
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Summarizing, Hitchcock's project of simplifying Pearl's account of actual 
causation fails in two respects: First, Hitchcock's account has a different 
extension than Pearl's. In itself, this would not necessarily be a bad thing, 
if the differences in judgment of these two accounts were in cases in which 
both verdicts were plausible. However, they are not, and this is the second 
and grave shortcoming of Hitchcock's project. In my chosen examples our 
causal intuitions are more or less unambiguous, and the verdicts delivered 
by Hitchcock's account contradict them. What makes my examples even 
more interesting is that they are structurally very basic, such that this 
violation of our causal intuition already takes place on a fundamental 
level. In this understanding, example 2 illustrates that Hitchcock's account 
already fails when it has to analyze certain basic net effects.
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H it c h c o c k 's  Later  N o t io n s  
of N et a n d  Co m p o n e n t  Ca u s a t io n
Admittedly, Hitchcock retracted his account featured in this thesis in a 
footnote in a later article, called 'A Tale of Two Effects'.126 In the same 
footnote, he mentions that his account featured in this thesis should better 
be understood as capturing a notion of actual component causation.
In 'A Tale of Two Effects' Hitchcock introduces this notion of component 
causation, or causation along a route, and contrasts it with a notion of net 
causation. Hitchcock himself only talks of component effects and net 
effects and prefers not to talk of the corresponding division of actual 
causation into component and net causation; in my view, though, such a 
division into two kinds of actual causation is canonically induced by a 
division into two kinds of effects, when these effects are token effects. 
Hitchcock motivates his new distinction at length, but does not give a 
formal definition of these new concepts.
This can easily be done, though, and in the following I offer a formal 
reconstruction of these two concepts. Admittedly, this reconstruction is 
only a crude one. Formally, it is kept close to Hitchcock's original account 
mainly featured in this thesis, in order not to deviate unnecessarily from 
the basic concepts introduced by Hitchcock. I also made no attempt to 
cover Hitchcock's newly won intuitions about component and net 
causation. The main purpose of my formal reconstruction is to deduce 
judgments about my two examples from Hitchcock's new account.
The straightforward definition of actual net causation is in my view the 
following:
126 Cf. [cH 01b], p. 363.
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Definition (Actual Net Causation, Hitchcock) (H ANC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S and let 
M := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the 
following holds: There are variables X and Z in V, such that the 
values x  of X and z of Z in the actual solution R{V) of (V, E) 
represent the actually occurring events c and e in S and such 
that their non-actual values x ’ and z' represent alterations of 
c and e respectively.
Then c is an actual net cause of e according to the model M  if and 
only if in the actual solution R(V) of M the value z of Z counter- 
factually depends on the value x  of X.
In this context, Hitchcock's original definition of counterfactual 
dependence (H CDSCM) is taken over without any changes. I.e. still the 
value z of variable Z depends counterfactually on the value x  of variable 
X in the solution R{V) of the model M  = (V, E) if and only if the following 
holds: In the solution R(V) of (V, E) it is X=x and Z=z, and there are values 
x'*x  and zVz, such that replacing the equation Ex for X with the new 
equation E'x := X=x' in E yields the result Z=z' for variable Z.
As a trivial result, Hitchcock's new actual net causation reduces to simple 
counterfactual dependence. No variables are frozen anymore in the 
model while intervening on variable X. The change in the value of X 
brought about by the intervention propagates through the unaltered 
model to variable Z.
Clearly this is a strong deviation from Hitchcock's previous idea to isolate 
causal routes r between variables X and Z in a causal model by freezing 
the variables that are intermediate between X and Z but do not belong to 
route r. Hitchcock's original rationale that c causes e if and only if these 
events are linked by a process, equating such a process to a route between 
the associated variables X and Z in an appropriate model, has hence to be
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given up. If one still wants to keep this intuition of a process linking cause 
and effect, the only straightforward candidate for a formal expression of 
such a process would hence be the causal model itself. But as said before, 
this is not the right place for examining these issues more deeply.
Interestingly, though, Hitchcock's understanding of causal processes as 
routes in a causal model is preserved in his new notion of actual 
component causation. A formalization of this new notion differs only in 
one respect from Hitchcock's definition of causation (H AC) featured in 
this thesis, namely by letting a set of routes be causally active instead of a 
single route:
Definition (Actual Component Causation, Hitchcock) (H ACC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let 
M  := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the 
following holds: There are variables X and Z in V, such that the 
values x of X and z of Z in the actual solution R(V) of (V, E) 
represent the actually occurring events c and e in S and such 
that their non-actual values x' and z' represent alterations of 
c and e respectively.
Then c is an actual component cause of e according to the model 
M if and only if in the actual solution R{V) of M  there is an 
active set of causal routes from X to Z.
In this context, Hitchcock's definition (H AR) of an active route is 
canonically extended to apply to a set of routes:
187
Definition (Active Set of Routes, Hitchcock) (H ASR)
A  set of routes {(X,Yi,...,Yn,Z), (X ,V i,...,V n,Z ), (X ,W i,...,W n,Z), ...}  
is active in a solution R(V) of the causal model (V,E) if and only 
if the actual value z of Z depends counterfactually upon the 
actual value x  of X  within the resulting solution R'(V) of the 
new system of equations E' constructed from E as follows:
For all Y in V, if Y is intermediate between X  and Z but does not 
belong to the set of routes {(X,Yi,...,Yn,Z), (X ,V i,...,V n,Z), 
(X ,W v--/W n,Z ), ... }, then replace the equation E y  for Y with a 
new equation E'y := Y=y that sets Y constant to its value y in the 
solution R(V).
Again, counterfactual dependence is defined by the original (H CDSCM); 
and again, if there are no intermediate variables that do not belong to this 
set of routes, then E' is just E.
For reasons of space I do not discuss Hitchcock's motivation for this new 
distinction between actual net and actual component causation, nor do I 
make any attempt to reconstruct the details of this later view of his. The 
main purpose for me to discuss this changed view of his is to examine 
how this new distinction fares with respect my two examples above. More 
precisely, I settle for a formal reconstruction of what it means that c is an 
actual net cause, or actual component cause, of e according to a given 
model. Certainly, I kept the notion of an appropriate model in my 
definitions (H ANC) and (H ACC) above, but only to stay as close as 
possible to Hitchcock's original formulation in (H AC). Nevertheless, I am 
only concerned here with the second task of causal modeling as I 
understand it: the definition of causation according to a model. That 
means I deliberately neglect whether Hitchcock's view regarding the first 
task of causal modeling in my understanding, the problem of generating 
an appropriate causal model, has changed in his later account. My
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justification for this neglect is that I could not find any evidence in 
Hitchcock's article that this has changed.
Returning to the problem for the original Hitchcock account posed by my 
two examples above, the first immediate observation to be made is that 
Hitchcock's new account simply tries to avoid this problem by not talking 
about actual causation as a generic concept any more. Instead, Hitchcock 
tries to motivate that there are only different aspects of causation, not a 
uniform generic understanding of one single causal relationship. Applied 
to our modeling problem on the token level, this would imply that talk of 
one concept of actual causation according to a model is not meaningful.
I do not want to enter into a discussion of this topic any deeper. For my 
present concern, it suffices to state that I hold the firm conviction that we 
have a clear pre-theoretic intuition about actual causation; and this 
intuition usually delivers unequivocal judgments about situations S when 
we ask whether a certain event c in S actually causes another event e in S. 
Moreover, I regard the rationale underlying Pearl's and the original 
Hitchcock account as very plausible and convincing: We say that a certain 
event c in S actually causes another event e in S if and only if there is a 
causal process, i.e. a concatenation of the mechanisms or local laws at 
work in situation S, linking c and e such that c sustains e.
If we insist in this way on the generic notion of an actual cause according 
to a model, there is only one straightforward way to explicate this notion 
in Hitchcock's later view, namely to merge actual net causation and actual 
component causation:127
127 Certainly, Hitchcock would not agree to such a formulation, since he has to maintain 
that a generic notion of actual causation cannot be constructed out of two disjoint aspects 
of net causation and component causation.
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Definition (Merged Actual Causation, Hitchcock) (H MAC)
Let c and e be distinct occurring events in a situation S, and let 
M  := (V, E) be a causal model formalizing S, such that the 
following holds: There are variables X and Z in V, such that the 
values x  of X and z of Z in the actual solution R{V) of (V, E) 
represent the actually occurring events c and e in S and such 
that their non-actual values x' and z' represent alterations of 
c and e respectively.
Then c is a merged actual cause of e according to the model M if 
and only if the following holds:
c is an actual net cause of e according to M, or 
c is an actual component cause of e according to M.
The analysis of example 2 by the definition of merged actual causation 
(H MAC) now delivers a verdict that no longer contradicts our pre- 
theoretic intuition about actual causation in this example:
T  = 0 is identified as a merged actual cause of V  = 0 according to (H MAC).
For, an intervention in model (V, E) on variable T setting T  = 1 yields S = 1 
and W =  1, and in turn V  = 1, demonstrating that V  = 0 is counterfactually 
dependent on T = 0. With this, V  is counterfactually dependent on T in the 
actual set of structural equations E in Hitchcock's terminology, such that 
according to my definition (H ANC) T = 0 is an actual net cause of V  = 0.
With (H MAC), T = 0 is lastly a merged actual cause of V  = 0.
And this result is in accord with our intuition about actual causation in 
this case, since we consider V  = 0 to be a clear net effect of T = 0.
However, the analysis of example 1 with the artificially defined notion of 
merged actual causation in (H MAC) still delivers a verdict that 
contradicts our pre-theoretic intuition about actual causation in this 
example:
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P = 0 is identified as a merged actual cause of C = 0 by (H MAC). For, the 
originally active route (P,C) trivially constitutes a singleton set {(P,C)} of 
active routes. More elaborately, an intervention on variable P, setting P = 0 
and freezing variable £ at its actual value E = 1 yields C = 0. With this, in 
Hitchcock's terminology the value of variable C is counterfactually 
dependent on the value of variable P in the new set of structural equations 
E' achieved by freezing variable £ at E = 1. As a result, the singleton set 
{(P,C)} is active, and according to my definition (H ACC) P = 0 is an actual 
component cause of C = 0. Again with (H MAC), P = 0 is finally a merged 
actual cause of C = 0.
And as mentioned above, our intuition about actual causation in this case 
rules that P = 0 is not responsible for C = 0, since the resulting value of C is 
C = 0, no matter whether P = 0 or not.
Summarizing, my notion of merged actual causation expressed by 
(H MAC), which I artificially constructed out of token level reductions of 
Hitchcock's two aspects of causation, still does not accord with our pre- 
theoretic intuitions about actual causation. Admittedly, the construction of 
this notion by (H MAC) is a little farfetched. However, the question 
remains whether one wants to give up the talk of actual causation as a 
generic term and settle for a division in component causation, net 
causation and possibly further notions. So far, I see no need to give up a 
generic notion of actual causation according to a model. For, as already 
mentioned, we have a clear pre-theoretic intuition about this in my view, 
and the understanding of actual causation as a process sustaining an effect 
in a situation brings further credibility to this intuition. And as I have 
demonstrated above, Pearl's account formalizing this idea of an actual 
cause being a sustaining process can handle my examples. From these 
considerations, I see only reasons against renouncing actual causation 
according to a model.
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To put these notions of actual component causation and actual net 
causation of Hitchcock's into perspective, consider them from the 
viewpoint of the distinction of actual and contributory causation. I have 
said before that contributory causation is a version of actual causation that 
applies to cases in which a token effect is symmetrically over-determined 
by various token causes. This was my attempt to suggestively express the 
fact that both concepts have the same underlying rationale in my view and 
that contributory causation is the more fundamental concept of the two. 
For, following the understanding of a token cause as being a causal 
process sustaining its token effect against possible contingencies, it 
became clear that the constraints posed by these contingencies for actual 
causes are much more specific and harder to meet than they are for 
contributory causes. Be this as it may, my main point here is that these two 
concepts of contributory and actual causation share their basic rationale.
In strong contrast to this, actual component causation and actual net 
causation do not share an underlying idea: Actual component causation 
tries to isolate causal processes in a situation by focusing on routes in the 
causal model, actual net causation relies on simple counterfactual 
dependence. With this, actual component causation and actual net 
causation simply express other aspects of causation that may very well be 
justified and in which we may very well be interested, too. However, as 
seen above, they cannot replace the notion of actual causation. And, as I 
have said this many times, we not only have a firm intuition about actual 
causation but also a strong interest in it.
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A n  Ex t e n s io n  o f  Pearl 's  A c c o u n t  
of  A c t u a l  a n d  Co n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n
Let me return now to the way my examples 1 and 2 are analyzed by 
Pearl's account of actual causation. As became obvious, in both cases 
dummy variables had to be introduced, such that an intervention on 
variables that were previously exogenous was possible. Such an 
introduction of dummy variables is heuristically more problematic than it 
might seem on first glance, though. Consider the assignment of certain 
event-alterations to the values of dummy variable F in both examples: In 
example 2 we could interpret F as modeling a bombardment of atom a 
with a certain particle, thus inducing nuclear fission. However, then we 
would have a case of nuclear fission and no longer a proper case of 
spontaneous nuclear decay, that means we would have altered the nature 
of the situation to be modeled significantly. That is exactly what we 
implicitly achieved in our treatment of example 1, altering the situation by 
identifying the variable F with the device producing protons that was not 
mentioned in the cover story.
As a result, Pearl's account of actual causation faces the following 
dilemma: Either dummy variables are identified with event-alterations in 
an extended situation, or dummy variables are understood as simple 
formal devices without a practical meaning. Both options are more than 
undesirable.
The first option would yield the result that Pearl's account is simply not 
applicable to any cases in which we are interested in whether a value of an 
exogenous variable is cause of another value of another variable. For, 
introducing an additional variable in the model would clearly distort the 
original situation. The second option would leave the modeled situation 
intact, but is formally highly questionable. On the one hand, an arbitrary
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introduction of variables that do not represent any event-alterations in the 
situation is completely unmotivated and ad hoc. On the other hand and 
much more gravely, the underlying rationale that a cause is a sustaining 
process between the cause and the effect variable is no longer compatible 
with constructing a beam according to a modified model in which a 
dummy variable has been introduced.
Since I see no plausible way for Pearl's account out of this dilemma, I 
propose a straightforward extension of Pearl's original account, which 
easily overcomes the problem of the inadmissibility of values of 
exogenous variables as causes. Starting point for this extension is the 
observation that for the construction of a causal beam according to Pearl's 
definition (P CB) the following holds:
The systematic addition of a dummy variable D\ to every exogenous 
variable U\ for j=l,...,m in a causal model M, also augmenting the model 
by the function Jvi(d))= idoj and then constructing the associated beams M'd 
for this extended model M' and state d of D corresponds to the following 
procedure.128 Consider the original model M in state u, but in constructing 
the associated beam Mu, admit the exogenous variables U in the sustaining 
sets S c: PA \.
Such a uniform treatment of exogenous and endogenous variables in 
constructing sustaining sets would in no way distort Pearl's original 
rationale of causal beams as projections on fixed states. The only 
difference is that the projection functions / u in Mu would be responsive to 
changes in the values of li. This would allow interventions on exogenous 
variables in a causal beam to have an effect on the values of its 
endogenous variables, such that values of exogenous variables could be 
causes in the same way as values of endogenous variables can be.
128 There, for every j=l,...,m , it is d j  = id-1 D j( iij) ,  the argument of the function id D j  for the 
value Mj, (hence not assuming that function id can automatically be inverted).
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My extended version of Pearl's account of actual causation implements 
this uniform treatment of exogenous and endogenous variables in Pearl's 
original definitions of a causal model, of a causal beam and of actual 
causation. Only slight modifications are needed to achieve this aim. The 
explicit construction of this extended account is given as follows:
Definition (Causal Model, Extended Pearl) (EP CM)
A causal model is a triple M = (U, V, F), where
(i) U is a set of background variables, also called 
'exogenous', whose values are causally determined by 
factors outside the model;
(ii) V  is a set { V i , . . . , V n }  of variables called 'endogenous', 
whose values are determined by variables in the model, 
i.e. by variables in U u  V; and
(iii) F is a set of functions ( / i , s u c h  that each fi is a 
mapping from the respective value-domains of U u(V\V\) 
to that of Vi and such that the entire set F forms a 
mapping from U to V and the entire set F has a unique 
solution. Symbolically, the set of equations F can be 
represented by writing
V i = f i ( p a \ ) ,  i =  2,..., n,
where p a \  is any realization of the unique minimal set of 
variables PA\ in U u  (V\V\) sufficient for representing/i.
The only change here is the relaxation of clause (iii), now unifying 
exogenous and endogenous variables in one parent set PA\. The decisive 
modification takes place in the definition of an extended causal beam.
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Definition (Causal Beam, Extended Pearl)
For causal model M = (U, V, (/i}i=i,...,n) and state U = u, a causal
beam is a new model Mu = (u, V, (/iM}i=i n) in which the set of
functions fi" is constructed from (/i}i=i,...,n as follows:
1. For each variable V\ e V, partition P A i into two subsets 
P A i =  S iu S i, where Si is any subset of P A i satisfying
for all realizations Si and Si' of Si.
In words, Si is any subset of PA, sufficient to entail the 
actual value of V,(u) in the original model M , regardless of 
how we set the other members of PAi.
2. For each variable V, e V, find a subset W, of Si, for which 
there exists some realization Wi = w  that renders the 
function S,w(u)) nontrivial in si; that is
f,(Si , Siw(tt)) ^ S i w ( l f ) )  = V i( t t )
for some realizations s / of Si.
Here, for a set Y c  V and a set W cz (liuV), Vw(u) denotes 
the solution for Y of the set of equations [f, : {Vi gW}u
{W = W?}}i=1 n.
3. Replace f,{s\, Si) by its projection which is given by
_/iM(Si) Siw(M)).
Here, Si should be chosen not to intersect the sustaining set 
Sj of any other variable Vj, for j ^ i. Likewise, setting 
Wi = w  should not contradict any other setting Wj for j * i.
(EP CB)
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In this way, an extended causal beam is still a projection of the original 
model M on the state u. However in an extended causal beam, the new 
parent sets PAiu = Si of V can contain exogenous variables Uki, ..., likP, so 
that the function f u is responsive to possible changes of the values of 
Uki, ..., Ukpby an intervention.
The definitions of an extended natural beam and of an extended actual 
cause are analogous reformulations of Pearl's original definitions (P NB) 
and (P AC), respectively:
Definition (Natural Beam, Extended Pearl) (EP NB)
An extended causal beam Mu is said to be natural if condition 2. 
in the above definition (EP CB) is satisfied with W\ = 0  for all 
Vi e V.
Definition (Actual Cause, Extended Pearl) (EP AC)
For extended model M, event X = x is said to be an actual cause 
of Y = y  in a state u  if and only if there exists an extended 
natural beam Mu such that:
Yx = y  in Mu, (Cl)
and
Yx’ * y  in Mu for some x' * x. (C2)
Now, variable X can very well be exogenous, thus allowing interventions 
on exogenous variables. This is achieved by the last extended definition of 
Yw(m) in (EP CB) -  the solution for Y of the set of equations
\fi :{V\ gW}u{W=u;}}i=i n -  now also allowing exogenous variables in the
set W.
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Apparently, these definitions bring about exactly the desired property, 
namely treating exogenous variables in exactly the same way as 
endogenous variables, thus allowing the value of an exogenous variable X 
to be a cause in exactly the same way as if X were endogenous.
One interesting problem remains though: It is not clear whether this new 
extended account of actual causation is conservative in characterizing 
endogenous variables as causes. For, definitions (P CB) and (EP CB) will 
usually produce structurally different beams to be evaluated by 
definitions (P AC) and (EP AC), respectively. This question is, though, not 
pursued further here. In the present context, it suffices to note that Pearl's 
underlying idea of sustenance of a value of a variable in a projection of a 
model to its states is preserved and that my extension is at least as natural 
as Pearl's original account: first, by treating all variables uniformly, no 
matter whether exogenous or endogenous, and second and more 
importantly, by being able to account for examples for which we clearly 
have a natural causal intuition.
It is only my conjectured rationale for Pearl's original account not 
allowing interventions on exogenous variables, since their determining 
mechanisms are not known, that would have to be given up, rendering 
interventions independent of our knowledge. Such an abstract 
understanding of interventions as hypothetical operations without any 
meaning outside the formal framework is, though, not implausible. After 
all, as I noted before, the interventions in Pearl's account are also not 
achieved by the corresponding mechanisms, i.e. the functions in the 
model. On the contrary, the function fx of the variable X intervened on is 
overridden by the intervention.
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Moreover, the impression arises that Pearl himself did not allow 
interventions on exogenous variables mainly for the sake of a simplified 
formal notation and a prevention of counter-intuitive results from the 
ambiguities in dealing with exogenous variables in the construction of 
sustaining sets. However, my relaxation of (P CB) to (EP CB) allows 
constructing sustaining sets completely unequivocally when Pearl's 
original definition (P CM) is relaxed to my (EP CM).
Overall, in my view parent variables can very well be exogenous 
according to our pre-theoretic intuition, and it seems to be much more 
natural to allow interventions on exogenous variables, too, thus treating 
all variables in the same way.
After this extended version of Pearl's account of actual causation has been 
formulated, let me turn consideration to Pearl's account of contributory 
causation. Clearly, this faces exactly the same problems as Pearl's account 
of actual causation -  values of exogenous variables cannot be contributory 
causes. For, both accounts share the same definitions (P CM), (P CB), 
(P NB), and definition (P CC) repeats the criterion (Cl) and (C2) of 
definition (P AC). In essence X = x is classified as a contributory cause of 
Y = y  if there is causal beam that fulfils clauses (Cl) and (C2), though not 
in any natural beam with this property.
However, the natural extension of this account of contributory causation 
can also be easily constructed by taking over definitions (EP CM), (EP CB) 
and (EP NB) from above and then reformulating definition (P CC) 
analogously to (EP AC). With this, the new extended definition of 
contributory causation is the following:
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Definition (Contributory Cause, Extended Pearl) (EP CC)
For extended causal model M, event X = x is said to be a 
contributory cause of Y  = y  in a state u if and only if there exists 
an extended causal beam Mu,  but no extended natural beam, 
such that:
Yx = y m M u ,  (Cl)
and
Yr* * y  in M u  for some x' * x. (C2)
As in the case of actual causation, an application of my extended account 
of contributory causation to an example situation is equivalent to an 
application of Pearl's original account plus the introduction of dummy 
variables for every exogenous variable in the corresponding causal model.
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Co n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n : 
H it c h c o c k 's  A c c o u n t  
a n d  M y Ex t e n s io n  o f  Pearl's A c c o u n t  
A pplied  t o  T w o  Exa m ples
Compare now Hitchcock's account of contributory causation for cases of 
symmetric over-determination with my extended version of Pearl's 
account. Admittedly, after the discussion of my examples 1 and 2 we have 
already come to the conclusion that Hitchcock's project of simplifying 
Pearl's account of actual causation fails in two respects: by first having a 
different extension than Pearl's and second by contradicting our pre- 
theoretic causal intuitions. And certainly I have motivated an 
understanding of contributory causation as being a weakened version of 
actual causation that applies to cases of symmetric over-determination. 
However, in strong contrast to Pearl, who offers a uniform account for 
actual and contributory causation, this is not the case with Hitchcock. For, 
his definition of a weakly active route in (H WAR) introduces the new 
notion of a redundancy set, by which the underlying rationale of the 
definition of an active route in (H AR) is given up: (H AR) allowed the 
freezing only of intermediate variables between cause variable X  and 
effect variable Z, in order to screen off possible side effects of the 
intervention on X  is. According to (H WAR), variables in a redundancy set 
{Wi,...,Wn} can be frozen at certain values independently from whether 
they are intermediate between X  and Z or not. The redundancy condition 
only requires that the setting of the values u7i,...,Wn for the variables 
Wi,...,Wn does not alter the values of the variables in the previously 
selected route between X  and Z.
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For this reason, I consider a comparison of Hitchcock's account of 
contributory causation with my extended version of Pearl's account as 
very instructive. Moreover, this comparison also serves as a proving 
ground for my extended version of Pearl's account of actual and 
contributory causation. Lastly this comparison also illustrates how an 
application of my extended Pearl account proceeds with paradigmatic 
examples.
In the following I will consider natural generalizations of the above 
examples 1 and 2. These are achieved by introducing another causal 
mechanism that applies to the effect variable and works in parallel with 
the existing mechanisms. For the sake of simplicity I suppress a cover 
story and only focus on the formal structure of these examples.
The natural extension of my above example 1 is the following:
Example 3
with the actual state P = 1 and Q = 1, 
yielding the solution E = 1 and C = 1.
Observe that now P = 1 at is not classified as an actual cause of C = 1
according to Hitchcock's account of actual causation with definitions
(H AR) and (H AC) any more: Neither route (P,C) nor route (P,E,C) are
E
P
Q
This is given by the equations / e(p) = idp and
1, if (E = P) or (Q = l)
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active, since in the actual model state with Q = 1 no intervention along the 
lines of definition (H AR) can change the value of C.
An application of Hitchcock's account of contributory causation with 
definitions (H WAR) and (H CC), though, yields the result that P = 1 is a 
contributory cause of C = 1. For, route (P,C) is weakly active according to 
Hitchcock's definition (H WAR):
Consider first route (P,E,C). Here, the only admissible choice of 
redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} is {Wi,...,Wn} = {Q}. But no matter whether we 
freeze variable Q at value Q = 1 or Q = 0, an intervention on P setting P = 0 
does not bring about a change in the value of C. This is different for route 
(P,C). Here, the choice of redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} = {Q,E} setting Q = 0 
and E = 1 obviously fulfils the redundancy criterion. This combined 
freezing of Q at Q = 0 and E at E = 1 results in the solution C = 0, if we 
intervene at P setting P = 0. Thus a change in the value of P brings about a 
change in the value of C, rendering route (P,C) weakly active.
This result of an analysis by Hitchcock's definitions (H WAR) and (H CC) 
contradicts our causal intuition about this case, though. For, even allowing 
the contingency Q = 0, the value of variable C stays constant at C = 1, no 
matter whether P = 1 or P = 0. Hence we do not regard P = 1 as responsible 
for C = 1; neither in the actual scenario with Q = 1, nor in the contingent 
scenario with Q = 0.
This contradiction to our intuition, which the analysis by Hitchcock's 
account of contributory causation with (H WAR) and (H CC) yields, has a 
striking analogy. Applied to example 1, Hitchcock's account of actual 
causation with definitions (H AR) and (H AC) achieved an analogous 
verdict contradicting our causal intuition in that case.
Example 1 was the structurally simpler original of example 3 without the 
occurrence of variable Q. The functions for the other variables were
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H p )
1, if  E =  P
0 ,  otherwise
and the actual state P = 1 brought
about the solution E = 1 and C = 1.
The graphical representation of example 1 was:
E
P
Hitchcock's account ruled of actual causation that route (P,C) was active, 
so that P = 0 was an actual cause of C = 0. But our causal intuition was 
already the same as it is now. The value of variable C stayed constant at 
C = 1, no matter whether P = 1 or P = 0, so that we did not regard P = 1 as 
responsible for C = 1. As a result, Hitchcock classified an event as an actual 
cause that was not a cause according to our pre-theoretic intuition, and 
with this I concluded that the account of actual causation with (H AR) and 
(H AC) was too wide in this respect.
Now, with regard to example 3, the analogous conclusion can be drawn 
that also Hitchcock's account of contributory causation with (H W A R ) and 
(H CC) is too wide in certain respects, namely in characterizing events as 
contributory causes that are not according to our natural understanding. 
In this way, the weakening of the definition of an active route (H A R ) by 
introducing the redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} whose variables can be frozen 
at arbitrary values has not proven successful. Despite this admission of 
contingencies in the definition of a weakly active route (H W A R )  
Hitchcock's account of contributory causation with (H CC) can still not 
deal with cases like example 3 that are straightforward extensions of 
example 1.
204
Verify now that my extended version of Pearl's account of contributory 
causation yields the analogous result to the application of my extended 
version of Pearl's account of actual causation in example l ,129 namely that 
P = 1 is neither an actual nor a contributory cause of C = 1:
For the present solution in the model with P = l, Q = l, £ = 1 and C = 1,
corresponding to state F = 1, Q = 1, we have, according to the definition of
a causal beam (EP CB), the following choice for sustaining sets:130
Se = {P}, Se = 0  with either
Sc = {Q, P}, Sc = {£}, or Sc = {£, P}, Sc = {Q}, or
Sc= {Q, P, £}, Sc = 0 .
Consider now the resulting natural beams for these choices in order to 
answer the question of actual causation, and also the associated non­
natural causal beams with the same three choices of sustaining sets in 
order to investigate contributory causation.
First consider the natural beam with sustaining sets Se = {P} with Se = 0 , 
and Sc = {Q, P} with Sc = {£}. The resulting projection functions according 
to definition (EP CB) are
C F - 1 0 - 1 /  \  r i  \  A ( M O M  \  J1’ (P =  1 )  O r  (Q =  1 )/Ef-Wfp) =^(p), and = n
[0 , otherwise
As required in definition (EP CB), both projection functions / e f=1q=1 and 
ycF=i,o=i are non-trivial. In this beam, an intervention on variable P in this 
natural beam setting P = 0 brings about the solution £ = 0 and C = 1, since 
the value Q remains unaltered at Q = 1, showing that the value of C is not 
affected by this intervention.
1291 noted earlier that an application of my extended version of Pearl's account of actual 
and contributory causation to an example situation is equivalent to an application of 
Pearl's respective original accounts plus the introduction of dummy variables for every 
exogenous variable in the corresponding causal model.
130 Note that the choice of Sc = {Q} with Sc = {£, Pj is not admissible, because variable P 
may not occur in any contingency set Sc, since it is member of the sustaining set of £.
205
There is only one non-natural causal beam with these sustaining sets, 
namely the beam with contingency subset Wc = {£} setting E = 0.131 This 
yields the projection
above for variable E , namely / e f=1 0=1 (p) = /k(p). Again,/cF=1Q=1 is clearly non­
trivial. Again, an intervention on P, now in this non-natural causal beam, 
setting P = 0 still brings about the solution E = 0 and C = 1, so that the value 
of C remains unaltered.
The second choice has the sustaining sets S e = {P} with S e = 0 , and 
Sc = {£, P} with Sc = {Q}. The resulting projection functions here would be 
y£F=i,Q=i(p) _ y^(p) and the constant /cF=1Q=1(e,p) = 1, the latter one obviously 
being trivial. That means that this choice of sustaining sets does not 
qualify as a natural beam.
Again, there is only one non-natural causal beam with these sustaining 
sets, this time with contingency subset Wc = {Q} setting Q = 0.132 This yields 
the projection
However, again an intervention on P that sets P = 0, now in this new non­
natural causal beam, does not alter the value of C.
The third choice of sustaining sets S e = {P} with S e = 0 , and Sc = {£, P, Q} 
with Sc = 0  brings about the projections /ef=1q=1 (p) = fk(p) and/cF=1Q=1(q,p) = 
/c(p), so that the resulting natural beam is identical to the original model, 
keeping its non-trivial functions for E and C. Since Sc = {£, P, Q} with 
Sc = 0 , there only choice for a contingency subset is Wc = 0 , so that there 
are no non-natural beams with these sustaining sets.
131 For the other choices Wc = {E} setting E = 1, or Wc = 0 ,  the solutions of the resulting 
beam coincide with the one of the above natural beam.
132 For the other choices Wc = {Q} setting Q = 1, or Wc = 0 ,  the solutions of the resulting 
beam again coincide with the one of the associated natural beam.
/ c F= W (  q ,p ) =
1, if (P =0)or(Q = l)
and the same projection function as
0, otherwise
1, if (E = P) 
0, otherwise
non-trivial in their arguments.
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Taken together, this shows that according to my extension of Pearl's 
definition of actual causation by (EP AC) and of contributory causation by 
(EP CC), P = 1 is neither an actual nor a contributory cause for C = 1. For, 
there is neither a natural beam nor a non-natural causal beam in which an 
intervention on variable P changes the values of variable C. In this way, 
my extended version of Pearl's account is still in accord with our causal 
intuition and has passed this first test.
As the second and final point of comparison of Hitchcock's account of 
contributory causation with my extended version of Pearl's account, 
consider now the natural generalization of the above example 2 to a case 
of symmetric over-determination, again suppressing a cover story:
Example 4
S
This is given by the functions /s(t) = idT, fw(t) = idT and
[0 ,  ifS  = 0 o rW  = 0 o rQ  = 0 
^ (S' W' q ) = l l ,  otherwise
and the actual state T = 0 and Q = 0, 
yielding the solution S = 0, W  = 0 and V  = 0.
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Observe that still T = 0 is not classified as an actual cause of V  = 0 
according to Hitchcock's account of actual causation with definitions 
(H AR) and (H AC): Neither route (T,S,V) nor route (T,W,V) are active, 
since in the actual model state with Q = 0 no intervention can change the 
value of V.
However, an application of Hitchcock's account of contributory causation 
for cases of symmetric over-determination, given by the definitions 
(H WAR) and (H CC), yields the result that T = 0 is a contributory cause of 
V  = 0. For, both routes (T,S,V) and (T,W,V) are weakly active. In both cases 
choose the redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} = {Q} setting Q = 1, such that an 
intervention on variable T  setting T = 1 yields the solution S = 1, W = 1 
and V=l .
Verify now that my extended versions of Pearl's account of actual and 
contributory causation, given by definitions (EP NB) and (EP AC), or by 
(EP CB) and (EP CC) respectively, yields the same result that T = 0 is not 
an actual, but very well a contributory cause of V = 0:
For the present state of the model with T = 0, Q = 0, yielding the solution 
S = 0, W  = 0, and V  = 0, we have, according to the definition of a causal 
beam (EP CB), the following choice for sustaining sets: For variables 
S and W  there is only one choice, which is Ss = [T] with Ss = 0 , and 
Sw = {T} with Sw = 0 . The resulting projection functions for these variables 
are hence identical to the functions in the original model with 
ysT=o(Q=o(t) = icjT = ^ ( t) and/WT=W(t) = idr =
For variable V, there are seven possibilities for a choice of sustaining sets, 
Sv = {S} with Sv = {W, Q}, or Sv = {W} with Sv = {S, Q}, or 
Sv= {Q} with Sv = {S, W), or Sv = {S, W} with Sv = {Q}, or 
Sv= {S, Q} with Sv = {W}, or Sv = {W, Q} with Sv = {S}, or 
Sv= |S, W, Q) with Sv = 0 .
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Consider now the resulting natural beams for these choices, and verify 
that in none of them a change in the value of T  can bring about a change in 
the value of V. For, observe that in the natural beams, in which Q is 
member of the sustaining set Sv, the actual value Q = 0 always ensures that
V = 0 as well; and variable Q is obviously not affected by the intervention 
on T. If Q is a member of the contingency set Sv and thereby frozen at 
its actual value, this yields a constant projection function /vT=0Q=0(t) = 0 
which is obviously trivial and hence not admitted in the construction of a 
beam. As a result, there are no natural beams in which Q is contained in 
the contingency set Sv, and the only well-defined natural beams are 
innocuous, so that T  = 0 does not actually cause V = 0, according to my 
definition (EP AC).
However, a non-natural causal beam exists with the required property, i.e. 
a beam in which an intervention on variable T setting T = 1 brings about
V  = 1, demonstrating that T = 0 is a contributory cause of V  = 0, according
to my definition (EP CC). Such a beam has to fulfill the following
properties: First variable Q has to be member of contingency subset
Wv c  Sv, and second variable S or W have to be contained in the sustaining
set Sv, so that an intervention on variable T can propagate to variable V.
A beam meeting these requirements is given by making the following
choices of sustaining sets: Choose Sv = {S, W} with Sv = {Q}, and for
variables S and W  follow the only possibility Ss = {T} with Ss = 0 , and Sw =
[T] with Sw = 0 . In this way, the projection functions with/sT=aQ=0(t) = idi =
/s(t) and ywT=OQ=0(t) = idT = /w(t) result for variables S and W. The projection
fO, if S = 0 or W = 0 
function of variable V  is given by/vT=0 Q=0(s,w,q) = <
[1, otherwise
Obviously, now an intervention on variable T  setting T = 1 yields the 
solution S = 1, W=  1 and the desired result V = l .133
133 The same would hold for the non-natural causal beams resulting from the following 
combinations of sustaining sets S and contingency subsets W:
Sv= {S} with Si = {W, Q} = Wv, setting W= 1 and Q = 1;
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With this it has been demonstrated that according to my extended 
versions of Pearl's account of actual and contributory causation, given by 
definitions (EP NB) and (EP AC), or by (EP CB) and (EP CC) respectively, 
T = 0 is not an actual, but very well a contributory cause of V  = 0.
This verdict coincides with our natural understanding of the situation. For 
under the assumption of Q = 1, clearly the net effect of T = 0 is V  = 0. More 
elaborately, we do not regard T = 0 as responsible for V  = 0 in the actual 
scenario given by Q = 0; that is why we do not understand T = 0 as actually 
causing V  = 0. However, in the contingent scenario given by Q = 1, we 
regard T = 0 as being very well responsible for V = 0; and that is the reason 
why we understand T  = 0 as causally contributing to V  = 0.
As a result, my extended version of Pearl's account of actual and 
contributory causation, given by definitions (EP NB) and (EP AC), or by 
(EP CB) and (EP CC) respectively, has passed its second test.
Let me lastly come back to the analogy with my example 2, which was the 
structurally simpler original of example 4 without the occurrence of 
variable Q. The functions for the other variables were fs(t) = id T ,  
,  v , , fl> if S = 1 and W = 1 _jw(t) = id T , and /v(s,w) = < . The actual state of the
[0 , otherwise
model was T = 0 with the resulting solution S = 0, W  = 0 and V = 0. The 
associated graphical representation of example 2 was:
T V
W
and analogously Sv= {W} with Si = |S, Q} = Wv, setting S = 1 and Q = 1.
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An application of Hitchcock's account of actual causation yielded the 
result that neither route (T, S, V) nor route (T, W, V) were active, so that 
T  = 0 was not an actual cause of V  = 0 according to Hitchcock.
Observe that this gap that existed in example 2 between the verdict of 
Hitchcock's account for actual causation and our intuition about actual 
causation is closed for contributory causation in example 4. Hitchcock's 
account of contributory causation, given by definitions (H WAR) and 
(H CC), can detect T = 0 as being a contributory cause of V = 0.
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Re a s o n s  fo r  t h e  Fa il u r e  
o f  H it c h c o c k 's  A c c o u n t  
of A c t u a l  a n d  Co n t r ib u t o r y  Ca u s a t io n
In the following, I investigate the differences between Hitchcock's account 
of contributory causation, given by definitions (H WAR) and (H CC), and 
his account of actual causation employing definitions (H AR) and (H AC). 
In the above example 4 we noticed that Hitchcock's account of 
contributory causation is in a certain way an improvement over his 
account of actual causation, since there an analysis with (H WAR) and 
(H CC) delivered a result in accordance with our intuition. However, 
example 3 showed that there are still cases where (H WAR) and (H CC) 
still yield analogous results to (H AR) and (H AC) that contradict our 
intuition. Understandably, I am particularly interested in why Hitchcock's 
account of contributory causation still fails, despite being an improvement 
over his account of actual causation.
Clearly, the core of Hitchcock's accounts of actual and of contributory 
causation lies in his definitions of an active route (H AR) or of a weakly 
active route, respectively. The decisive deviation in (H W A R ) from (H AR) 
is the possibility of choosing the set of variables {W i,...,W n}, whose values 
are arbitrarily fixed, independently from whether they are intermediate 
between cause variable X  and effect variable Z or not. The redundancy 
condition only requires that the setting of the values wi,...,wn for the 
variables W i,...,W n does not alter the values of the variables in the 
previously selected route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) for the actual solution in the 
model.
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Another possible weakening of Hitchcock's definition of an active route 
(H AR) in order to cover cases of symmetric over-determination would, 
though, be the following: Take {Wi,...,Wn} to be a set of intermediate 
variables between X and Z such that an arbitrary fixation of these 
variables Wi at the values w\ does not alter the value of Yi,...,Yn and Z. 
Observe though that this formulation could not account for symmetric 
over-determination, for it would still fail for obvious reasons for my 
example 3: Route (P,C) would still be weakly active in this understanding, 
because we could still choose the redundancy set as {Wi,...,Wn} = {Q,E} 
and set Q = 0 and E = 1.
Furthermore, we could also add a freezing of intermediate variables at 
their actual values to Hitchcock's definition (H WAR). {W i,...,W n} would 
be taken to be an arbitrary set of variables disjoint from the set of 
intermediate variables between X and Z such that an arbitrary fixation of 
these variables Wi at the values w\ does not alter the value of Yi,...,Yn and 
Z. And the variables that are intermediate between X and Z but do not 
belong to the route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) would be frozen at their actual values. 
This formulation would fail in example 4, though, for the same reasons as 
(H AR) failed in example 2: Neither route (T, S, V) nor route (T, W, V) 
would be weakly active in this understanding, since for route (T, S, V) the 
intermediate variable W would be frozen at is actual value, and for route 
(T, W, V) the same would hold for variable S.
Both these variants would conserve the rationale underlying Hitchcock's 
account of actual causation: isolate causal processes by freezing 
intermediate variables between X and Z not belonging to the route 
between X and Z in question at their actual values, in this way screening 
off unwanted side effects of the intervention on the cause variable X.
Hitchcock's favored definition of a weakly active route (H WAR) deviates 
from this rationale. Instead (H WAR) is a huge step in the direction of 
Pearl's account by reflecting a notion of sustaining the actual values along
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the route between X and Z against contingencies that are introduced by 
the redundancy set.
Obviously, definition (H WAR) of Hitchcock's fares better in comparison 
to my extended version of Pearl's account on contributory causation than 
his definition (H AR) compares to my extended version of Pearl's account 
on actual causation. However, (H WAR) is not a natural generalization of 
(H AR), but instead an ad hoc concession to deal with cases of a special 
structure, i.e. symmetric over-determination, while also incorporating a 
certain aspect of sustenance. In my view, this strongly suggests that 
Hitchcock's original idea underlying (H AR) and (H AC) to identify causal 
processes in a situation with concrete or graphic routes in the causal 
model of this situation heads in the wrong direction.
This conjecture gets more evidence when (H AR) is modified along the 
lines of (H WAR). The straightforward reduction of (H WAR) to deal with 
cases of actual causation would namely be the following:
Definition (Strongly Active Route, M odified Hitchcock) (MH SAR)
The route (X,Yi,...,Yn,Z) is strongly active in a solution R(V) of 
the causal model M  := (V, E) if and only if there exists a set 
(possibly empty) of variables {W i,...,W m} in V  \ {X,Yi,...,Yn,Z}, 
such that the following holds:
The value z of Z depends counterfactually upon the value x of X 
within the resulting solution R '(V )  of the new system of 
equations E', constructed from E  as follows:
For each Wi, replace the equation Em for W with the new 
equation E'wi := W\=ai that sets Wi constant to its value a\ in the 
solution R(V).
Under this modified account, the above example 2 would be analyzed 
differently yielding the same result as an application of my extended 
Pearl account of actual causation, namely identifying T = 0 as an actual
214
cause of V  = 0: In the actual state T = 0 of the model, resulting in S = 0, 
W = 0 and V  = 0, both routes (T, S, V) and (T, W, V) are strongly active 
according to definition (MH SAR), since one can choose the redundancy 
set to be {Wi,...,Wm} = 0  in both cases. This way, the original functions of 
the model are preserved, and an intervention on T setting T  = 1 brings 
about S = 1, W  = 1, and in turn V  = 1, so that according to (MH SAR) T = 0 
is an actual cause of V  = 0.
However, this modified account would still have the same shortcoming 
as Hitchcock's original account in analyzing example 1 as containing a 
case of genuine actual causation: For, observe that in the actual state P = 1, 
yielding the solution E = 1 and C = 1, route (P, C) is still strongly active 
according to definition (MH SAR), ruling P = 1 to be an actual cause of 
C = 1: Choose redundancy set {Wi,...,Wm} = {E}, and freeze E at its actual 
value E = 1, so that an intervention on P setting P = 0 brings about 
C = 0, because variables £ and P have different values.
These considerations can only lead to the result that the rationale 
underlying Hitchcock's accounts of actual and contributory causation, 
given by (H AR) and (H WAR), namely to identify a causal process in a 
situation with a route in the causal model, seems to be misguided. The 
notion of a causal process linking a cause with its effect in a situation 
requires a structurally more complicated construction to be formalized. I 
maintain that such a construction is given by Pearl's definition of a causal 
beam that also captures a notion of sustenance. My slight extension of 
Pearl's definition yielding my extended causal beams conserves these two 
underlying notions. And so far, the verdicts my extended account delivers 
are in accord with our causal intuition.
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In c l u siv e  To k e n  Ca u s a t io n : 
W o o d w a r d 's A c c o u n t  
A pplied  t o  M y  Fo u r  Ex a m ples
Let us now briefly investigate how W oodward's account of token 
causation fares with regard to the above examples. We observed in 
Chapter 1 that Woodward does not distinguish between actual and 
contributory causation. For Woodward, there is only one notion of token 
causation, and he attempts to capture this by his definition (W TC). 
Woodward understands token causation to be an inclusive notion of 
singular event causation that also applies to cases of symmetric over- 
determination. However, his definition of token causation (W TC) is 
equivalent to Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation (H CC) 
employing the notion of a weakly active route defined by (H WAR). The 
difference from Hitchcock is that Woodward does not limit the extension 
of his definition (W TC) to cases of symmetric over-determination, as 
Hitchcock does, but that Woodward takes his definition to cover all cases 
of singular event causation.
Since W oodward's definition (W TC) is equivalent to Hitchcock's 
definition of contributory causation (H CC) employing the definition of a 
weakly active route (H WAR), we can immediately verify the verdicts of 
Woodward's account when it is applied to my examples 3 and 4 above. 
With regard to my first two examples, one has to keep in mind that 
Hitchcock's definition of an active route (H AR) was a special case of a 
weakly active route according to (H WAR), so that for Hitchcock actual 
causation was a special case of contributory causation.
In the following, I give a detailed description of how an application of 
Woodward's account of token causation given by (W TC) to my four 
examples proceeds, dealing with the examples in reversed order.
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Application of Woodward's Definition (W TC) to Example 4
Woodward's definition (W TC) successfully passes the test posed by
example 4. This example was given by the functions js(t) = idT, fw(t) = idT,
, , fO, ifS = 0orW = 0orQ = 0 _and f v (s,w,q) = < . The actual state of the
[1, otherwise
model with T  = 0 and Q = 0 resulted in the solution S = 0, W  = 0 and 
V  = 0. The graphical representation was:
S
Q
Under an analysis with W oodward's definition of token causation (W TC), 
T = 0 is a token cause of V  = 0: For, my discussion of how Hitchcock's 
account of contributory causation with definitions (H CC) and (H AR) is 
applied to example 4 has shown that both routes (T,S,V) and (T,W,V) were 
weakly active. The redundancy set was for both routes chosen as 
{Wi,...,Wn} = {Q}, setting Q = 1, such that an intervention on variable T  
setting T = 1 yields the solution S = 1, W  = 1 and V = 1. As a result, T = 0 
was a contributory cause of V  = 0 according to Hitchcock's (H CC). With 
this, T = 0 clearly is a token cause of V  = 0 according to W oodward's 
definition (W TC), since as noted above (W TC) is equivalent to (H CC). 
And this verdict accords to our intuition for this case that V  = 0 is a net 
effect of T  = 0.
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Application of Woodward's Definition (W TC) to Example 3
However, example 3 is a clear counter-example to Woodward's account. 
This example had the graphical representation:
The actual state of the model was P = 1 and Q = 1, which resulted in the 
solution E = 1 and C = 1.
An application of W oodward's definition of token causation (W TC) now 
yields the result that P = 1 is a token cause of C = 1: For, route (P,C) was 
weakly active according to Hitchcock's definition (H WAR). With the 
redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} = {Q,E} setting Q = 0 and £ = 1, an intervention 
on P setting P = 0 resulted in the solution C = 0, i.e. a change in the value of 
P brought about a change in the value of C. As a result, P = 1 was a 
contributory cause of C = 1 according to Hitchcock's (H CC). And with this 
P = 1 clearly is a token cause of C = 1 according to W oodward's definition 
(W TC), since as noted above (W TC) is equivalent to (H CC).
But, as outlined above, this result contradicts our pre-theoretic intuition, 
since even assuming that Q = 0, the value of variable C stays constant at 
C = 1 no matter whether P = 1 or P = 0. An analogous conclusion as in 
Hitchcock's case can be drawn, namely that W oodward's account of token 
causation given by (W TC) is also too wide in certain respects. It 
characterizes events as token causes that are not according to our natural 
understanding.
E
P
Q
It was given by functions/k(p) = idp and/c(p,e,q) =
1, if (E = P) or (Q = l) 
0 , otherwise
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Application of Woodward's Definition (W TC) to Example 2
Example 2 was the basis out of which my example 4 was generated by
adding variable Q to reach a case of symmetrical over-determination for
variable V. Example 2 was given by the functions/s(t) = idT, /w(t) = idT, and
f l ,  if  S = 1 and W = 1 _
/v(s,w) = < . The actual state of the model was
[0, otherwise
T = 0 with the resulting solution S = 0, W  = 0 and V -  0. The associated 
graphical representation was:
S
V
W
An application of Hitchcock's definitions (H AC) of actual causation and 
(H AR) of an active route yielded the verdict that neither route (T, S, V) 
nor route (T, W, V) were active. As a result, T  = 0 was not an actual cause 
of V  = 0 according to Hitchcock.
However, under an analysis with Woodward's definition of token 
causation (W TC), T = 0 is a token cause of V = 0: For, observe that 
analogously to my discussion of how W oodward's account of token 
causation is applied to example 4, both routes (T,S,V) and (T,W,V) are 
again weakly active. Choose the redundancy set for both routes as 
{Wi,...,Wn} = 0 ,134 such that an intervention on variable T  setting T = 1 in 
both cases yields the solution S = 1, W  = 1 and V  = 1. As a result, both 
routes (T,S,V) and (T,W,V) are weakly active according to Hitchcock's
134 Remember that Hitchcock's definition of a weakly active route clearly allowed empty 
redundancy sets. In this case, this setting of { W i,... ,W n }  =  0  results in freezing no 
variables while intervening on T.
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definition (H WAR), so that T = 0 is a contributory cause of V  = 0 according 
to Hitchcock's (H CC). With this T = 0 clearly is a token cause of V  = 0 
according to W oodward's definition (W TC), since as noted above (W TC) 
is equivalent to (H CC).
Our intuition for this case ruled that V = 0 is a net effect of T = 0. Hence, 
analogously to example 4, Woodward's account of token causation given 
by (W TC) is once more in accord with our pre-theoretic intuition. 
However, this time the verdict of W oodward's account of token causation 
deviates from the one that Hitchcock's account of actual causation 
delivered for this example.
This divergence in verdict gets more plausible by remembering that 
Hitchcock distinguished between actual and contributory causation. 
Examples 3 and 4 are cases of symmetric over-determination, for which 
Hitchcock specifically developed his account of contributory causation 
with (H CC). For these two examples Woodward's account reached the 
same verdicts, since his definition of token causation (W TC) is equivalent 
to Hitchcock's definition of a contributory cause. However, whereas 
Woodward's notion of token causation is an inclusive one covering all 
cases of single event causation, Hitchcock's notion of contributory 
causation was not: For Hitchcock, actual causes certainly were a special 
case of contributory causes; however, the conditions an actual cause had 
to fulfill were much stricter than the ones expected from a contributory 
cause.
Viewed from this angle, example 2 gives a clear case in which 
Woodward's account of token causation is superior to Hitchcock's account 
of actual causation. I leave it to the reader, however to judge whether this 
counts as evidence in favor of an inclusive understanding of token 
causation.
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Application of Woodward's Definition (W TC) to Example 1
Example 1 was the basis out of which my example 3 was generated by 
adding variable Q to reach a case of symmetrical over-determination for 
variable C. Example 1 had the graphical representation
E
CP
and was given by the functions/k(p) = idp and
[0, if E and P have different values 
/c(e,p) = < . The actual state of the model
[1, if E and P have the same value
was P = 1, so that the resulting solution was E = 1 and C = 1.
An application of Hitchcock's account of actual causation given by
definitions (H AC) and (H AR) yielded the verdict that P = 0 is an actual 
cause of C = 0, since the route (P,C) is active.
As mentioned above, every active route r according to definition (H AR) is 
in particular weakly active according to definition (H WAR): In the 
application of definition (H WAR), choose the redundancy set as the set of 
intermediate variables not belonging to the route r, and freeze these 
variables at their actual values. As a result, every actual cause according to 
(H AC) is in particular a contributory cause along the lines of (H CC) for 
Hitchcock.
It is instructive to verify in the following that route (P,C) is weakly active 
according to (H WAR), too. Choose the redundancy set {Wi,...,Wn} = {E} 
and freeze variable E at its actual value E = 1. Then an intervention on P 
setting P = 0 results in the solution C = 0, i.e. a change in the value of P 
brings about a change in the value of C. As a result, P = 1 is a contributory 
cause of C = 1 according to Hitchcock's (H CC).
Since as noted above (W TC) is equivalent to (H CC), with this, P = 1
clearly is a token cause of C = 1 according to W oodward's definition
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(W TC), too. And as outlined above, too, this result contradicts our pre- 
theoretic intuition, since the value of variable C stays constant at C = 1, no 
matter whether P = 1 or P = 0.
Hence, this result reinforces the conclusion that could already be drawn in 
example 3: W oodward's account of token causation given by (W TC) is too 
wide in certain respects, namely by characterizing events as token causes 
that are not according to our natural understanding.
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Re a s o n s  f o r  the  Fa il u r e  
of W o o d w a r d 's A c c o u n t  
a n d  a n  Ex t e n s io n  o f  Pearl 's A c c o u n t  
t o  C o v e r  In c l u siv e  T o k e n  Ca u s a t io n
Let me briefly summarize what has been achieved by the application of 
Woodward's account of token causation to my four examples in the last 
section of this chapter:
I could verify that this inclusive understanding of token causation of 
Woodward's marks an improvement over Hitchcock's separated notions 
of actual and contributory causation: In example 2, Woodward's account 
with (W TC) delivered a result that was in accord with our causal 
intuition; Hitchcock's account of actual causation with (H AC) and (H AR) 
previously failed with this example. However, W oodward's account with 
(W TC) still analyzed the examples 1 and 3 in a way yielding results that 
contradicted our causal intuition. And this should give sufficient evidence 
to reject his account.
In the last but one section of this chapter, I maintained that the reason for 
the failure of Hitchcock's account of actual and contributory causation was 
the fixation on causal routes. Hitchcock understood causal routes in a 
model to be the formalization of a causal process that links a cause with its 
effect.
The same rationale underlies Woodward's account of token causation, 
since he adopts Hitchcock's definition (H CC). And this is the reason for 
the failure of W oodward's account in examples 1 and 3: Identifying causal 
processes with routes r in a model between cause and effect variables A  
and Z, respectively, leads to a freezing of intermediate variables Y that do 
not belong to r at their actual values y. If these variables Y are involved in
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sustaining the actual value of the effect variable Z, then a freezing of Y at 
their actual values distorts the interaction of the mechanisms that are at 
work in the modeled situation. This is exactly what happens in examples 1 
and 3. The route in question is (P,C) with the intermediate variable £. 
Variable £ is involved in sustaining the actual value of the effect variable 
C, hence a freezing of E at its actual value distorts the interaction of the 
mechanisms in the modeled situation.
This failure of Woodward's account of token causation and the fact that it 
fails because of the same reason as Hitchcock's account of actual and 
contributory causation gives a final justification to the way in which I 
discuss Woodward's account in this thesis. I decided to give only a short 
presentation and discussion of Woodward's account since it adopted one 
of Hitchcock's definitions, where Hitchcock's account was the earlier one 
and in strong need of conceptual clarification. However, now it has also 
turned out that Woodward's account does not offer us huge advantages 
over Hitchcock's account in terms of its analytical abilities. Where 
Hitchcock's account failed in three examples out of four, Woodward's 
account only failed in two.
The main improvement of Hitchcock's account that Woodward offered 
was the uniform treatment of all cases of singular event causation by the 
same definition (W TC) with an underlying understanding of inclusive 
token causation. However, in the following I argue that such a uniform 
treatment of all cases of singular event causation can also be achieved by 
my extension of Pearl's account, if one makes a minimal modification in 
my definition of extended contributory causation (EP CC).
Let me start with some broad considerations about unified token 
causation. Certainly such an understanding of token causation as a unified 
notion comprising both actual and contributory causation has appeal. 
After all, in both cases we had the same basic rationale of a causal process 
linking token cause and token effect underlying Hitchcock's as well as
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Pearl's account. The difference between actual and contributory causation 
for Hitchcock and Pearl was located in the kind of contingencies in which 
a causal process operates. For actual causation this process had to operate 
in the very circumstances prevailing in the situation to be modeled: both 
Hitchcock and Pearl froze the variables not immediately involved in the 
process at their actual values. For contributory causation, they allowed the 
process to operate in non-actual circumstances that correspond to freezing 
variables not immediately involved in the process at arbitrary values, with 
the only constraint being that this did not disturb the actual value of the 
effect variable.
Sharing this underlying rationale, the main difference in Hitchcock's and 
Pearl's accounts resulted from a different formalization of a process: 
Hitchcock identified a process with a route in the causal model whereas 
Pearl equated a process to a projection of the causal model. In Pearl's 
projections, his so-called beams, the resulting projection functions were 
still allowed to have more than one argument. For Hitchcock, the 
functions associated to the variables in a route were effectively only 
allowed one argument, because all other variables were frozen.
Putting these considerations aside, though, we noticed in chapter 1 that 
such a unified understanding of token causation was not a major 
breakthrough. After all, Woodward's definition (W TC) was equivalent to 
Hitchcock's definition of contributory causation employing Hitchcock's 
definition of a weakly active route (H WAR). And Hitchcock's definition 
of an active route (H AR) was a special case of a weakly active route, so 
that for Hitchcock actual causation was a special case of contributory 
causation. With his preliminary definition of token causation (W TCP) 
Woodward even gave a definition that was equivalent to Hitchcock's 
definition of actual causation (H AC).
Admittedly, this was though only a heuristic step for Woodward in order 
to motivate his final definition of token causation (W TC). Moreover, to
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make another admission, neither Woodward nor Hitchcock used the term 
'contributory causation'. Hitchcock developed his weakly active routes in 
order to deal with cases of symmetric over-determination, but did not 
really distinguish two notions of token causation. I borrowed the term 
'contributory causation' from Pearl for my description of Hitchcock's 
account for the mere reason that I found this to be a practical way of 
talking.
Even Pearl does not really distinguish between actual and contributory 
causation as being two kinds of token causation. For, natural beams 
defined by (P NB) are just a special case of causal beams defined by (P 
CB), namely the ones in which all the variables in the complements S of 
the sustaining sets S are frozen at their actual values. Pearl's way of 
formulating actual and contributory causation as being mutually exclusive 
concepts is hence completely arbitrary. For, delete the phrase 'bu t no 
natural beam' from Pearl's definition of contributory causation:
Definition (Contributory Cause, Pearl) (P CC)
An event X = x  is said to be a contributory cause of Y = y  in a 
state u if and only if there exists a causal beam M«, but no natural 
beam, such that:
The result is an inclusive notion of contributory causation that comprises 
actual causation as a special case, since as said every natural beam is in 
particular a causal beam. With this modification, one could rightfully call 
this a definition of token causation containing actual causation as a special 
case. Hence, I would finally like to suggest this modification for my 
definition of extended contributory causation in order to yield an inclusive 
definition of extended token causation:
Yx = y  in Mu, 
and Yx- * y  in Mu for some x' * x.
(Cl)
(C2)
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Definition (Token Cause, Extended Pearl) (EP TC)
An event X = x  is said to be a token cause of Y = y  in a state u  if 
and only if there exists a causal beam M« such that:
Yx = y  in M«, 
and YV * y  in M« for some x' * x.
(Cl)
(C2)
Apparently, with this one reaches a uniform treatment of all cases of 
singular event causation by one underlying notion of inclusive token 
causation. Definition (EP TC) expresses the canonical unification of an 
extended actual and an extended contributory cause according to 
definitions (EP AC) and (EP CC), respectively.
However, in my understanding this issue of a inclusive understanding of 
token causation applying to all cases of singular event causation 
simultaneously was more a terminological problem than an analytical one. 
The important fact to remember is that my extension of Pearl's account has 
analyzed all my paradigmatic examples successfully.
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M y Ex t e n s io n  o f  Pearl's A c c o u n t  
A pplied  t o  Cl a ssic  Ca s e s  o f  
In t r a n sit iv it y , Pr e e m pt io n , 
a n d  Sym m etr ic  O v e r -D e t e r m in a t io n
As a final proving ground for my extension of Pearl's account of actual 
and contributory causation I briefly demonstrate that it does not fare 
worse than Hitchcock's original account in dealing with the three major 
problems of Lewis's classic counterfactual account: the intransitivity of 
causation, cases of preemption, and cases of symmetric over­
determination.
Application of (EP AC) to a Classic Example 
Featuring Intransitivity
Let me start with the intransitivity of actual causation. Admittedly, I do 
not have a formal proof that my account does not fare worse than 
Hitchcock's regarding this problem. However, observe that in order to 
motivate the superiority of his own account of actual causation over 
Lewis's classic counterfactual account Hitchcock himself settled for two 
things: The first was a remark that his account of actual causation did not 
stipulate transitivity. The second was a discussion of two examples, which 
illustrated a failure of composition of actual causation, together with the 
demonstration that their analysis by his account delivered a verdict in 
accord with our causal intuition.
In the same spirit, let me first remark that my extension of Pearl's account 
apparently nowhere stipulates or assumes transitivity of actual causation. 
Second, let me demonstrate that an application of my extension of Pearl's 
account of actual causation to Hitchcock featured two examples delivers
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analogous verdicts as Hitchcock's own account. These two examples of 
Hitchcock's shared a common structure; in essence they just contained 
three events c, d, and e such that c was an actual cause of d in our 
understanding, d an actual cause of e, but c failed to be an actual cause of e 
in our intuition. I settle for a discussion of Hitchcock's favored example 
'Boulder' here because the analysis of his other example 'Dog Bite' 
proceeds in exactly the same way.135
The graphical representation of the 'Boulder' example was:
D
B ----------------------------- *’ S
™ f j j /- f0 ’ i f B  = l a n d D  = 0The functions were j d  =  idB and fs= <  , so that the
[1, otherwise
model state B = 1 yielded the actual solution D = 1 and S = 1.
In Hitchcock's analysis, route (B,D) was active, and the same applied to 
route (D,S), given the actual state of the model with B = 1. However, 
neither of the routes (B,S) and (B,D,S) were active, since an intervention on 
B setting B = 0 does not alter the value of S, no matter whether D is frozen 
at its actual value D = 1 or not. According to (H AC), with this B = 1 was an 
actual cause of D = 1, D = 1 was an actual cause of S = 1, but B = 1 was not 
an actual cause of D = 1, thus showing a failure of composition.
According to my extended definition of a causal beam (EP CB), there is 
only one admissible choice of sustaining sets, namely S d  =  {B} with S d  = 0  
and Ss = {B, D} with Ss = 0 . Hence, there is only one natural beam to 
consider, and this beam is identical to the original model with the original 
functions fo  and/s as projection f u n c t i o n s a n d / ^ s .  Obviously, in this 
beam an intervention on variable B setting B = 0 changes the value of 
variable D to D = 0, so that according to definition (EP AC) B = 1 is an 
extended actual cause of D = 1. Analogously, an intervention on variable D
135 For Hitchcock's original example 'Dog Bite' cf. [cH 01], pp. 290-295.
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setting D = 0 changes the value of variable S to S = 0, so that also D = 1 is 
an extended actual cause of S = 1. However, an intervention on variable B 
setting B = 0 does not affect the value of variable S, so that B = 1 is not an 
extended actual cause of D = 1.
With this, an application of my account reaches exactly the same verdict as 
an application of Hitchcock's account to this example, showing that my 
extended actual causation as defined by (EP AC) is not a transitive relation 
either in general.
Application of (EP AC) to a Classic Example 
Featuring Preemption
Second, let me discuss preemption. Again, I do not give a formal proof 
that my account of actual causation does not fare worse than Hitchcock's 
own regarding this problem. Instead I settle again for demonstrating that 
an application of my account to Hitchcock's featured examples delivers 
the same verdicts as his own account.
This time, Hitchcock only discusses one example in detail that contains a
cause preempting another one, and that is his example 'Backup'.136 The.
causal model for the example 'Backup' was given by the functions fs= sigT.
with sigv = 1, if Y = 0 and sigv = 1, if Y * 0, for an arbitrary variable Y, and
, , fO, if T = 0andS = 0 _  , , , , , ,
by r* = i • model state T = 1 yielded the actual
[1, otherwise
solution S = 0 and V = 1, and the graphical representation was:
An application of Hitchcock's account showed that route (T, V) is active, 
since by freezing S at its actual value S = 0, an intervention on T setting
136 Cf. [cH 01], pp. 287-288.
S
T
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T = 0 changes the value of V. In this way, Hitchcock could analyze this 
example correctly according to our intuition ruling that T = 1 is an actual 
cause of V  = 1, despite preempting S = 1 that would otherwise bring about 
V  = 1 itself.
An application of my extended version of Pearls account of actual 
causation proceeds in the following way: According to (EP CB), there are 
two admissible choices of sustaining sets, namely Ss = {T} with Ss = 0  for 
variable S, and Sv = {T, S} with Sv = 0 , or Sv = (T) with Sv = {S} for variable 
V, so that there are two natural beams to consider.137 
Consider the beam with sustaining sets Ss = {T}, Ss = 0 , and Sv = {T}, 
Sv = {S}. Its projection functions a re /B=1s= sigT =/s, and 
fO, if T = 0
f^v  = < , since variable S is frozen at its actual value S = 0.
J [1, if T = 1
Clearly, in this beam an intervention on variable T setting T  = 0 changes 
the value of variable V  to V  = 0. According to my definition (EP AC), T = 1 
is thus an extended actual cause of V= 1.
As a result, the analysis of this example by my extended version of Pearl's 
account gives the same result as an application of Hitchcock's account.
Application of (EP CC) to a Classic Example 
Featuring Symmetric Over-Determination
Let me lastly discuss the problem of symmetric over-determination. Here, 
Hitchcock himself does not really discuss an example in detail that 
contains an effect being caused in a parallel way by more than one 
cause.138 Instead, let me conclude this chapter with the discussion of 
Lewis's classic example 'Firing Squad'.
137 The choice of Sv = {S} with Sv = {T} for the sustaining set of variable V  is not admissible, 
since variable T is contained in the sustaining set Ss of variable S.
138 As already mentioned, Hitchcock's main concern in [cH 01] is to show the 
intransitivity of actual causation.
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The causal model for this example was given by the graph
with the structural equations C = U , B = C ,A  = C and D = max{v4,B}, and 
the actual state 11 = 1, yielding the solution C = 1, A  = 1, B = 1, and in turn 
D = 1. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, Lewis's account 
could not answer the question whether the shooting of rifleman B, 
formalized by B = 1 is a contributory cause of the death of the prisoner, 
formalized by D = 1, which is why he tried to find a way out by 
proclaiming that he had no intuition in this case.
I have shown, though, that Hitchcock's account could analyze this 
example successfully, with the upshot that B = 1 is not an actual cause of 
D = 1, but that route (B, D) is weakly active. In this way, the verdict of 
Hitchcock's account coincided with my intuition, which I consider to be 
the natural one, namely that the shooting by the rifleman is very well a 
contributory cause of the death of the prisoner.
For an application of my extended Pearl account of actual and 
contributory causation, respectively, observe that according to definition 
(EP CB) we have the following choice of sustaining sets: Sc = {U} with 
S c  =  0  for variable C, S a  = {C} with S a  =  0  for variable A, S b =  {C} with 
S b =  0  for variable B , and for variable D  S d  =  { A ,  B} with S d  =  0 , or S d  =  { A }  
with S d  = {B}, or S d  = {B} with S d  =  { A } .
Verify first that B = 1 is not an extended actual cause for D =1: Observe that 
the latter two choices of sustaining sets for variable D are not admissible 
for the construction of a natural beam, because the resulting projection 
function / ^ ’d would be constant at value / ^ d  = 1 and hence trivial. In the 
only remaining natural beam with sustaining set S d  =  {A, B} and S s  =  0 ,  the 
projection function / ^ d  for variable D is identical to the original function
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fo, so that an intervention on variable B setting B = 0 does not alter the 
value of variable D. With definition (EP AC), B = 1 is thus not an extended 
actual cause of D = 1.
Demonstrate now that B = 1 is an extended contributory cause of D = 1: 
Observe that for the construction of non-natural causal beams S d  = {Ajwith 
S d  =  {B}, and S d  =  {B} with S d  = {A} are admissible, namely by setting W d  = 
S d = {B} with B = 0 in the first case and W d  = S d  = {A} and A  = 0 in the 
second. In the resulting beam of the latter constellation, projection 
function / ^ d  has the form f J=1D = idB, so that an intervention on B setting 
B = 0 brings about D = 0. As a result, B = 1 is verified as a contributory 
cause of D = 1 according to definition (EP CC).
With this, my extended Pearl account analyzes this case of contributory 
causation successfully, too, by reaching the same verdict as an application 
of Hitchcock's account, and more importantly by agreeing with our 
intuition in this case.
Summarizing, with this I certainly have not proven that my extended 
version of Pearl's account does not fare worse than Hitchcock's account in 
dealing with the classic three problems of Lewis's counterfactual theory. 
However, in my view I have given strong evidence for the following 
claims:
First, that my account of actual causation should be able to analyze cases 
containing an intransitivity of actual causation at least as well as 
Hitchcock's account can. Second, that my account of actual causation 
should also be able to deal with cases of an asymmetric over­
determination of an effect by more than one cause, called preemption, at 
least as well as Hitchcock's account can. Third, that my account of 
contributory causation should be able to deal with cases of a symmetric 
over-determination of an effect by at least two causes working in a parallel 
way at least as well as Hitchcock's account can.
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S u m m a r y
hat has this thesis achieved? I have described Judea Pearl's
structural account of modeling token causation as presented in
his book Causality -  Models, Reasoning, and Inference as a milestone in 
causal modeling using counterfactual information. I have shown that there 
is evidence that this account of Pearl's, written from the perspective of an 
engineer, solves the classic three problems of Lewis's metaphysical 
counterfactual account of causation: Cases of symmetric and of 
asymmetric over-determination and the stipulation of the transitivity of 
causation. Moreover, I have argued for an understanding of Pearl's 
account of modeling token causation that splits the classic problem of 
analyzing causal relationships on the token level, with which Lewis dealt, 
into two sub-problems: first the generation of an appropriate model M  to 
formalize a given situation S, and second the definition of token causation 
relative to such a model M. I have maintained that relativizing the analysis 
of token causation to a given model M provides a way to handle the fact 
that there usually is a multitude of equally justified descriptions of any 
one situation S, depending on which events and which kinds of events in 
S are of interest for us.
The focus in this thesis has clearly been on the second sub-problem of 
causal modeling. My main observations concerning Pearl's account and 
the second sub-problem are the following: Pearl's basic idea is that for an 
event c to qualify as a token cause for another event e in an arbitrary 
situation S, described by a model M, event c has to be able to sustain event 
e against certain contingencies. I have maintained that this can be most 
easily understood with the aid of the leading idea that c sustains its effect e 
via a causal process that links cause c and effect e. More precisely, for Pearl
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if M := (U,V,F) in state U=u is a causal model formalizing the actual 
situation S with X=x formalizing event c and Y=y formalizing event e, then 
x  can be called an actual cause, or contributory cause respectively, of y  
according to M  in the state u if and only if x  sustains y  against certain 
structural contingencies in a natural beam M«, or in a non-natural causal 
beam M« respectively. With this, I have reached the insight that a causal 
process can be understood to be the concatenation of the projection 
functions / “ in a causal or natural beam Mu of exactly the variables V\ that 
are intermediate between the cause variable X and the effect variable Y. 
Moreover, I have drawn attention to the fact that values of exogenous 
variables U can neither be actual nor contributory causes for Pearl, mainly 
since he excludes these variables II from sustaining sets in the 
construction of both natural and causal beams Mu. For this reason, I have 
offered a natural extension of Pearl's account of actual and of contributory 
causation that allows interventions on exogenous variables. I have 
achieved this by slight modifications in Pearl's definitions of a causal and 
a natural beam, and of actual and contributory causation, by which a 
uniform treatment of exogenous and endogenous variables in constructing 
sustaining sets is facilitated. Finally, I have argued that Pearl's distinction 
between two mutually disjoint kinds of token causation -  actual and 
contributory causation -  is unnecessary, and I have offered a trivial 
unified definition of token causation that contains actual causation as a 
special case, although I have regarded this issue to be mainly a 
terminological problem
Concerning the first sub-problem of modeling token causation, with 
which I have only marginally dealt in this thesis, and Pearl's account, I 
have mainly made the following observations: Pearl does not directly deal 
with the problem of generating models M  for a given situation S. His main 
concern is to generate causal models geared to analyzing causal 
relationships on the type level. Pearl's algorithm of inductive causation
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starts out with a joint probability distribution P extending over a set UuV 
and a definition of conditional probabilistic independence and generates 
an equivalence class of basic causal structures D. In this way, the result of 
Pearl's model generating procedure is not a complete causal model M 
with a set of deterministic functions F, but instead, the result is the 
equivalence class of basic causal structures D that are in essence just the 
set of variables UuV together with a relation describing parenthood 
between these variables.
I have drawn the obvious conclusion that in the application of Pearl's 
definitions of actual or contributory causation, the causal model M  out of 
which the beams M« are constructed is strongly underdetermined, because 
the set of functions F determining the values of the variables in V has to be 
stipulated. I have interpreted this result as being compatible with the 
differentiation of causal analysis into two sub-problems: In the first step, 
probability distributions allow the extraction of causal patterns out of 
them ending up with a multitude of basic causal structures. In the second 
step, these basic causal structures can serve as blueprints for a complete 
causal model, relative to which token causation is defined.
Throughout this thesis, I have argued for an understanding of Hitchcock's 
and Woodward's work in 'The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in 
Equations and Graphs' and in Making Things Happen as being an attempt 
by philosophers to give a formally less complicated modeling account of 
token causation that captures the leading idea of Pearl's account: A cause c 
and an effect e in a situation S are linked by a causal process that is a 
concatenation of mechanisms at work in S. I have given an elaborate 
corrective reconstruction of Hitchcock's account and have briefly touched 
on Woodward's account, which essentially takes over Hitchcock's 
definitions with a slightly changed terminology.
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I have employed these accounts of Hitchcock and Woodward as a graphic 
introduction to Pearl's account, since the same notions of a causal model 
and of a causal process are defined in a formally more accessible way. 
In particular, I have motivated that Hitchcock and Woodward formalize a 
causal process between events c and e in a situation S by an active route, or 
a weakly active route respectively, in a causal model M between the 
variables X and Z whose actual values x and z formalize these events c 
and e. The only point in which my corrective reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
and Woodward's accounts has deviated from their originals has been in 
relativizing my reconstructed definitions of token causation in a situation 
S to a given model M.
Concerning the problem of generating a causal model M to appropriately 
formalize a given situation S, I have tried to organize Hitchcock's 
fragmentary remarks in a coherent sketch that has consisted of two steps: 
First the extraction of variables in situation S, and second the 
establishment of counterfactual dependencies between these variables 
and construction of the structural equations E. From this sketch I have 
drawn the conclusion that Hitchcock's structural equations are in essence 
another notation for exactly the counterfactual information that we put 
into the analysis of a situation S. Moreover, I have briefly motivated that 
Hitchcock's attempt to conceptually reduce token causation to ENF- 
counterfactuals fails, since the causal notion of a surgical intervention has 
to enter in the definition of an active route.
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Finally, concerning the core question whether Hitchcock and Woodward 
succeed in giving a simplification of Pearl's modeling account of singular 
event causation, I have reached the result that they do not. I have 
motivated this result by constructing four paradigmatic examples to 
which I have applied my modeling reconstruction of Hitchcock's 
definitions of actual and contributory causation, my extension of Pearl's 
corresponding definitions that allow exogenous variables to be causes, 
and finally my modeling reconstruction of W oodward's definition of 
token causation.
Two of these examples have been geared to compare my modeling 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of actual causation with my 
extension of Pearl's definition of actual causation allowing exogenous 
variables to be causes. For both examples, the verdicts that an analysis 
with my extension of Pearl's account has delivered have been in accord 
with what I take to be our causal intuitions, whereas the application of my 
reconstruction of Hitchcock's account has delivered results contradicting 
these intuitions in both cases.
The other two examples have been canonical extensions of the former, 
designed to compare my reconstruction of Hitchcock's definition of 
contributory causation with my extension of Pearl's definition of 
contributory causation. Again, for both examples, the verdicts that an 
analysis with my extension of Pearl's account has delivered have been in 
accord with what I take to be our causal intuitions. And the results that an 
application of my reconstruction of Hitchcock's account has delivered 
have still contradicted these intuitions in one of these cases.
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An application of my modeling reconstruction of W oodward's inclusive 
account of token causation to these four examples has shown that 
W oodward's inclusive understanding of token causation has an advantage 
over Hitchcock's separated notions of actual and contributory causation. 
For, my modeling reconstruction of Woodward's account has analyzed 
two of my examples in a way that has been in accord with our causal 
intuition. Nevertheless, it has still failed in the analysis of the other two 
examples, where it has delivered results that have contradicted our 
intuition.
From the discussion of these four examples I have concluded that 
Hitchcock's and W oodward's project of simplifying Pearl's account fails 
because of their underlying rationale that identifies a causal process 
linking a cause and its effect with a route in a causal model. I have argued 
that this formalization of a process is too simplistic, lastly because it does 
not incorporate Pearl's notion of sustenance.
Finally, I have briefly dealt with Hitchcock's revocation of his account of 
token causation that he makes in a footnote in his later article 'A Tale of 
Two Effects'. This article implicitly features two new notions of 
component and net causation, and I have offered formalizations of token 
level reductions of these notions. Moreover, I have argued that these token 
level reductions cannot replace the basic notion of actual causation, so that 
I have unified them to a definition of merged actual causation. However, 
even this artificially reconstructed definition has failed in the analysis of 
one of my examples.
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